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Abstract 
This thesis explores what I call the functional question: what is the functional role 
of phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness)? Over the last thirty years or so, 
philosophers (and non-philosophers) have been occupied with trying to provide an 
account of p-consciousness in scientifically acceptable terms. One question that 
has not received as much attention, however, is the question of what p-
consciousness contributes to the functioning of the mind. This question is 
important, for we tend to think that p-consciousness must contribute something 
to our mental economy. How might we attempt to address it? The strategy that I 
adopt in this thesis is to look at some important accounts of the functional role of 
p-consciousness, and see whether they offer a promising answer to the functional 
question. The accounts that I consider in this thesis satisfy an important 
requirement: they both endorse Ned Block’s distinction between p-consciousness 
and access consciousness (a-consciousness). Even though we still lack a satisfactory 
account of the former, the distinction has allowed us to make significant progress 
in explaining the latter. Today, several researchers from different fields agree that 
the Global Workspace Model provides an empirically-grounded, and theoretically-
satisfying picture of a-consciousness. So, which are the accounts of the functional 
role of p-consciousness that I have in mind? Uriah Kriegel’s, and Block’s very own. 
According to both accounts, p-consciousness figures, somehow, in the causal 
explanation of a-consciousness. Unfortunately, as I will argue, both accounts fail to 
provide a tenable answer to the functional question. While Kriegel’s account is 
incompatible with certain empirical results, Block’s ends up providing the 
functional role of a property other than p-consciousness. In fact, Block’s account 
may even rest on a misunderstanding of the functional question. I conclude that 
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Kriegel’s and Block’s are not the accounts that we should look at for a promising 
answer to the functional question. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Some mental states are phenomenally conscious (p-conscious). To use Thomas 
Nagel’s (1974) famous phrase, there is something it is like for one to be in them. As 
I sit at my desk, there is something it is like for me to see the words that I am typing 
on the screen, to smell the coffee that’s coming out of my new moka pot, and to 
hear the sound of the carpenter’s shop just outside. A question that has kept many 
philosophers (and non-philosophers) occupied over the last thirty years or so is 
how to account for p-consciousness in naturalistic terms; that is, roughly, in 
scientifically adequate terms (Carruthers 2002, xiii). In this context, one topic that 
has not received the extensive treatment that it deserves is the functional role of p-
consciousness. To a first approximation, we may understand the phrase ‘the 
functional role of phenomenal consciousness’ as referring to what p-consciousness 
does. To a second approximation, we may understand the same phrase as referring 
to what p-consciousness contributes to the functioning of the mind. 
The main topic of this thesis is exactly the functional role of p-
consciousness. More precisely, on the quite plausible assumption that p-
consciousness has a functional role at all, the question that I seek to explore is what 
that functional role is; for the purposes of this introduction, call that the functional 
question. The issue is huge and extremely complex. This probably explains – at least 
in part – why it has not received the extensive treatment that it deserves. I will 
further develop and, more importantly, assess two important accounts that purport 
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to answer the functional question. Which accounts are the ones that I have in mind, 
we will see in a few paragraphs. 
There is one main reason why exploring the functional question is 
important. For we tend to think that p-consciousness must make a contribution to 
the functioning of the mind, or, equally, that it must play some role in our mental 
economy. Indeed, p-consciousness is such a central feature of our mental lives that 
it would be very surprising – let alone counterintuitive – if it did not have a 
functional role. As a consequence, on the assumption that the ultimate aim of the 
study of p-consciousness is to provide a comprehensive, naturalistic account of the 
phenomenon, such a study can hardly ignore the question of what the functional 
role of p-consciousness is. 
(One note. For the purposes of this work, I assume a rough distinction 
between accounts of p-consciousness – which sometimes I will also refer to as 
accounts of what p-consciousness is – and accounts of the functional role of p-
consciousness – which sometimes I will also refer to as accounts of what p-
consciousness does.1 According to what I said in the paragraph immediately above, 
however, the two are best seen as different – albeit tightly-related – parts of an 
overall, comprehensive account of p-consciousness). 
There are at least two potential strategies that one might adopt to address 
the functional question. To start with, one might first defend – or assume – a 
specific account of p-consciousness, and then address the functional question by 
developing an account of the functional role of p-consciousness against the 
background of the former. Alternatively, one might look at the different accounts 
of the functional role of p-consciousness on offer, and then attempt to understand 
                                                          
1 In talking of accounts of what p-consciousness is and accounts of what p-
consciousness does, I am following Uriah Kriegel (2004b).  
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which account – if any – provides a satisfactory answer to the functional question.2 
The strategy that I adopt in this work is the latter.  
For present purposes, one issue that I need to deal with right from the start 
is the following. For obvious reasons, considering all the accounts of the functional 
role of p-consciousness on offer is not something that can be done in one thesis. 
As a consequence, I have no choice but to find one or more criteria on the basis of 
which I can pick out some accounts to consider. There is one specific criterion that 
I have treated as crucial: the accounts that we should take into consideration will 
have to respect Ned Block’s distinction between p-consciousness and access 
consciousness (a-consciousness). What is a-consciousness? To a first 
approximation, a mental state is said by Block to be a-conscious if it can be used in 
reasoning, report, and the (rational) control of action (1995, 382). For example, my 
perceptual experience as of a glass of water on the table is said by Block to be a-
conscious if I can use that experience in my reasoning about whether I should be 
drinking from it or not.   
Of course, now I need to say something about why the distinction between 
p-consciousness and a-consciousness is so important. The idea is that although 
there is still no agreement as to what a promising account of p-consciousness 
should look like, that distinction has allowed researchers working in the broad 
discipline of Consciousness Studies to make some genuine progress. In particular, 
it has enabled researchers from fields as different as philosophy, psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience, to develop a shared, empirically-grounded, and 
                                                          
2 Perhaps there is also a third strategy. In the Oxford Companion to Consciousness entry 
on “Functions of Consciousness”, Tim Bayne seems to suggest that addressing the 
functional question might help us develop an account of what p-consciousness is (2009, 
315).2 His suggestion appears to imply that one might be able to handle the functional 
question without providing, or endorsing, an underlying account of the nature of p-
consciousness. Personally, I am not so sure how – or even whether – this strategy could be 
pursued, however. Indeed, I know of no one who has pursued it. 
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theoretically-satisfying model of a-consciousness: the Global Workspace Model 
(GWM) (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dennett 2001; Carruthers 2015a).  
Of all the accounts of the functional role of p-consciousness available, which 
are the accounts that presuppose Block’s distinction? Two main accounts come to 
mind: Uriah Kriegel’s (2007, 2009, 2015), and Block’s (e.g., 1995, 2009) very own. 
According to both accounts, p-consciousness figures, somehow, in the causal 
explanation of a-consciousness. That is, p-consciousness is somehow involved in 
making a mental state usable in reasoning, report, etc. Roughly, on Kriegel’s 
account, p-consciousness is that property in virtue of which a mental state is a-
conscious. On Block’s account, p-consciousness is that property that contributes – 
in a way to be duly explained – to a mental state’s becoming a-conscious.  
How do Kriegel’s and Block’s account fare? Alas, as I will argue, neither 
account provides a promising answer to the functional question. In a nutshell, 
there are two main issues with Kriegel’s account. First it is incompatible with 
GWM. Second, given certain empirical results, the account entails a view of the 
relation between a-consciousness and attention that is highly implausible. Block’s 
account, too, is affected by two main problems. First, it misidentifies the functional 
role of p-consciousness. Second, even though he sells it as an account of the 
functional role of p-consciousness, it may not be an account of the functional role 
of p-consciousness at all.  
Here is a chapter-by-chapter outline of the thesis: 
Chapter 1 is divided in three parts. In the first part, I rehearse a number of 
familiar distinctions between kinds of consciousness (simpliciter); e.g., creature 
consciousness vs state consciousness, and transitive consciousness vs intransitive 
consciousness. In the second part, I briefly close in on the very notion of p-
consciousness. The biggest chunk of the chapter is the third, where my main aim 
is to provide a rigorous definition of the phrase ‘the functional role of p-
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consciousness’, a definition that I will work with throughout the remainder of the 
thesis.  
In chapter 2, as in chapter 1, I do three things. First, I zoom in on Block’s 
distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness, and clarify my 
commitments to the distinction. Second, I offer a first pass at GWM and its relation 
with a-consciousness. GWM is the model of a-consciousness that Block endorses 
and that, because of the impressive amount of evidence in its support, I, too, 
assume throughout the thesis. Last, I look at some empirical studies on the 
relationship between a-consciousness and attention, and argue, together with the 
advocates of GWM, that attention is necessary for a-consciousness.  
Chapter 3 considers, and assesses, Kriegel’s account of the functional role of 
p-consciousness. In the first part of the chapter, I outline Kriegel’s self-
representationalist theory of p-consciousness. This is a necessary step to appreciate 
his answer to the functional question, which he offers against the background of 
that very theory. In the second part of the chapter, I introduce Kriegel’s account of 
the functional role of p-consciousness, and argue that it is untenable. As 
anticipated, Kriegel argues that a mental state’s being p-conscious is that property 
in virtue of which the state is also a-conscious. In turn, this allows him to construe 
a-consciousness as the functional role of p-consciousness. As I also anticipated, I 
believe that Kriegel’s account is untenable for two reasons. First, it is incompatible 
with GWM. Being GWM a well-established model of a-consciousness, this gives us 
reason to reject the account. Second, the account entails a view of the relationship 
between a-consciousness and attention that, given the results of some of the 
studies discussed in chapter 2, is empirically implausible. 
In chapter 4, I come back to Block’s distinction. In the first part of the 
chapter, I discuss his most recent view on how, exactly, p-consciousness relates to 
a-consciousness (e.g., 2007a; 2008). This allows me to introduce a number of 
notions that I will then put to work in chapter 5, where I will deal with Block’s 
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account of the functional role of p-consciousness. In the second part of the chapter, 
I defend Block’s most recent view on the relation between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness from a criticism advanced by Peter Carruthers (2015b). Carruthers’s 
criticism threatens to show that Block’s view is affected by serious issues that would 
clearly make it untenable independently of its potential as an account of the 
functional role of p-consciousness. By removing these potentially devastating 
obstacles to Block’s view, my response to Carruthers will allow me to focus precisely 
upon its relevance for the functional question that is this thesis’s main concern. 
In chapter 5, which is also the last, I consider, and assess, Block’s account of 
the functional role of p-consciousness. As we will see, Block has addressed the 
functional question on several occasions, but his position suffers from some 
important unclarities. A large part of my job in this chapter, then, consists in 
refining Block’s ideas in important ways, and using many of the notions introduced 
in chapter 4 to develop his proposals to a significant degree. As noted, Block’s view 
is that p-consciousness contributes to a mental state’s becoming a-conscious. With 
my development of Block’s account in place, however, I then argue for two claims. 
The first is that Block provides an account of the functional role of a property other 
than p-consciousness. The second is that that account may even rest on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the functional question.  
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1  
 
Setting the Stage 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I do three main things. First, I rehearse a number of familiar 
distinctions between kinds of consciousness. In particular, I distinguish between 
creature and state consciousness, transitive and intransitive consciousness, look at 
some of the relations between them, and characterize p-consciousness as a kind of 
state consciousness. All that, I do in §2. Second, I briefly close in on the notion of 
p-consciousness. As usual, I characterize p-consciousness in terms of the notion of 
what it is like for one, and provide some examples of p-conscious states. This, I do 
in §3. The other major aim of this chapter is to provide a clear definition of the 
notion of functional role of p-consciousness. I argue that, in a way to be duly 
explained, that notion may be defined as follows: the fund of appropriate 
dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows a mental state with. The task 
of defining the notion of functional role of p-consciousness, I undertake in §4, 
which is the largest section of the chapter.  
2. Kinds of Consciousness 
The phrase ‘is conscious’ has various meanings, and is also applied to different sorts 
of things (Kriegel 2009; Van Gulick 2009). The complex usage of ‘is conscious’ is 
apparent in everyday language, but is arguably even more apparent in philosophy 
                Chapter1 
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of mind/psychology. When the doctor says of the patient that he is still conscious, 
she plausibly means that the patient is still awake. Moreover, the doctor attributes 
the property of being conscious to a whole creature, namely, the patient. When 
philosophers say that some mental states are p-conscious, they mean that there is 
something it is like for a creature to be in them. Moreover, they attribute the 
property of being conscious to the creature itself, not the creature’s mental states. 
This leads us to the distinction between two concepts of consciousness (and the 
properties they putatively pick out): creature consciousness vs state consciousness. 
In this section, I elaborate upon this and a further distinction: that between 
transitive consciousness vs intransitive consciousness. Both distinctions are due to 
David Rosenthal (e.g., 1986, 1997), but have been further developed since. Here’s 
how I will proceed. First, I introduce the concept of creature consciousness, and 
provide some examples of the different ways in which a creature may be said to be 
conscious. Second, I introduce the distinction between transitive and intransitive 
consciousness as it applies to creature consciousness. I then introduce the concept 
of state consciousness, provide some examples of the different ways in which a 
mental state may be said to be conscious, and explain how the distinction between 
transitive and intransitive applies to state consciousness. 
Let us begin, then, with the concept of creature consciousness. Creature 
consciousness is consciousness as pertains to creatures; e.g., humans and other 
animals. In saying that Suzy is conscious, I am saying of a human, Suzy, that she is 
conscious. Analogously, in saying that my cousin’s dog, Heiwin, is conscious, I am 
saying of a dog, Heiwin, that she is conscious. There is more than one sense in 
which a creature may be said to be conscious (Van Gulick 2009). Below, I 
distinguish three. 
In everyday life, when one attributes consciousness to a whole creature, 
what one has sometimes in mind is wakefulness. That is, the phrase ‘is conscious’ 
is construed as a rough synonym of ‘is awake’. Plausibly, as noted, this is how the 
Chapter 1 
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doctor uses the phrase ‘is conscious’ when she says of the patient that he was still 
conscious after the accident, or that he has just regained consciousness. On this 
understanding of creature consciousness, a creature can be in different states of 
alertness, which vary in how responsive the creature is to its environment (Van 
Gulick 2009, 163). It is only when it is in a high state of alertness – that is, awake, 
as opposed to being asleep or in a coma, for example – that the creature counts as 
conscious. In the literature, this specific notion of creature consciousness was 
isolated by Rosenthal (1997).3 
A second sense in which a creature is sometimes said to be conscious is if it 
is “perceiving such-and-such” (Carruthers 2002, 10). On this construal, the phrase 
‘is conscious’ is treated as a rough synonym of ‘is perceiving’. This is how we 
understand creature consciousness when we say that Suzy is conscious of the book 
on her desk, or that my cousin’s dog, Heiwin, is conscious of her bone on the mat. 
A third, possibly less common, sense in which a creature may be said to be 
conscious is if it is self-conscious. Carruthers (2002) distinguishes between a weaker 
and a stronger variety of self-consciousness. For a creature to be self-conscious in 
the weak sense is for it to (be able to) be self-aware of itself “as an object distinct 
from others” (Ibid., 12). According to Carruthers, this variety of self-consciousness 
is not too demanding in terms of the creature’s conceptual capacities. That is, 
roughly, it does not require that the creature possess and be able to deploy a 
large/complex conceptual repertoire. Accordingly, many animals can probably be 
said to be conscious in this sense. On the other hand, for a creature to be self-
conscious in the strong sense is for it to (be able to) be self-aware of itself “as a self, 
as a being with mental states and a subjective inner life” (Ibid.). Unlike the weaker 
                                                          
3 It is debatable whether, on the present understanding of creature consciousness, 
wakefulness really is a necessary condition for consciousness. While this is the position 
espoused by Rosenthal (1997), Carruthers (2002, 9) aptly points out that whether 
wakefulness really is necessary for consciousness depends on whether we wish to say that 
creatures are conscious when dreaming –this, however, is far from being uncontroversial.  
                Chapter1 
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variety, this variety of self-consciousness is conceptually very demanding, and is 
probably possessed by humans and (possibly) great apes only (Ibid.).4  
Creature consciousness can be transitive or intransitive. Consider the 
following two reports: (i) ‘Suzy is conscious of the noise’; (ii) ‘Suzy is conscious’. (i) 
says of a creature, Suzy, that she is conscious of something, namely, the noise. This 
is the transitive sense. (ii), instead, says of a creature, Suzy, that she is conscious 
simpliciter. This is the intransitive sense. Transitive creature consciousness is 
always consciousness “directed at an object” (Van Gulick 2009, 737). Intransitive 
creature consciousness, instead, is consciousness simpliciter. While (i) attributes 
to Suzy a relational property (Kriegel 2009, 25) – the property of standing in a 
consciousness-of relation to something5 – (ii) attributes to Suzy a non-relational 
property – the property of being conscious simpliciter (Ibid.).  
How does the transitive/intransitive distinction apply to the varieties of 
creature consciousness considered above? The first is of the intransitive kind, while 
the second and the third are of the transitive kind. To say of Suzy that she is 
conscious in the sense of being awake is to attribute to Suzy a non-relational 
property. To say of Suzy that she is conscious in the sense that she is perceiving 
such-and-such, instead, is to attribute to Suzy a relational property, namely, the 
property of being conscious of such-and-such. The same considerations that apply 
to creature consciousness as perception of such-and-such apply to creature 
                                                          
4 The reader should bear in mind that not everyone understands self-consciousness 
exactly in those terms. 
5 The term ‘relational’ here might suggest that the item of which Suzy is conscious has 
to exist. This is not what I – and Kriegel – have in mind when using that term, however. 
For the transitive sense of ‘conscious’ is meant to apply also in cases in which, for example, 
Suzy hallucinates something. When I say that the report ‘Suzy is conscious of the noise’ 
attributes to Suzy a relational property, then, I mean the property of standing in a 
consciousness-of relation to an intensional object. Intensional objects may or may not 
exist. In this sense, the object picked out by ‘O’ in reports like ‘Suzy is conscious of O’ is 
like the object picked out by ‘O’ in reports like ‘Suzy believes that O is beautiful’: Both 
objects need not exist. Analogous considerations apply below, when I discuss transitive 
state consciousness. 
Chapter 1 
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consciousness as self-consciousness. To say of Suzy that she is conscious in the 
sense of being self-conscious is to attribute to Suzy a relational property, namely, 
the property of being aware of herself “as a being with mental states and a 
subjective inner life”  (Carruthers 2002, 12). 
Now for state consciousness. While creature consciousness is consciousness 
as pertains to whole creatures, state consciousness is consciousness as pertains to 
a creature’s mental states. In saying that Suzy’s experience is conscious, I am 
attributing the property of being conscious not to a whole creature, but to one of 
its mental states. The most discussed – as well as the most mysterious – variety of 
state consciousness is p-consciousness. As anticipated, a mental state is said to be 
p-conscious if there is something it is like for one to be in it. A second variety of 
state consciousness is access consciousness (a-consciousness). As noted, a mental 
state is said to be a-conscious if its content is available for report, deliberation, 
reasoning, etc.   
Like creature consciousness, state consciousness can be transitive or 
intransitive. When, as above, I say that Suzy’s experience is conscious, I say of a 
mental state of Suzy’s that it is conscious simpliciter. In so doing, I take 
consciousness to be a non-relational property of Suzy’s mental state. On the other 
hand, when I say that ‘Suzy’s experience is conscious of the cup’, I say of a mental 
state of Suzy’s that it is conscious of something. In so doing, I take consciousness 
to be a relational property of Suzy’s mental state. As should be apparent, ordinary 
language struggles to express transitive state consciousness. Indeed, reports of the 
form ‘S’s mental state is conscious of O’ are nonsensical (Kriegel 2009, 27). But that 
does not mean that transitive state consciousness is conceptually problematic. One 
way to express the concept of transitive state consciousness in ordinary language 
may be by characterizing transitive state consciousness as “the property mental 
states exhibit when, and only when, their subjects are transitively conscious of 
something in virtue of being in them” (Ibid.). The idea is that a mental state’s being 
                Chapter1 
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transitively conscious is the property that accounts for a creature’s being 
transitively conscious. It is in virtue of the fact that Suzy’s experience of the cup is 
transitively (state) conscious that Suzy is transitively (creature) conscious of the 
cup.  
How does the transitive/intransitive distinction apply to p-consciousness 
and a-consciousness? As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, a-conscious 
states are essentially representational (Block 1995). This entails, among other 
things, that a-conscious states are essentially transitive states. To say of a mental 
state that it is conscious in the sense of being a-conscious is thus to attribute to the 
state a relational property. But what about p-consciousness? Things are a little bit 
more complex here. Everyone seems to agree that p-consciousness is essentially 
intransitive. As I will explain in the next chapter, however, Ned Block (Ibid.) thinks 
that p-consciousness is often also transitive. Differently put, although it is not of 
the essence of p-consciousness to be directed at an object, he thinks that many p-
conscious states are also so directed. 
Before moving on to the next section, there is one worry that I would like to 
address: Why does p-consciousness only figure on my list of the varieties of state 
consciousness? I think few philosophers, if any, would deny that a creature can be 
said to be p-conscious. More strongly, few philosophers, if any, would deny that at 
least some creatures are p-conscious. In contemporary philosophy of mind, 
however, phenomenal creature consciousness (PCC) is seldom discussed. Better, 
insofar as philosophical accounts of p-consciousness are concerned, philosophers 
have consistently been focusing on phenomenal state consciousness (PSC). But 
why? 
It is noteworthy that most of the time it is simply assumed that to enquire 
about p-consciousness is to enquire about PSC, or that at least it is more convenient 
to do so by enquiring about PSC. But even from those who do offer an explanation 
for focusing on PSC, it is hard to find answer to our question. According to Jesse 
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Prinz (2013), for example, a creature’s mental state’s being p-conscious at a time T 
is sufficient for that creature’s being p-conscious at T. This supposedly justifies the 
focus on the latter. According to Kriegel (2004a, 2009), on the other hand, a 
creature’s mental state’s being p-conscious at a time T is necessary for that 
creature’s being p-conscious at T. Thus, in his view, PCC can be said to depend on 
PSC. This, Kriegel takes to be the reason why philosophers have normally focused 
on PSC.6 
As far as I am concerned, I do not need to take a stance on this issue. Thus, 
given the typical focus on PSC, I will put talk of PCC aside, if only to avoid confusing 
the reader. Nothing substantial hinges upon this choice. 
3. Closing in on the Notion of Phenomenal Consciousness 
In this section, I briefly close in on notion of p-consciousness. The locus classicus 
for characterizing (or attempting to characterize) p-consciousness is Thomas 
Nagel’s (1974) What Is It Like to Be a Bat? There, Nagel characterizes p-
consciousness (or conscious experience, as he calls it) in terms of what it is like for 
an organism (or for one). There is something it is like for one to hear the sound of 
a trumpet, to see the Colosseum, and, more generally, to be in certain mental states. 
Following standard practice, in the remainder of this section, I provide some 
examples of p-conscious states.  
One uncontroversial place to start (if not the obvious place to start) is p-
conscious perceptual states. As I sit at my desk, there is something it is like for me 
to see my laptop screen slowly being filled with words, to see a glass full of water 
to my left, and my iPad to my right. But there is also something it is like for me to 
chew a square of my 90% cocoa chocolate bar, to hear the noise coming from the 
                                                          
6 In fact, some philosophers have recently started to put the focus on PSC into serious 
question (e.g., Piccinini 2007). 
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carpenter’s shop just outside, and to smell the coffee that my dad is brewing in the 
kitchen. 
Another paradigmatic example of p-conscious experience is pain. There is, 
as we all know too well, something it is like for one to be in pain. Pain experiences 
might range from light pricks to severe burns, or from stabbing pains in the bottom 
of one’s feet, to intense pains in one’s chest (D. J. Chalmers 1996, 9). 
Other uncontroversial examples of p-conscious states are quasi-perceptual 
states, like visual images – as when you visually imagine a white rabbit hopping in 
the grass – and auditorily imaginings (not sure that’s the right term?) – as when 
you auditorily imagine Bach’s Sonata no 5. The list could go on, of course. But what 
I have said should suffice to give the reader an idea of the variety of states p-
consciousness attaches to.  
Before turning to the next section, I should note that, given the 
philosophical (as well as scientific) literature’s almost exclusive focus on p-
consciousness as pertains to visual perceptual states, that is the kind of states that 
I will focus on in this work.   
4. Getting Clearer on the Notion of Functional Role of Phenomenal 
Consciousness 
What exactly is the meaning of the phrase ‘the functional role of p-consciousness’? 
This is the question that I aim to address in the remainder of this chapter. When 
philosophers ask about the functional role of p-consciousness, they are normally 
interested in one of two things: What is the causal contribution that p-
consciousness makes to the functioning of the mind? Or, what was p-
consciousness “engineered” by evolution to do – that is, what was it selected for? 
When one asks the former question, one understands the notion of functional role 
in terms of the notion of causal role (Polger 2004, chap. 5; Piccinini 2010). When 
Chapter 1 
 
31 
 
one asks the latter question, one understands the notion of functional role in terms 
of the notion of teleological function (Ibid.). 
On the former understanding of the notion of functional role, for a thing X 
to have a functional role is for X to have a causal role. Tentatively, for X to have a 
causal role, in turn, is for X to be apt to enter into certain causal relations that 
explain (or contribute to explain) the functioning of the system X belongs to. For a 
certain gear G to have a causal role is for it to be apt to enter into certain causal 
relations that explain, for example, how the watch G belongs to works (Polger 2004, 
150). On the teleological function understanding of functional role, instead, for a 
thing X to have a functional role is for X to have a teleological function. Assuming 
that X is a biological trait of an organism, for X to have a teleological function, in 
turn, is for X to have one or more effects “that [explain] its presence […] due to 
evolution by natural selection” (Ibid., 166).7  
In this work, I am interested in the functional role of p-consciousness in the 
causal role sense of ‘functional role’. That is, I am interested in the question of what 
p-consciousness contributes to the functioning of the mind. For present purposes, I 
assume that ‘functioning’ stands for normal functioning. To ask what p-
consciousness contributes to the functioning of the mind is thus to ask what it 
contributes to its normal functioning. A watch may be said to function normally 
when it tells the (right) time. A carburettor may be said to function normally when 
it mixes air and fuel (in the right way). What does it mean for the mind to function 
normally? Things are a bit trickier here. For there seems to be no non-vague and 
non-circular way to address the latter question. The best one can do, it seems, is 
say things like: The mind functions normally when it operates as it usually does; or 
the mind functions normally when it does not malfunction. Although answers such 
                                                          
7 For an account of the relevant notion of function, which sometimes is also known as 
‘etiological’ or ‘proper’ function, see, for example, Neander (1991). For an account of the 
notion of teleological function as applies to both human artefacts and biological 
organisms, instead, see Wright (1973). 
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as these are, as noted, are both vague and circular, there is also a sense in which 
they do intuitive justice to the notion of normal functioning (or so I hope). For my 
purposes, that is all that I should need.   
Being p-consciousness a property of mental states, I suggest we begin by 
closing in on the notion of functional role as it applies to the latter, and then move 
to the same notion as it applies to p-consciousness.  
4.1. The Functional Role of Mental States 
In the contemporary philosophy of mind, when philosophers talk about the 
functional role of mental states, they normally understand ‘functional role’ 
precisely in terms of the notion of causal role (Polger 2004, 150). Before introducing 
the notion of functional role as it applies to mental states, it will thus be convenient 
sketching a picture of the notion of causal role. 8 I should note that, unless 
otherwise specified, I will be concerned with mental state types (or with types of 
things). The considerations that I will make in relation to types, however, will 
equally apply to tokens of those types.9 
There are two main things to note about the notion of causal role. First, the 
causal role of a thing X is the fund of dispositional properties of X (Cummins 1975). 
More specifically, the causal role of X is X’s fund of dispositions to enter into certain 
causal relations (fund of dispositions/dispositional properties for short). Second, the 
causal role of X is normally a proper subset of X’s total fund of dispositional 
                                                          
8 The best-known account of the notion of causal role is Cummins’s (1975). According 
to Cummins’s account, the causal role of an X is always relative to an analytic account A of 
a system’s capacity to C (Ibid., 763). For present purposes, however, I am going to adopt a 
simplified version of Cummins’s account. 
9 What is a token? Tokens are normally understood precisely in opposition with types. 
Consider the following string of words: ‘Bad and bad and bad and bad’. In one sense of the 
term ‘word’, the above string contains two words – ‘bad’ and ‘and’. In another sense of 
term, it contains seven words: Four ‘bad’ and three ‘and’. Differently put, the above string 
contains two word types (the word type ‘bad’ and the word type ‘and’) and seven word 
tokens (four tokens of the word type ‘bad’ and three tokens of the word type ‘and’) (Bickle 
2016). 
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properties.10 This is because X’s causal role is always relative to a theory T of the 
functioning of a system S (Godfrey-Smith 1996, chap. 1; Polger 2004, chap. 5). Let 
me expand on these two points in order. 
In general, a dispositional property can be defined as the tendency of a thing 
X to behave in characteristic ways, under certain circumstances. As an example, 
consider the solubility of salt. Roughly, this is the tendency of salt to dissolve when 
poured into water (or some other suitable solvent). An important aspect of 
dispositions is that for X to have a certain disposition, X need not (ever) actually 
manifest that disposition, but only be apt to behave in certain ways under certain 
circumstances. What I mean is that for a pinch of salt to be disposed to dissolve in 
water, for example, it need not (ever) actually be poured into water and dissolve. 
The only thing that matters, instead, is that if that pinch of salt were poured into 
water, it would dissolve. As concerns causal role, for a thing X to have a certain 
causal role is for X to possess a fund of dispositional properties. In other words, for 
X to have a certain causal role, is for X to be capable of entering into a number N 
of causal relations, under certain circumstances. 
As anticipated, the second thing to note about causal role is that the causal 
role of a thing X is normally a subset of all the causal relations that X is disposed to 
enter into. The reason is that the causal role of X is always relative to a theory T of 
the functioning of a system S to which X belongs. We can think of T as a theory that 
tells us/gives us two things. First, it gives us an inventory of the “components” or 
“parts” X’s of the system S. Depending on the nature of T (e.g., on its being a folk 
or broadly-scientific theory),11 ‘component’ or ‘part’ will refer to different kinds of 
things; e.g., subsystems, properties/states, and processes of S. Second, a theory T 
tells us which, of all the dispositions that X has, are those dispositions that explain, 
                                                          
10 I am assuming here that dispositions are always causal dispositions. That is, that to 
be disposed to X is always to be disposed to do something, where by ‘do’, I mean enter into 
certain causal relations.   
11  More on this later. 
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or contribute to explain, the functioning of S (or how we should go about finding 
out what those dispositions are).12 That is, aside from telling us what X’s belong to 
S, T also tells us what the causal roles of those X’s are (or how we should go about 
finding out what they are).  
Consider a watch. According to a theory of the watch TW, a watch has many 
different components; e.g., a number of gears Gn, a pallet, a hairspring, and two 
hands. Now, consider a gear G1. G1 has several dispositions. That is to say that G1 is 
apt to enter into a number of different causal relations. Suppose that G1 is: (1) 
disposed to cause G2 to rotate clockwise; (2) disposed to cause G3 to rotate 
anticlockwise; (3) disposed to cause G4 to rotate at a certain speed S1; and (4) it is 
disposed to move the air particles around it, making a soothing noise. Of all the 
dispositions that G1 has, only some will be included in G1’s causal role. The reason 
is that the causal role of G1 is relative to our theory TW. According to the latter, of 
the all the dispositions that G1 has, it is only (1) and (3) that figure in an explanation 
of how the watch functions. What this means is that, among (1), (2), (3), and (4), 
only (1) and (3) are included in the causal role of G1.  
In sum, first, the causal role of a thing X is a fund of dispositional properties 
of X. That is, for X to have a causal role is for it to have a fund of dispositions. 
Second, not all the dispositions that X has are included in its causal role. The reason 
is that the causal role of X is always relative to a theory T of the functioning of a 
system S to which X belongs. With this general picture of the notion of causal role 
in hand, let us now turn to the functional role of mental states.  
A standard definition of the notion of functional role of a mental state M – 
where ‘functional role’ is understood in terms of the notion of causal role – is the 
following: 
                                                          
12 I shall say more about the phrase between parentheses later.  
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Functional Role of M: M’s fund of appropriate dispositional properties. 
Let me unpack this definition. First, in line with I said earlier about the notion of 
causal role, M’s functional role is taken to be a fund of dispositional properties of it 
(Kriegel 2004b; Block 2007b; Kim 2010). As explained, for a thing X to have a certain 
disposition, X need not (ever) actually manifest that disposition, but only be apt to 
behave in certain ways, under certain circumstances. The same applies to the 
functional role of a mental state M. M can (and does) have a certain functional role 
regardless of whether it actually (ever) enters into any of the causal relations it is 
disposed to enter into. Thus, for M to have a certain functional role, it is only 
required that M be disposed to enter into those causal relations (Kriegel 2009, 213).  
The second point which we should consider concerns the meaning of 
‘appropriate’. In this context, a dispositional property of M’s counts as appropriate 
relative to a theory T of the functioning of a system S to which M belongs. As 
concerns mental states, T will be a psychological theory PT. Analogously to what I 
said above, here we can think of PT as a theory that tells us what the “components” 
or “parts” X’s of the mind are (I will call these X’s mentalia), and which, of all the 
dispositions that those mentalia have, are those dispositions that explain, or 
contribute to explain, the functioning of the mind (or how we should go about 
finding out what those dispositions are). Below, I introduce two PT’s. I should note, 
however, that I will only provide a very broad (and simplistic) outline of such PT’s. 
That, after all, is all that I need for my purposes. 
One PT is what is usually known as Folk Psychology or Common-Sense 
Psychology (e.g., Lewis 1972). Folk Psychology is an analytic PT. It is a PT 
constructed by analysing the concepts we ordinarily use when thinking about the 
mind (Polger 2004, 154). The theory can be seen as a set of generalizations of the 
form “When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives 
sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused 
thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor 
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responses” (Ibid.). An instance of such generalizations might be “someone who is 
pricked with a pin will likely feel pain and flinch” (Ibid.).  
Folk-Psychology tells us, first, what mentalia there are. Such a list would 
certainly include mental states/properties such as pains, beliefs, and desires, as well 
as capacities such as perception and memory. What Folk-Psychology also tells us 
is the causal roles of those states, properties, etc. For example, as concerns pain, 
Folk-Psychology tells us that the causal role of pain is its fund of dispositions to i) 
be typically caused by tissue damage; 2) cause the belief that something is not right 
with one’s body; 3) cause winces and groans; 4) cause the desire to abandon the 
state, etc. (Levin 2016, n/a).  
Now, in telling what the causal roles of mentalia are, Folk-Psychology, in 
effect, tells us which, of all the dispositional properties that – for example – a 
mental state M has, are the dispositional properties that are relevant to the 
functioning of the mind. Plausibly, the total set of pain’s dispositional properties is 
much larger than the set of dispositions that are included in its causal role.  For 
example, pain might always be disposed to cause the desire to remain in the state, 
rather than be out of it. According to Folk-Psychology, however, the disposition to 
cause the desire to remain in pain does not enter into the causal role of pain. 
The second psychological theory PT that I wish to consider is what we may 
call Cognitive Science. Analogously to Folk Psychology, Cognitive Science can be 
seen as a set of laws and generalizations about the mind. Unlike the former, 
however, the generalizations of Cognitive Science are not derived (entirely) a-priori 
– derived from the analysis of the concepts we normally use when thinking about 
the mind – but (partly) derived from an empirically informed study of the mind. 
Cognitive Science, too, tells us which mentalia there are. In general, it seems that 
the inventory of mentalia provided by Cognitive Science partly overlaps with the 
one provided by Folk Psychology (Prinz 2013, 281). Thus, for example, a list of 
mental states as provided by Cognitive Science will certainly include states such as 
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pains, perceptions, beliefs, and desires. The inventory of mentalia provided by 
Cognitive Science, however, is larger than the provided by Folk-Psychology. This is 
because, being an empirical PT, Cognitive Science’s inventory of mentalia will 
include, for example, several “empirically discovered distinctions that are not 
recognized in Folk Psychology (episodic vs semantic memory […] iconic memory 
[…] and so on)” (Ibid.). Being an empirically informed PT, Cognitive Science is far 
from being a complete theory of the mind. On the contrary, it is to be seen as an 
approach to the study of the mind.  
This last point becomes quite evident the moment we turn to what 
Cognitive Science tells us about the causal roles of mentalia. Unlike Folk 
Psychology, Cognitive Science holds that those causal roles are to be discovered – 
at least in part – empirically (Block 2007b; Levin 2016). While Folk Psychology 
derives the causal roles of those states, processes, and so on, by analysing the 
concepts of the folk, Cognitive Science holds that those causal roles should be 
discovered through an empirically informed study of the mind.  
Cognitive Science so characterized is the psychological theory PT that I 
assume for the purposes of this work. To enquire about what the functional role of 
p-consciousness is, is thus to enquire about it against the background of such a PT 
(more on this below). Having introduced the notion of functional role as it applies 
to mental states, I now turn to the notion as it applies to p-consciousness. 
4.2. The Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness  
The things that a mental state can do depend on the properties that the state has. 
To put it with Kriegel, “the state has various properties, Fi, …, Fn, and each property 
Fi contributes something to […] the state’s fund of causal powers” (2004b, 172). In 
other words, the state has various properties, and each property endows the state 
with certain dispositions. Consider, again, a watch’s gear G. The things that G can 
do depend on its properties. They depend, for example, on G’s shape, dimensions, 
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where exactly in the watch G is positioned, and what G’s rotating speed is. Each of 
G’s properties can thus be said to dispose G to enter into certain causal relations. 
Some mental states have the property of being p-conscious: There is 
something it is like for one to be in them. If metaphysical epiphenomenalism about 
p-consciousness is false, then p-consciousness will contribute something to the 
fund of dispositions of the mental states that have it (Ibid.). As applies to p-
consciousness, metaphysical epiphenomenalism claims that the latter is causally 
inert. That is, it denies that it contributes anything to the fund of dispositional 
properties of the mental states that have it. The view is usually associated with 
property dualism, the doctrine that p-consciousness is a non-physical property of 
physical states (Polger and Flanagan 2002, 35).  
On the basis of the considerations made thus far, we may define the 
functional role of p-consciousness, relative to a mental state M, as follows:  
Functional Role of P-Consciousness Relative to a Mental State M: The fund of 
appropriate dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows M with.13 
Differently put, the functional role of p-consciousness is the fund of appropriate 
dispositional properties that M has in virtue of being p-conscious. To my 
understanding this definition should capture what many philosophers normally 
have in mind when discussing the functional role of p-consciousness. On top of 
that, the definition should be in line with what we have in mind when we ask what 
the functional role of some non-mental property in a non-mental system is. 
Consider the following analogy. The things that a watch’s gear G can do, as we have 
seen, depend on G’s properties. Suppose that G has a certain shape. Call this 
property X-shape. Suppose also that, on the assumption that X-shape has a 
functional role at all, we wish to address the question of what that functional role 
                                                          
13 My definition is akin to the one offered by Kriegel (2009, 252).  
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is. I take it that to address that question is just to identify the appropriate 
dispositional properties that G has in virtue of being X-shaped.  
One more thing to note about the definition that I have offered is that it 
construes p-consciousness as what, in effects, plays (or realizes, or occupies) (at 
least part) of the functional role of M. For it is precisely in virtue of being p-
conscious, that M has certain appropriate dispositional properties. To return to our 
gear G again. Suppose that, in virtue of being X-shaped, G has the appropriate 
disposition to enter into certain causal relations with Gn. We can then say that the 
property of being C-shaped plays or (or realizes, or occupies) part of the functional 
role of G.14 
 Having provided a definition of the notion of the functional role of p-
consciousness, let me now briefly put forward a working hypothesis. 
4.3. A Working Hypothesis 
For the purposes of this work, I am going to assume, as a working hypothesis, that 
p-consciousness does have a functional role at all. Ideally, that will make it easier 
for us to focus on the question of what that functional role is, which is the question 
that I am interested in exploring. Importantly, such a hypothesis should not be 
seen as a blind assumption. Instead, as noted in the introduction, we tend to think 
                                                          
14 It may also be interesting to note that the proposed definition is neutral as to whether 
the functional role of p-consciousness is, or is not, a proper part of the functional role of 
M. The idea is this. The functional role of M, as I explained in §4.1., includes M’s fund of 
appropriate dispositional properties. Now, on top of being p-conscious, M may, or may 
not, have other properties. If M has other properties, then, possibly, some of the 
appropriate dispositions that M has, M has in virtue of having those other properties. From 
this, it follows that the fund of appropriate dispositions that M has in virtue of being p-
conscious is smaller than M’s total fund of appropriate dispositions. In other words, the 
functional role of p-consciousness is only a proper part of the overall functional role of M. 
On the other hand, if M has no properties other than p-consciousness, then the functional 
role of M is identical to the functional role of p-consciousness. Nothing in the definition 
that I have proposed, however, implies that p-consciousness is or is not a proper part of 
the functional role of M. Moreover, the issue of whether p-consciousness is or is not a 
proper part of the functional role of M will play no role in this work. 
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that p-consciousness must have a functional role. Indeed, p-consciousness is such 
a central aspect of our mental lives that it would be very surprising – let alone 
counterintuitive – if it did not have a functional role.  
 It is worth pointing out that to work under the assumption the p-
consciousness has a functional role at all is to assume the falsity of two forms of 
epiphenomenalism about p-consciousness. One form, we have already 
encountered: metaphysical epiphenomenalism. According to metaphysical 
epiphenomenalism, as we have seen, p-consciousness is causally inert. To work 
under the assumption that p-consciousness has a functional role at all, then, is, in 
part, to assume that p-consciousness in effect endows the mental states that have 
it with certain dispositions. 
But to assume that metaphysical epiphenomenalism is false does not by 
itself guarantee that p-consciousness has a functional role. For that to be the case, 
it is also necessary that we assume that another form of epiphenomenalism about 
p-consciousness is false, too. Why? For granted the falsity of metaphysical 
epiphenomenalism, p-consciousness might only endow the mental states that have 
it with dispositions that are not contemplated by (a complete version of) the 
psychological theory that we have endorsed. So, even though p-consciousness 
would still contribute something to what those states can do, it would not endow 
them with any appropriate dispositions. If that were the case, although 
metaphysical epiphenomenalism about p-consciousness would be false, causal role 
epiphenomenalism about p-consciousness would be true.  
What is causal role epiphenomenalism about p-consciousness? As 
characterized by Polger and Flanagan (2002, 34–35), causal role epiphenomenalism 
about p-consciousness is exactly the thesis that p-consciousness contributes 
nothing to the functioning of the mind. Consider an analogy. Suppose you have a 
car whose engine is particularly noisy. Being particularly noisy makes your car 
engine easily audible from 800 meters away. Still, being extremely noisy probably 
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contributes nothing to the functioning of the car. In a similar way, causal role 
epiphenomenalism allows that p-consciousness disposes its mental states to enter 
into certain causal relations, but denies that it endows them with the appropriate 
dispositions.  
To sum up, in order to focus on the question of what the functional role of 
p-consciousness is, I am going to work under the (plausible) assumption that p-
consciousness has a functional role at all. To assume that p-consciousness has a 
functional role at all, in turn, is to assume that both metaphysical and causal role 
epiphenomenalism are false. Before moving onto the next chapter, there is one last 
thing that I would like to do. That is to clarify that the claim p-consciousness has a 
functional role is to be kept clearly distinct from the claim that functionalism about 
p-consciousness is true (Kriegel 2004b, 2009). Let me explain. 
4.3. Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness  
What is functionalism about p-consciousness? Addressing this question will be 
easier if we explain what functionalism about the mind is first. By ‘functionalism’, 
in this context, I mean a metaphysical view about the mind, which goes back to at 
least Hilary Putnam (1975) and Jerry Fodor (1974). Qua metaphysical view, 
functionalism concerns what kinds of things mental states are, what their ultimate 
nature is (Block 2007b, chaps. 1, 2; Polger 2012).  
Functionalism arises as an alternative to the mind-brain identity theory 
(e.g., Smart 1959). While the latter identifies mental state types with brain state 
types (e.g., pain with C-fibre activation), functionalism holds that a system could 
have mental states without having brains states like ours, or any brain states at all 
(Polger 2004). A system may be in pain regardless of whether it is in a brain state 
identical to C-fiber activation, whether it is in a hydraulic state of a hydraulic 
computer, etc. According to functionalism, then, mental state types are not 
identical to brain state types. Instead, mental states are said to be realized or 
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implemented by other (typically, although not necessarily, physical) states, be these 
physico-chemical states of brains, hydraulic states of hydraulic computers, etc. 
Thus, on the functionalist view, mental states are multiply realizable states. 
Different physico-chemical states, as well as hydraulic and electronic states, for 
example, can all realize or implement the same mental state type.  
But what does functionalism take mental states to be, exactly? 
Functionalism dictates that mental states are (nothing but) functional states of 
systems (Putnam 1975). To say that a mental state is a functional state is to say that 
there is nothing more to the state than its having a certain functional role (Block 
2007; Polger 2004). The notion of functional role, as we have seen, can be 
understood in different ways. Commonly, it is understood in terms of the notion of 
causal role (Kim 1996; Polger 2004). On this understanding, to say that there is 
nothing more to a mental state than its having a certain functional role is to say 
that there is nothing more to that state than its having a certain causal role. 
Importantly, by construing mental states as functional states, functionalism 
takes the former to be second-order states of systems. In this context, a second 
order state is the state of “having some first-order state or other which plays the 
specified causal role” (Pryor 2002, n.a.). Consider pain, again. Pain is the state of 
having some first-order state or other that plays or carries out the pain role. The 
first-order state is precisely what realizes, implements, or plays the pain role. As 
noted, given multiple realization, this may be a certain brain state, electronic state, 
hydraulic state, etc. As for the pain role, instead, this is the functional role of pain 
as specified by psychological theory PT (Block 2007a).15 
                                                          
15 Although the variety of functionalism that purports to reduce mental states to their 
functional role is the most prominent, there is also another, less popular, variety of 
functionalism, due to David Lewis (1980). While the former variety identifies mental states 
with second-order states of systems, Lewis functionalism holds that mental states are to 
be identified with first-order states. That is, according to Lewis functionalism, a mental 
state is a state of a system that realizes, fills, or occupies a certain functional role. 
Considering the example of pain again, Lewis functionalism identifies pain with whatever 
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I have sketched a picture of functionalism as applies to mental states. But 
the reason I have talked about functionalism at all is to make one specific point. 
The point is that to hold that p-consciousness has a functional role is not to commit 
to functionalism about p-consciousness. So, what does functionalism about p-
consciousness say? According to the thesis, what makes a mental state p-conscious 
is (plausibly part of) its functional role. In other words, there is nothing more to a 
mental state’s being p-conscious than its having a fund of appropriate dispositions.  
With a picture of functionalism about p-consciousness in hand, it should be 
apparent why the claim that that p-consciousness has a functional role is not to 
subscribe to functionalism about p-consciousness. For it is one thing for p-
consciousness to endow the mental states that have it with certain dispositions, 
and it is another for it to be identical to (plausibly part of) the functional role of 
those states.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
I begun this chapter by rehearsing a number of familiar distinctions about kinds of 
consciousness, and clarified that, for my purposes, I will treat p-consciousness as a 
kind of state consciousness. After that, I provided some examples of p-conscious 
states, and explained that, as is customary, I will understand p-consciousness in 
terms of Thomas Nagel’s what-it-is-like-for-one notion. In the third – and largest – 
part of the chapter, my main task was to offer a rigorous definition of the notion of 
                                                          
state – be this a brain state or a machine state – realizes or fills the pain role. One 
consequence of this is that what pain itself is will be population-specific: It will be a certain 
brain state in humans, a different brain state in bats, a hydraulic state in a hydraulic 
automaton, and a non-physical state in a ghost. But in what sense can all those states be 
said to qualify as pain? Lewis addresses this question by suggesting that the concept of pain 
is a non-rigid designator. In other words, the concept of pain is identical with the concept 
‘the state that occupies such and such a functional role’, where the functional role occupied 
by the state is specified by a theory of the mind T (Block 2007b). In this sense, the concept 
of pain has multiple referents – it applies to different things: A certain brain state in us, a 
certain hydraulic state in a hydraulic automaton, etc.  
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functional role of p-consciousness, a definition that I would be able to work with 
in the rest of the thesis. In the specific, I defined the functional role of p-
consciousness as the fund of appropriate dispositional properties that p-
consciousness endows a mental state with. Having offered a definition of the 
functional role of p-consciousness, I then did two more things. First, I suggested 
that, for the purposes of exploring the question of what the functional role of p-
consciousness is, we work under the assumption that p-consciousness does has a 
functional role at all. Second, I clarified that the claim that p-consciousness has a 
functional role is to be kept distinct from the claim that functionalism about p-
consciousness is true.  
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2  
 
Block’s Distinction and the Global Workspace 
Model of Access Consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter has three main parts. In §2, I introduce Block’s (1995) distinction 
between p-consciousness and a-consciousness. As anticipated, that distinction is a 
fundamental assumption of this work. A mental state is said by Block to be p-
conscious if there is something it is like for its subject to be in it (Ibid., 228). A 
mental state is said by Block to be a-conscious, instead, if its content is available to 
a number higher-level cognitive processes/capacities such as report, reasoning, and 
the rational control of action (Ibid., 231).  
In the second part of the chapter (§3), I draw a first, general picture of the 
Global Workspace Model of a-consciousness (GWM) (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; 
Dehaene and Naccache 2001). As I have also anticipated, this is the model of a-
consciousness that I assume in this work. According to GWM, a representation’s 
being a-conscious is to be explained in terms of its content’s being broadcast in a 
global workspace. The latter, as I will duly explain, is a resource that allows modular 
systems of the mind/brain to exchange information.  
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In the third and last part of the chapter (§4), I argue, together with the 
advocates of GWM, that attention is necessary for both global broadcasting and a-
consciousness. As we will see, different experiments suggest that when subjects fail 
to attend to a certain stimulus S, they also fail to report having seen S. From this, 
it is inferred that attention is necessary for a-consciousness and – given certain 
assumptions – for global broadcasting as well. 
The reader should note that, in this chapter, I will only offer a first pass at 
defining GWM and its relationship with a-consciousness, and that I will be offering 
a more detailed account of both over the next few chapters. 
2. Block’s Distinction Between Phenomenal Consciousness and Access 
Consciousness 
Following an explosion of books and papers on consciousness between the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, the publication of Ned Block’s paper On a Confusion 
about a Function of Consciousness, in 1995, compelled philosophers and cognitive 
scientists working in the field to take stock. In his paper, Block charged researchers 
with having (unwittingly) conflated two concepts: the concept of p-consciousness 
and the concept of a-consciousness.  
In Block’s (1995) view, the confusion between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness can be vividly brought to light by considering a number of 
hypotheses about the functional significance of consciousness tout court. Arguably, 
the most influential of the hypotheses that Block has in mind has to do with the 
phenomenon of blindsight. On the basis of blindsight, philosophers and 
psychologists alike (Marcel 1986; Flanagan 1992, chap. 7; Van Gulick 1994) have 
argued that part of the functional role of consciousness must be to enable 
information to be used in reasoning, the rational control of action, and other 
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higher-level cognitive processes/capacities.16 To give a reader a sense of what Block 
has in mind, below I outline what is sometimes known as the Argument from 
Blindsight. 
2.1. The Argument from Blindsight 
What is blindsight? In humans, the optic nerve that leaves the eye flows directly 
into an area of the thalamus known as the lateral geniculate nucleus. From there, 
new fibres originate that terminate into a specific region of the occipital lobe – one 
of the four lobes of the cerebral cortex, situated in the “back of the head” – known 
as the primary visual cortex, striate cortex, or V1 (Weiskrantz 1990, 3-6). V1 is the 
visual area that receives most of the information coming from the eyes. It is 
responsible for processing some of that information, and for channelling the rest 
to other areas of the visual system where further processing will occur.   
Lesions to V1 and to the occipital lobe more generally typically result in the 
appearance of a blind region in the patients’ visual field. A lesion can be caused by 
the occurrence of an accident, a stroke, or by the surgical removal of portions of 
the cortex for medical purposes, for example (Ibid.). If the lesion is such that the 
V1 is completely destroyed, the patient will lose her sight altogether. If the lesion 
affects only part of the V1, instead, the patient will suffer from partial blindness; 
that is, she will be blind in circumscribed regions of her visual field.17 A local region 
of blindness is typically known as a scotoma – plural, scotomata (Ibid., 9).  
                                                          
16 What does the term ‘information’ mean here? What philosophers as well as 
psychologists (and arguably also many neuroscientists) normally have in mind when using 
the term is semantic information; that is, the content of a representation (Wu 2014, 14–15). 
I will come back to this point below. 
17 A lesion to the right portion of the primary visual cortex will result in a blind area 
corresponding to part, or the whole of the left field of vision of both eyes, depending on 
the extent of the damage. On the other hand, a lesion affecting the left part of the primary 
visual cortex will cause the formation of a blind area covering the right field of vision of 
both eyes (Weiskrantz 1990, chap. 1). 
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Among those patients that have suffered from lesions that exclusively affect 
portions of V1, some have been discovered to have a very special ability. When 
presented with relatively simple stimuli in their scotoma, all patients claim to see 
nothing. Yet, if asked to guess whether a presented stimulus is either a vertical or 
horizontal line, for example, some patients will perform at a rate significantly above 
chance. In a similar fashion, if forced to attempt to grasp an object in their blind 
field, the same patients will preadjust their wrist, fingers, and arm suitably to the 
shape, orientation, and location of that object (Marcel 1988, 136, 146). These 
patients are thus “able to respond to visual stimuli without consciously perceiving 
them” – hence the name of ‘blindsight’ (Weiskrantz 2007, 175).18 
Crucially, unless probed, blindsight subjects will never spontaneously report 
or act on the relevant stimulus. Thus, as Anthony Marcel (1986, 41) points out, if a 
glass of water is placed in the blind field of a thirsty blindsight patient, the latter 
will fail to reach for the glass. But why? Why is it that, despite her remarkable 
abilities, the patient will not spontaneously grasp the glass of water? For Marcel, 
the answer lies in the patient’s lack of consciousness in her blind field. 
Consciousness, he contends, enables the initiation of a voluntary action: “[p]eople 
will not themselves initiate voluntary actions which involve some segment of the 
environment unless they are phenomenally aware of that segment of the 
environment” (Ibid., 146, emphasis mine). Thus, consciousness is somehow 
causally responsible for the deliberate initiation of actions with respect to a portion 
                                                          
18 Why is it only some patients who are able to make visual discriminations within their 
scotomata? According to Weiskrantz, there may be different reasons for that: one such 
reason, for example, “is that the location and extent of lesions are not uniform across 
patients” (1998, 154). Another reason may be related to the age at which a patient has 
suffered damage to her primary visual cortex: younger patients may be more likely to have 
the ability to make discriminations within their scotomata than older ones (Ibid.). (See 
also Weiskrantz 1995). 
  Chapter 2 
50 
 
of the environment. This makes the facilitation of the guidance of voluntary action 
part of its functional role.19  
As Block (1995, 241-242) notes, in speculations about the functional role of 
consciousness from blindsight, the reasoning is typically the following: (1) 
blindsight patients lack consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field; (2) 
information about the stimuli in their blind field is not used in report, reasoning, 
or the deliberate control of action; (3) therefore, (part of) the functional role of 
consciousness is to facilitate report, reasoning, etc. In Block’s view, however, the 
above reasoning is fallacious. This is because it misses the distinction between p-
consciousness and a-consciousness. ‘Consciousness’ is used in one way in (1), and 
in another way in (3). More specifically, it is used to mean what Block calls p-
consciousness in (1), and a-consciousness in (3). For this reason, the argument 
slides “from an obvious function of A-consciousness to a non-obvious function of 
P-consciousness” (Ibid., 232). 
2.2. Zooming in on Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness 
2.2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness 
In this section, I close in on Block’s take on p-consciousness. One thing that I 
should note from the start, however, is that although I endorse Block’s distinction, 
I wish to remain neutral as to whether, as Block contends, p-consciousness is 
neither functional nor identical to a mental state’s having a certain representational 
content (I will explain what those qualifications mean in a couple of pages).  
Block acknowledges that it is hard, if not impossible, to define p-
consciousness in non-circular terms. The best one can do, he concedes, is “point to 
the phenomenon” (1995, 230). In his own words, “P-consciousness is experience. P-
                                                          
19 Van Gulick, too, suggests that “[i]nformation needs to be presented to us 
phenomenally for it to play a role in the choice, initiation, or direction of the intentional 
action” (1994, 33). 
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consciousness properties are experiential ones. P-conscious states are experiential, 
that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the 
experiential properties of a state are ‘what it is like’ to have it’” (Ibid.). Paradigmatic 
examples of p-conscious mental states are sensations. Consider, for example, what 
it is like for you to have a throbbing pain in your right hand, or what it is like for 
you to be cold, or to have an orgasm.  
Another way of fixing the reference of the phrase ‘p-consciousness’ is by 
appealing to the famous explanatory gap.20 P-consciousness, notes Block, is “the 
entity to which the explanatory gap applies” (1995, 232). The idea of an explanatory 
gap in connection to p-consciousness seems to have been around for quite a while 
– at least since Leibniz’s Monadology (1898).21 A very vivid expression of the gap is 
due to John Tyndall:22 
 
Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated as 
to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable 
of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electric 
discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the 
corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever 
from the solution of the problem, “How are these physical processes 
connected with the facts of consciousness?” The chasm between the two 
classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable (1872, 
120).  
 
What Tyndall calls chasm is what philosophers today seem to have in mind when 
they use the phrase ‘explanatory gap’. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the 
                                                          
20 Perhaps fixing the reference is too strong. For as I will explain below, Block thinks that 
the explanatory gap might apply to phenomenal consciousness only contingently. 
21 See Monadology §17.  
22 See also Huxley (1900). 
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notion of an explanatory gap in relation to p-consciousness is typically associated 
with the work of Joseph Levine (1983).  
Consider the two following identity statements: (1) “[h]eat is the motion of 
molecules”; (2) “Pain is the firing of C-fibers” (Ibid., 354). As Levine notes, (1) seems 
to explain everything there is to explain about heat.23 Thus, for example, (1) explains 
why metal expands at high temperatures, why heating up water makes it boil, etc. 
It seems, however, that the same cannot be said about (2). Surely, notes Levine, (2) 
seems to explain something about pain: it explains the mechanisms underlying the 
fact that, for example, pain “warns us of damage, it causes us to attempt to avoid 
situations we believe will result in it, etc.” (Ibid., 357). Yet, (2) also seems to leave 
something out. “There is a ‘gap’”, says Levine, “in the explanatory import of 
[statements like (2)]” (Ibid.). This gap stands out rather vividly when we consider 
questions such as “Why should pain feel like this rather than that?”. Or “Why 
should pain feel like anything at all?”. There seems to be nothing about C-fibres 
that would enable us to answer these questions. Differently put, the relation 
between c-fibres and pain seems contingent. We can easily imagine a world where 
there are C-fibres firing in your brain, but you do not feel any pain, and a world 
where you feel pain, but there are no C-fibres’ firing in your brain. Hence “the 
chasm between the two classes of phenomena”, between physical and p-conscious 
phenomena.24 
In going back to Block’s characterization of p-consciousness, Block thinks 
that the p-conscious properties of mental states are distinct from the states’ 
intentional properties (1995, 232). Let me immediately say something on p-
conscious properties and intentional properties, respectively. By ‘p-conscious 
                                                          
23 Importantly, what we mean by ‘heat’ here is not the p-conscious experience that we 
enjoy when we are sitting by the fireplace, but the phenomenon as it exists independently 
of our experience (Levine 1983, 355).  
24 So why does Block think that the explanatory gap might apply to p-consciousness 
only contingently? Roughly, the idea is that one day we might be able to produce the 
concepts that will allow us to close the gap (1995, 231). 
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properties’, Block means “experiential properties” (Ibid., 230). Examples of p-
conscious properties are the reddish character of a perceptual experience as of a 
red sunset, the painfulness of pain, and the pleasantness of orgasms. The totality 
of the p-conscious properties of a mental state, Block takes to be identical with 
what it is like to be in that state (Ibid., 232).  
Now for intentional properties. An intentional property is the property of 
being directed at, or about, certain objects, properties, or states of affairs. We will 
encounter talk of intentional (or representational) properties in the following 
chapters as well. For this reason, it is worth briefly expanding on the subject right 
away. Mental states that have intentional properties are normally referred to as 
intentional mental states (intentional states, for short). Classic examples of 
intentional states are propositional attitudes; e.g., beliefs and desires. Consider, for 
example, my belief that Mars is a planet. My belief is directed at something, namely, 
Mars and its being a planet. As a second example, consider my desire that it be 
sunny outside. My desire is about something, namely, today’s weather being a 
certain way.  
The term ‘intentional’ is normally considered to be on a par with 
‘representational’. The intentional properties of mental states are the states’ 
representational properties. To say that intentional states are directed at, or about, 
objects, properties, or states of affairs is to say that they represent them. Because 
‘intentional’ is normally considered on a par with ‘representational’, philosophers 
normally use the terms ‘intentional states’ and ‘representational states’ 
interchangeably. Representational states are said to have content. Typically, the 
latter is taken to be a proposition. To come back to the examples above, my belief 
that Mars is a planet has, as its content, the proposition that Mars is a planet. My 
desire that it be sunny outside, instead, has, as its content, the proposition that it 
be sunny outside.   
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(One note: for the purposes of this and the following chapters, I will treat 
the notion of information as equivalent to the notion of representational content, 
and the notion of carrying information as equivalent to the notion of having 
representational content. To my understanding, this is how the authors that figure 
in this work understand ‘information’ and ‘carrying information’).  
In light of what I have just said about p-conscious conscious properties and 
intentional properties, Block’s claim that the p-conscious properties of mental 
states are distinct from their intentional properties is to be understood as the claim 
that the experiential properties of mental states are distinct from the states’ having 
a certain representational content. But if, according to Block, the p-conscious 
properties of mental states are distinct from their intentional properties, what kind 
of properties does Block think p-conscious properties are? I will address this 
question at length in chapter 4. For now, however, we can make some progress 
towards addressing it by putting things as follows. 
Consider the painting La Mort de Marat, by the famous Neoclassical French 
painter Jacques-Louis David. The painting represents Marat, a leading French 
revolutionary, lying dead in a bathtub. The painting has a certain content; e.g., that 
Marat lies dead in a bathtub. The property of having that content is a 
representational property of the painting. But the painting also has other 
properties. What I have in mind are the paint, the canvas, etc. But what kinds of 
properties are these? They are intrinsic, non-representational properties of the 
painting. Now, according to Block, the p-conscious properties of a mental state are 
akin to a painting’s intrinsic properties (1996): they, too, are intrinsic properties of 
the state. 
Thinking of p-conscious properties as intrinsic properties of mental states 
will also help us appreciate a further claim of Block’s. The claim is that p-
consciousness can be – and often is – both intransitive and transitive (1995, 232). 
That is, although p-consciousness is essentially intransitive, it often is also 
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consciousness of. According to Block, the reason is this. Sometimes, p-
consciousness is like a blob of paint on the very edge of a painting: it represents 
nothing (or so we may assume). Quite often, however, p-consciousness is like the 
paint that represents Marat: it represents/has content. It will also be helpful here 
recalling what I said in the previous chapter about transitive state consciousness. 
Following Kriegel, we can think of transitive state consciousness as “the property 
mental states exhibit when, and only when, their subjects are transitively conscious 
of something in virtue of being in them” (2009, 27). As concerns p-consciousness, 
Block’s idea seems to be that, because p-consciousness often represents, one can 
be p-conscious of something in virtue of being in a p-conscious state.25 
Two brief points before moving onto a-consciousness. First, according to 
Block, transitive p-consciousness is non-conceptual, in the sense that one need not 
possess the relevant concepts in order to be p-conscious of something (Ibid.). Thus, 
for example, I can be p-conscious of a square without seeing the square as a square, 
and I can be p-conscious of the sound a trumpet without hearing it as the sound of 
a trumpet.  
The second point is that not only does Block deny that p-conscious 
properties are distinct from intentional properties; he also denies that they are 
distinct from functional properties (1995, 230). We can understand this claim as the 
claim that functionalism about p-consciousness is false. As explained in the 
previous chapter, this means denying that what makes a mental state p-conscious 
is its functional role.  
                                                          
25 One issue which I mention only to set aside is this. Given Block’s characterization of 
p-consciousness as what it’s like, it is not clear how p-consciousness might also be said to 
be transitive. For prima facie, at least, consciousness as what it’s like is only an intransitive 
kind of consciousness. When I have a p-conscious visual experience as of a yellow bird, 
what it is like to have that experience is not a matter of being conscious of. Rather, it seems 
to be exclusively a matter of my experience’s being conscious simpliciter.  
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2.2.2. Access Consciousness  
To a-consciousness now. A mental state is said by Block to be a-conscious if its 
representational content is “made available to the brain’s ‘consumer’ systems: 
systems of memory, perceptual categorization, reasoning, planning, evaluation of 
alternatives, decision-making, voluntary direction of attention, and more 
generally, rational control of action” (2005, 47).26 The term ‘rational’ here is meant 
to exclude the guessing-guided behaviour of blindsight patients (1995, 228). For 
there is a sense in which information about the stimuli presented in the blind field 
of a blindsight patient is available to the relevant consuming systems. If the patient 
is forced to guess whether she has just been presented with an ‘X’ or an ‘O’, for 
example, she will somehow be able to access her perceptual state and make an 
accurate report. Still, there is another sense in which information about stimuli 
presented in her blind field is not available for her to “deliberately” or “rationally” 
use. The kind of access that Block has in mind when talking about a-consciousness, 
however, is full-blooded access in the latter sense. Hence, a blindsight patient’s 
reporting a perceptual state on the basis of a “hunch” does not count as rational 
guidance of her behaviour. 
I will say much more about of a-consciousness when discussing GWM (the 
Global Workspace Model), which Block and I endorse. For now, let me briefly 
mention a couple of things. First, unlike p-consciousness, a-consciousness is always 
consciousness of. A-conscious mental states are always states in virtue of we are 
transitively conscious of something. Relatedly, while Block thinks that it might be 
possible for a mental state to be p-conscious without having representational 
                                                          
26 Block (1995, 231) originally defines access consciousness as follows: “[a] state is access 
conscious (A-conscious) if, in virtue of one’s having the state, a representation of its 
content (1) inferentially promiscuous, that is, poised for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) 
poised for rational control of action, (3) poised for rational control of speech”. The choice 
of opting for Block’s (2005, 47) characterisation of access consciousness here is due to two 
main reasons. First of all, it is more developed/informative than the one offered in his 
(1995). Secondly, it employs some terminology that is more consonant with the 
terminology I will adopt in the remainder of this chapter, particularly in §3. 
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content, a mental state cannot be a-conscious if it does not have content. After all, 
a state counts as a-conscious only if its content can be used in reasoning, the 
rational control of action, etc. Thus, paradigmatic examples of a-conscious states 
are propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires (Ibid., 232). Why? For these 
states always have representational content. Third, unlike p-consciousness, a-
consciousness is essentially functional (Ibid.). A-consciousness, as noted, is a 
matter of the content of a state being made available to a number of consumer 
systems. As such, what makes a mental state a-conscious is the role that the state 
has in the subject’s cognitive economy.  
2.2.3. Two Numerically Different Properties  
From what I have said so far it should be clear that p-consciousness and a-
consciousness are different concepts. But Block’s (1995) aim is also to argue that 
the two concepts pick out numerically different properties. How does he argue for 
such a claim? The thought seems to be the following: if we can find conceptually 
possible cases where p-consciousness and a-consciousness come apart, then we will 
have found – to put it with Kriegel (2009) – “metaphysically possible particulars 
that instantiate phenomenal consciousness but not access consciousness, and vice-
versa” (Ibid., 34). From there, we can then infer that p-consciousness and a-
consciousness are numerically different properties. 27 Importantly, in saying that I 
                                                          
27 Block (1995) says that by introducing conceptually possible cases where p-
consciousness and a-consciousness come apart he only wishes to show that the two are 
different concepts. In a later, slightly revised, version of the same paper, however, he adds 
that it is also his aim to show that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are quite likely 
numerically different properties (2002, 211). Different authors have understood Block’s aim 
in different ways, however. Carruthers (2015b), for example, takes Block to be arguing only 
for the claim that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are two different concepts. Kriegel 
(2007, 2009), on the other hand, takes Block to be arguing that the two are also different 
properties. As is apparent, here, I side with Kriegel. Why? Because if Block’s intention were 
only to show that that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are different concepts, he 
would not need to present cases where one occurs without the other. Instead, it would 
probably be sufficient to characterize them in different ways. 
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assume Block’s distinction, I mean that I assume it both as a conceptual distinction 
and as a distinction between properties. 
Below, I am going to offer a more precise reconstruction of Block’s 
argument. To that end, however, I first need to briefly introduce three notions the 
understanding of which is fundamental to the understanding of the argument.28 
The notions that I have in mind are the ones of conceptual possibility, metaphysical 
possibility, and metaphysically possible world. Let’s proceed in order. Following 
Levine (2001), we may say that, given a situation S, “S is conceptually possible 
relative to a representation R just in case S, when thought of under R, is judged 
possible” (Ibid., 40).29 By way of example, consider a situation in which someone 
drinks water but does not drink H2O. This situation is conceptually possible 
relative to the representation that someone drinks water but does not drink H2O 
just in case, when I think of someone who drinks water but does not drink H2O, 
under the representation that someone drinks water but does not drink H2O, I judge 
that it I possible that someone drinks water but does not drink H2O. 
As for metaphysical possibility, to say that a situation is metaphysically 
possible is to say that “it could happen (or could have happened)” (Ibid., 39-40). 
Importantly, this does not entail that that situation could happen (or could have 
happened) according to the laws of nature that hold in this world. Thus, a 
situation’s being metaphysically possible is compatible with its being 
nomologically impossible (Ibid., 40). Last, for metaphysically possible worlds. A 
metaphysically possible world is just a world that could have been, where ‘world’ 
                                                          
28 Plus, we will encounter two of these notions in the next chapter again.  
29 I assume that the notion of situation is relatively intuitive. Still, it won’t hurt us to be 
precise about it. Here’s Levine on the notion: “[b]y a situation I mean an object's 
instantiating one or more properties (perhaps at a time), or an ordered n-tuple of objects 
instantiating one or more relations. It is the sort of entity that serves as the truth condition 
for a statement. Situations are the subjects of possibility and necessity; this could happen, 
that couldn't have happened, and this must happen. In all these cases, we are referring to 
situations. What can happen, I presume, is that I quit my job tomorrow; but it can't happen 
that I both quit and do not quit my job tomorrow” (2001, 40). 
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stands for a “maximally inclusive situation encompassing all others” (Menzel 2016, 
n/a). 
With the above notions in hand, we can now take a closer look at what I 
take to be Block’s argument for the claim that p-consciousness and a-consciousness 
are different properties. Here is one way of reconstructing the argument: 1) if it is 
conceptually possible for p-consciousness to occur without a-consciousness, and 
vice-versa, then p-consciousness and a-consciousness are not coextensive in every 
metaphysically possible world; 2) if p-consciousness and a-consciousness are not 
coextensive in every metaphysically possible world, then they are different 
properties; 3) it is conceptually possible for p-consciousness to occur without a-
consciousness, and vice-versa; therefore, 4) p-consciousness and a-consciousness 
are not coextensive in every metaphysically possible world; therefore, 5) p-
consciousness and a-consciousness are numerically different properties.30 
A step-by-step discussion of Block’s argument would take us too far afield. 
As noted on several occasions, it is not my aim to argue for Block’s distinction. 
Rather, I am only assuming it. Still, it will be worth looking at some of the 
conceptually possible cases which Block comes up with, for that will give us a better 
idea of the distinction itself.  
Start with p-consciousness without a-consciousness. Block (1995, 233) asks 
us to imagine an animal that is p-conscious, but whose brain areas underpinning 
                                                          
30 I should point out that the step from conceptual to metaphysical possibility is not 
always a legitimate one to make. I strongly sympathise with Block’s idea that there being 
conceptually possible cases of p-consciousness without a-consciousness, and vice-versa, 
implies that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are not coextensive in every 
metaphysically possible world. But note that there are uncontroversial cases where 
conceptual possibility does not imply metaphysical possibility. For consider the example 
provided above. While it is conceptually possible that someone drinks water but does not 
drink H2O, relative to the representation that someone drinks water but does not drink 
H2O, it is not metaphysically possible for someone to drink water but not H2O. Why? In 
a nutshell, the reason is that, as Saul Kripke (1980) has convincingly argued, the term 
‘water’ is a rigid designator: it picks out H2O in all metaphysically possible worlds. 
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the systems for reasoning and the rational control of action have been destroyed. 
Surely, says Block, it is at least conceptually possible that the brain machinery 
underlying p-consciousness and the machinery underlying a-consciousness are 
distinct. In this case, the animal’s experiences will be p-conscious without being a-
conscious.  
A second case of p-consciousness without a-consciousness may be the 
following: 
 
Suppose you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon 
you realize that right outside your window there is – and there has been for 
some time – a deafening pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were 
aware of the noise all along, but only at noon you are consciously aware of 
it. That is, you were P-conscious of the noise all along, but at noon you are 
both P-conscious and A-conscious of it (Block 1995, 234).  
 
Thus, although p-conscious all along, your experience of the noise is not a-
conscious until noon. That is to say that, although, before noon, there is something 
it is like for you to hear the noise of the drill, the content of your experience is not 
made available to the relevant cognitive systems until after noon. 31, 32  
Finding conceptually possible cases of a-consciousness without p-
consciousness is more difficult. There is only one such case that Block is able to 
come up with. This is the case of  superblindsight, an imaginary extension of 
blindsight (Ibid., 233). We already know what blindsight is: it is the capacity of 
subjects that have suffered damage to the primary visual cortex to respond to 
                                                          
31 It is apparent that on top of being metaphysically possible, the pneumatic drill 
scenario may be an actual case of p-consciousness without a-consciousness. 
32 Here is a similar case from Tyler Burge: “[i]f one ‘sees stars’ in a drunken stupor but 
cannot reason with or about that state, the images might be phenomenally conscious, but 
thoughts with or about such a state might be unconscious in the sense that they are not 
[access conscious]” (2007, 385). 
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stimuli in their blind field, albeit only when probed. Superblindsighters are 
imaginary blindsight subjects that, through intensive training, have acquired the 
ability to make guesses about stimuli in their blind field without being instructed 
to guess. To put it with Daniel Dennett, superblindsighters have acquired the 
ability to “guess when to guess” (1991, 331). When a stimulus is presented in a 
superblindsighter’s blind field, “visual information from his blind field simply pops 
into his thoughts in the way […] some people just know the time or which way is 
North without having any perceptual experience of it” (Block 1995, 233). In this 
respect, superblindsighters are similar to Elijah Chudnoff’s blindfolded clairvoyant 
(2012). When walking into a room, the blindfolded clairvoyant knows how the 
room is arranged, even though there is nothing it is like for her to (visually) 
perceive the room. On the assumption that p-consciousness is actually missing in 
blindsight, superblindsight might then count as a case of a-consciousness without 
p-consciousness. For even though a superblindsighter’s visual perceptual state is 
not p-conscious, the contents of the state are available to be used in thought, 
report, etc.33  
With superblindsight, I conclude my exposition of Block’s argument. Before 
moving onto the next section, however, I should make it clear that to claim that p-
consciousness and a-consciousness are different properties is not to say that, in this 
world, one can occur without the other, and vice-versa. The two may well be 
different properties but, as a matter of empirical fact, always co-occur. Block’s 
(1995) claim is thus compatible with the possibility that p-consciousness and a-
consciousness are “empirically inseparable” (Chalmers 1997, 148). 
                                                          
33 Unlike Block, Daniel Dennett (1991, 322–44) thinks that a superblindsighter’s visual 
perceptual state would actually be phenomenally conscious. Indeed, Dennett uses the 
same thought experiment in order to show that there is nothing more to phenomenal 
consciousness than the functional role of the mental states that have it.   
  Chapter 2 
62 
 
3. Access Consciousness as Broadcasting in a Global Workspace 
Since Block’s (1995), our understanding of a-consciousness has increased 
dramatically. Many researchers from different fields (e.g. Carruthers 2015; Dennett 
2001; Kanwisher 2001; Kouider and Sackur 2014; Shelton et al. 2008) now agree that 
GWM (the global workspace model) offers an empirically-grounded and 
theoretically-satisfying account of our capacity to access our mental states. As 
Block himself notes, “[there is] impressive evidence that our ability to report our 
mental states hinges on such a global workspace” (2007, 491).34, 35 Indeed, the model 
makes a number of empirically testable predictions, most of which have been borne 
out by studies of different nature. These include anatomical, physiological, brain 
imaging, and pharmacological studies (Dehaene et al. 1998; Dehaene and Naccache 
2001; Dehaene and Changeux 2011). It should thus be safe to say that the model in 
question is the model of a-consciousness. 
GWM was originally put forward by Bernard Baars (1988), and later 
developed in a neural/neuronal direction by Dehaene and colleagues. (In what 
follows, I am going to use the terms ‘neural’ and ‘neuronal’ interchangeably). 
Although my focus in this work will be on Dehaene et al.’s version of the model, 
below I begin setting the stage by outlining some of the model’s key tenets as 
introduced by Baars.  
A terminological note. Recently (e.g., 2007; 2008; 2015), Block has replaced 
the phrase ‘access consciousness’ by the phrase ‘cognitive accessibility’: “[a]ccess 
consciousness was my term for approximately what I am calling ‘cognitive 
accessibility’ here” (2007, 486). The main difference between the two phrases is 
that while ‘access consciousness’ implies that there are two different concepts of 
                                                          
34 Block only mentions report, but he also has in mind reasoning, the rational control 
of action, etc. 
35 In line with Block, Carruthers writes that “there is now extensive evidence supporting 
the global broadcasting account” (2015a, 52). 
Chapter 2 
63 
 
consciousness, ‘cognitive accessibility’ does not (Coates and Coleman 2015, 329). 
For my purposes, I will overlook the difference between the two phrases and use 
them interchangeably. This means that I will sometimes talk of GWM as a model 
of a-consciousness, and sometimes as a model of cognitive accessibility, or 
accessibility tout court.  
3.1. Baars’s Global Workspace Model 
GWM construes the cognitive system as comprising two major functional spaces: 
a “massive parallel set of specialized processors” (Baars 2005, 46, emphasis mine), 
and a global workspace.36 A processor is defined “as a relatively unitary, organized 
set of processes that work together in the service of a particular function” (Baars 
1988, 50). In this sense, processors are functionally unified or modular sets of 
processes. The global workspace, on the other hand, might tentatively be 
characterized as a system that allows processors to exchange information with one 
another (Ibid., 87). Let us close in on processors and the global workspace in order. 
Processors have one job: to compute or transform mental representations.37 
Among others, there are processors tasked with computing sensory or perceptual 
representations; processors tasked with computing representations of objects or 
events stored in different kinds of memory (long-term memory, recognition 
memory, etc.); and processors dedicated to the computation of mental 
representations relevant to language recognition and production. (Ibid., 43–64).38  
Processors have a number of important features. For one thing, as 
mentioned, they (typically) work in parallel. In this sense, processors are quite 
autonomous or independent from one another: one processor need not rely on 
                                                          
36 See also (Baars 1988, chap. 2). 
37 What is it to compute a mental representation? Following Jerry Fodor, we may 
understand the computation of a mental representation as “a transformation of 
representations which respects these sorts of semantic relations [i.e., implication, 
confirmation, and logical consequence]” (1981, 5).  
38 This is by no means supposed to be an exhaustive list. 
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another processor’s work. Second, processors are highly specialized: each processor 
or small set of processors is able to process a very specific kind of input only. For 
example, some processors may only be able to process specific types of visual 
information, while others may only be able to process specific types of auditory 
information. Third, because of their high level of specialization, processors are 
relatively rigid. What this means is that they are quite bad at processing unfamiliar 
or novel kinds of information. At the same time, in virtue of the fact that they 
always process the same kind of information, processors are very fast and efficient. 
Last, processors are characterised by a variable composition. As Baars explains, 
“processors are like Chinese puzzle boxes: they are structured recursively, so that a 
processor may consist of a coalition of processors, which in turn may also be a 
member of an even larger set of processors that can act as a single chunk” (Ibid., 
62).  
Alongside specialized processors, the cognitive architecture of the 
mind/brain comprises a further component, namely, the global workspace. In 
Baars’s own words, the global workspace “is a fleeting memory capacity that 
enables access between brain functions that are otherwise separate” (2005, 46). The 
global workspace is a system that enables otherwise isolated processors to 
disseminate information across the whole cognitive system, thereby allowing them 
find (or at least look for) common solutions to problems that individual processors 
are unable to handle by themselves (1988, 87). Baars  aptly compares the global 
workspace to a “television broadcasting station in a human community” and to a 
“blackboard in a classroom” (Ibid., 74). At any one time, a number of processors 
compete or cooperate to “broadcast” a message – some piece of information – 
across the entire system for further processing (Ibid.). 
An analogy from Baars himself will help make the picture clearer (Ibid., 87–
88). We can compare specialized processors to a very large community of human 
experts gathered in an auditorium. Suppose now that the whole community is 
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presented with a problem, and that none of the experts who understand (or partly 
understand) that problem, are, however, able to solve it all by themselves. Call the 
set of the experts that understand (or partly understand) the problem E. How might 
a member of E, E1, find and communicate with E2, E3, and En, and get to work on 
that problem with them? A blackboard in the front of the auditorium might do the 
trick. E1 might write a message on the blackboard, thereby making it potentially 
available for everyone else in the auditorium to read. In this way, E2, E3, and En 
will be able to read what’s written on the blackboard, and react. Thanks to the 
blackboard, E’s members will then also be able to keep exchanging information, 
and work towards a common solution to the relevant problem. 
In an analogous way, the global workspace allows specialized processors to 
disseminate information across the entire cognitive system, and to solve problems 
that they would not be able to solve by themselves. Specialization has several 
advantages: one knows exactly what to do in particular routine situations. Yet, 
specialization implies a lack of flexibility in dealing with new situations. A 
specialized processor is very good at dealing with what is known, but very bad at 
dealing with novelty (Ibid., 77). By providing specialized processors with a space to 
distribute information to, and react to information from, other processors, the 
global workspace allows the cognitive system to effectively deal with problems that 
arise in novel domains. Examples of novel domains are learning a new language or 
learning how to ride a bicycle. In cases such as these, the rigid, highly specialized 
nature of the single processors may be an issue. Novelty requires new strategies to 
solve new problems. It requires a kind of flexibility that the single processors lack. 
Thanks to the global workspace, information from otherwise separate sources of 
knowledge may then be put together to reach solutions to new problems (Ibid., 
89).  
More generally, the global workspace allows specialized processors to solve 
“problems whose solutions are underdetermined” (Baars Ibid., 92). Aside from 
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arising in novel domains, these problems commonly arise in ambiguous domains – 
that is, domains that allow for multiple interpretations. Ambiguities, suggests 
Baars, are often found both in language and visual processing, for example. To deal 
with ambiguities, a unified and coherent interpretation has to be found. This, in 
Baars’s view (Ibid., 77), requires the cooperation and coordination of multiple 
specialized processors at the same time. 
To summarize, according to Baars, the functional architecture of the 
mind/brain comprises a set of specialized processors and a global workspace. 
Processors are highly specialized, functionally unified sets of processes that 
(typically) operate in parallel. The global workspace, on the other hand, is a fleeting 
memory capacity that allows specialized processors to disseminate information 
across the whole system, and to cooperate towards the solution of problems that 
each individual processor would not be able to solve by itself. In this way, the global 
workspace allows the mind/brain to, among other things, effectively deal with 
novel situations, and readily resolve ambiguities.  
But in what sense is GWM supposed to be a model of cognitive accessibility? 
I have said nothing about this issue yet, at least not explicitly. This is the aim of the 
section immediately below. There, I introduce Dehaene et al.’s further 
development of GWM and close in on the relationship between the latter and 
cognitive accessibility. I should point out again, however, that in what follows I 
only offer a first pass at both GWM and its relationship with a-consciousness, and 
that I will be offering a more detailed account of both over the next few chapters.   
3.2. The Global Neuronal Workspace Model 
When speaking of the GWM, what philosophers and cognitive scientists normally 
have in mind today is the model as has more recently been developed by the 
cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene and colleagues (e.g., Dehaene et al. 
1998; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene et al. 2006; Dehaene and Changeux 
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2011). What Dehaene and colleagues have done is develop Baars’s original version 
of GWM in a neural direction, and provide a massive amount of evidence in its 
support. (It is GWM as further developed by Dehaene and colleagues that I will 
assume in the remainder of this work). Like Baars, Dehaene and Naccache (2001, 
12) hold that the mind/brain is to be construed as a massive set of specialized 
processors on which “automatic […] cognitive processing rests”. At the level of the 
brain, these processors can be found both in cortical and subcortical regions 
(Dehaene and Changeux 2004, 1146). Processors dedicated to the processing of 
motion, for example, can be found in area V5 (or MT) of the visual cortex, while 
processors dedicated to the processing of faces in the so-called ‘fusiform-face area’.  
On top of this large collection of specialized processors, 
 
The human brain also comprises a distributed neural system or “workspace” with 
long-distance connectivity that can potentially interconnect multiple specialized 
brain areas in a coordinated though variable manner. Through the workspace, 
modular systems that do not directly exchange information in an automatic mode 
can nevertheless gain access to each other’s content. The global workspace thus 
provides a common “communication protocol” through which a particularly large 
potential for the combination of multiple input, output, and internal systems 
becomes available (Dehaene and Naccache 2001, 13). 
 
According to the model, the global workspace consists of a set of cortical neurons 
with long-distance connections – that is, with particularly long axons. Through 
their long-distance connections, these neurons allow a variety of modular systems 
(processors) to exchange information. In this way, the global workspace “break[s] 
the modularity” of the mind/brain (Ibid., 1147). Indeed, as Dehaene et al. (1998, 
14530) point out (but see also Dehaene and Naccache 2001, 14), at least five 
categories of modular systems are interconnected through the workspace: 1) 
perceptual systems; 2) motor systems – which include speech-production and 
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language systems; 3) long-term memory systems; 4) evaluation systems; 5) 
attentional systems. 
But what is the connection with a-consciousness? Focusing on the 
accessibility of perceptual representations, the idea is that, by broadcasting the 
content of their output representations in the global workspace, perceptual 
processors can make such content “available to a variety of processes including 
perceptual categorization, long term memorization, evaluation, and intentional 
action” (Dehaene and Naccache 2001, 1, emphasis mine). Cognitive accessibility is 
thus to be explained in terms of the content of a mental state/representation being 
globally broadcast.  
A very clear picture of the relation between the global broadcasting of 
perceptual information and cognitive accessibility is offered by Block, who has 
endorsed the neural GWM in many of his papers (e.g. 2002; 2007; 2008).  Block 
(2007a, 491) usefully distinguishes between suppliers of and consumers of 
information. Perceptual systems can be thought of as supplying information to 
consuming mechanisms. These include “mechanisms of reporting, reasoning, 
evaluating, deciding, and remembering” (Ibid.). Perceptual systems supply 
information to the consuming mechanisms by sending information to “an active 
storage system” (Ibid.) – the global workspace – to which the consuming 
mechanisms are connected. Information that is sent to this storage system is 
directly available to all cognitive mechanisms. That is, it is “available to all cognitive 
mechanisms without further processing” (Ibid.) (see also Block 2009, 1111). 
Even though above I focused on the global broadcasting of perceptual 
information, it is important to note that it is not just perceptual systems that can 
broadcast information in the workspace. In other words, it is not just perceptual 
systems that act as suppliers of information. On the contrary, other systems, too, 
can (and do) function as suppliers of information. An uncontroversial example is 
systems of long-term memory. These systems work both as suppliers and 
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consumers of information. When the content of a perceptual representation is 
globally broadcast, it can, among other things, be stored in long-term memory. In 
this case, long-term memory systems will act as consumers of information. But 
information stored in long-term memory can also be globally broadcast, and thus 
made available for report, for example, as when one is asked to report a past 
experience. In this case, the long-term memory systems will work as suppliers of 
information. In the words of Dehaene and Naccache (2001, 14), these systems can 
“reinstate past workspace states”. That is, they can broadcast information that was 
previously broadcast by the perceptual systems, for example.  
One thing that is worth noting is that even though GWM as developed by 
Dehaene and colleagues is described in neural/anatomical terms, it is still a 
functional model of cognition. There are two main reasons for this claim. First, as 
Dehaene and Naccache acknowledge (Ibid., 14), the global workspace itself does 
not coincide with a single brain structure. Although certain brain areas, like the 
prefrontal cortices, the anterior cingulate, and parietal regions seem to be more 
“important” or “dominant” than others – workspace neurons are particularly dense 
in those areas, which is where the consuming systems are located (Dehaene et al. 
1998, 14533) – there is no “sharp anatomical delineation of the workspace system. 
In time, the contours of the workspace fluctuate as different brain circuits are 
temporarily mobilized, then demobilized. It would therefore be incorrect to 
identify the workspace […] with a fixed set of brain areas” (Dehaene and Naccache 
2001, 14). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the fundamental tenets of the 
model “abstract away from the neuronal details” (Block 2009, 1111). Nothing in the 
model requires the specific biological makeup of the brain. Instead, like any other 
functional model, the GWM can be implement in systems of a wide variety of 
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makeups. That is, it “can just as easily be realized in silicon-based computers as in 
protoplasm” (Ibid.).39 
Before moving onto the next section, I should point out one last thing. 
According to its advocates, GWM is not just a model of a-consciousness. On the 
contrary, it is also meant to be an account of p-consciousness. Essentially, the idea 
is that p-consciousness just is “global information availability” (Dehaene et al. 2011, 
56).40 A representation is thus said to be p-conscious iff it is cognitively accessible; 
that is, iff its content is directly available to the consuming systems (see also Block 
2007a, 492).41 Of direct relevance here is the fact that although GWM is also meant 
to be an account of what Block calls ‘phenomenal consciousness’, nothing prevents 
us from construing it as a model of cognitive accessibility alone. One can endorse 
the model as a model of accessibility, while holding that the model fails to capture 
the nature of phenomenality. I will return to GWM’s identification of p-
consciousness with cognitive accessibility in chapter 4. 
                                                          
39 Thus, as Dennett (2001, 233) writes, “The proposed consensual thesis is […] that this 
global availability […] is, all by itself, a conscious state”. See also Block (2001, 203–4).  
40 That what Dehaene and Naccache are trying to explain is phenomenal consciousness, 
they make it quite clear when they write: “[w]e postulate that this global availability of 
information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious 
state” (2001, 1).  
41 As we will see in chapter 4, on the other end of the spectrum, we find what Block calls 
‘non-cognitive’ theories of consciousness (2015, 165–68). These theories share a 
commitment to the claim that a representation can be phenomenally conscious 
independently of its being broadcast in the workspace. In this sense, these theories do 
retain the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility. 
Importantly, this should not be taken to imply that, once globally broadcast, a perceptual 
representation is no longer phenomenally conscious. Instead, the claim is just that global 
broadcasting is not “part of what it is to be conscious” (Block 2007a, 481). Among others, 
non-cognitive theories of consciousness have been advocated by Block (e.g., 1995, 2007); 
Lamme (2003), and Bronfman et al. (2014). I will discuss these theories at length in chapters 
4 and 5.   
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4. Global Broadcasting, Access Consciousness, and Selective Attention 
Let us assume, for the moment, that global broadcasting is both necessary and 
sufficient for a-consciousness.42 Of central importance for the issues that we will 
discuss in later chapters is the relationship between global broadcasting and 
selective attention (“attention”, for short). Dehaene et al. (e.g., 1998; 2001; 2006) 
suggest that global broadcasting, and thus cognitive accessibility, are strongly 
dependent on attention. But what is attention? Is the above claim justified? And in 
what sense does global broadcasting depend on attention? These are the main 
questions that I aim to address in this section.   
The question of what attention is, has received a great many answers (Mole 
2011). It is not my aim here to argue for one view of attention or another, or even 
review the different answers that have been provided. For my purposes, I will 
instead assume a very thin notion of attention which, in principle, should be 
accepted at least by the majority of researchers. The general idea seems to be that 
attention is a mechanism (or set of mechanisms) whose main purpose is to control 
how our cognitive system’s resources are allocated.43 The background assumption 
is that the cognitive system’s processing capacity is limited: there is only so much 
information that can be handled at any one time (Wu 2014, chap. 1). It is thus 
generally accepted that the role of attention is to filter or select information 
relevant to the organism’s current goals, so as to allow only the selected 
information to reach further stages of processing (Lamme 2004; Wu 2014; 
Carruthers 2015a).44 Attention, in other words, determines the depth of processing 
of information.45 
                                                          
42 I will come back to this assumption at the end of this section. 
43 Even this very general idea, however, has been challenged by some (see Mole 2011). 
44 The so-called ‘filter’ model of attention was originally proposed by (Broadbent 1958). 
45 As we will see, there are other factors involved in determining depth of processing. 
Some stimuli, for example, are processed at a deeper level than others simply because they 
are stronger than others in terms of brightness, colour, or dimension, for example (Lamme, 
n.d., 4). 
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A significant body of evidence has been offered in support of the claim that 
our capacity to report and, more generally, to access our mental states depends on 
attention. In the language of GWM, this claim can also be understood as the claim 
that attentional selection is necessary for global broadcasting. Following Wu (2014, 
chaps. 5–6), we can call this the gatekeeping view of attention: attention is the 
gatekeeper of the global workspace. The basic idea is quite simple. A representation 
of a stimulus/group of stimuli will be broadcast in the global workspace on 
condition that the subject attend to the stimulus. Attention determines or selects 
which representations get into the workspace and, accordingly, which 
representations become available to the relevant consuming systems. By contrast, 
representations of unattended stimuli remain inaccessible, at least until (if ever) 
they are themselves targeted by attention.46  
A much-discussed phenomenon that is thought to lend support to the 
gatekeeping view is inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock 1998). This can be 
broadly defined as a subject’s failure to have an (a-)conscious perception of an 
object or features of an object in plain sight in the absence of attention.47 Several 
experiments are thought to provide evidence for the phenomenon. One of the most 
well-known sets of experiments is Simons and Chabris’s (1999).  
In one experiment, subjects were invited to watch a videotape, and were 
later asked whether they had noticed anything unusual. Prior to viewing the video, 
subjects were told that they would be watching two teams of three players, one in 
black, and one in white, passing basketballs. Subjects were also instructed to pay 
attention to either the team in black or the team in white, and to keep count of the 
number of passes made by the attended team (the Easy condition), or to keep count 
                                                          
46 I will say more on this very last point in chapter 5. 
47 Some, like Dehaene and colleagues, would define inattentional blindness a subject’s 
failure to have a conscious (without the ‘a’) perception of an object or features of an object 
in plain sight in the absence of attention. As I will explain below, however, one can believe 
that attentional blindness is a true phenomenon, and understand ‘blindness’ as having to 
do with a-consciousness, but not p-consciousness. 
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“of the number of bounce passes and aerial passes made by the attended team (the 
Hard condition)” (Ibid., 1066) .   
After 44 - 48 sec. from the beginning of the video, an unexpected event took 
place: an actor wearing a gorilla costume walked through the scene, from one side 
of the action to the other. The event lasted for 5 sec. Both during, and after the 
event, the players continued passing basketballs as before. After the video ended, 
subjects were immediately asked to record their counts on paper. They were then 
asked whether they had noticed a gorilla walk across the screen. Surprisingly, about 
half of the subjects provided a negative answer: they had failed to notice the gorilla 
walking through the scene. Even more surprisingly, the experimenters obtained 
roughly the same results when, instead of simply walking through the scene, the 
gorilla “stopped in the middle of the display, turned the face to the camera, 
thumped its chest, and then continued walking across the field of view” (Ibid., 
1069). 
There is wide agreement that experiments like the ones above lend support 
to the inattentional blindness hypothesis (Mack and Rock 1998; Simons and 
Chabris 1999; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Carruthers 2015a).48 Following Wu 
(2014, 159), we can reconstruct the inference as follows. We begin from the 
observation that subjects do not report seeing the gorilla. From this, it is inferred 
that, while the gorilla was walking across the screen, no representation of the 
gorilla was (a-)conscious. Given that all (or almost all) of the subjects’ attentional 
resources were focused on the ball, it is further inferred that subjects were not 
attending to the gorilla. Hence, there is evidence that no representation of the 
gorilla was (a-)conscious, and that subjects were not attending to the gorilla. 
Proceeding by inference to the best explanation, it is then concluded that a 
representation of the gorilla was not (a-)conscious because subjects were not 
                                                          
48 Although see Watzl (2017) for a dissident position. 
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attending to the gorilla. Hence, attention is necessary for (a-)consciousness. 
According to the advocates of GWM, the above conclusion further implies that 
attention is necessary for global broadcasting. 
I should note that the inattentional blindness hypothesis is not 
uncontroversial, though. For failure to report a previously seen stimulus is 
compatible with the claim that subjects were (a-)conscious of the stimulus. Indeed, 
in connection to the Simons and Chabris’s experiments, for example, one might 
suggest that whilst watching the video subjects did become (a-)conscious of the 
gorilla, but failed to report seeing it because no representation of the stimulus was 
stored in memory. According to this reading of the evidence, inattention results in 
memory lapses, rather than in a representation’s failure to become (a-)conscious 
(Wu 2014; Carruthers 2015a). Such a hypothesis is normally known as ‘inattentional 
amnesia’. It is not my aim here to engage in a thorough defence of the inattentional 
blindness against the inattentional amnesia hypothesis. Yet, as Carruthers (2015a) 
notes – correctly, in my view – the inattentional amnesia hypothesis is a very 
implausible alternative. For in experiments like Simons and Chabris’s, the event or 
stimulus that subjects fail to report is, to put it with Carruthers, “both unusual and 
striking” (Ibid., 54). This makes it really hard to understand how, if seen, such an 
event would fail to be remembered, as the defender of the inattentional amnesia 
hypothesis contends (Ibid.). 
Importantly, it should be borne in mind that, for those who equate a-
consciousness with p-consciousness, the experiments above show that attention is 
necessary for consciousness simpliciter. Someone, like Block, who distinguishes 
between p-consciousness and a-consciousness can endorse the inattentional 
blindness thesis and understand ‘blindness’ as having to do with a-consciousness, 
but not p-consciousness. That is, he can accept that our capacity to access our 
mental states depends on attention, while holding that we can be p-conscious of 
stimuli we do not attend to. In the present context, given our endorsement of 
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Block’s distinction, and given our understanding of GWM as a model of a-
consciousness alone, the ‘blindness’ part of ‘inattentional blindness’ should only be 
understood as blindness as concerning a-consciousness (hence my choice to place 
an ‘a-’ in parentheses next to ‘consciousness’ above and below). 
Let me cover one more piece of evidence that lends support to the 
gatekeeping view of attention. Lesions to the right parietal region of the brain often 
lead to a condition known as hemineglect (e.g., Driver and Mattingley 1998; 
Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Driver and Vuilleumier 2001). In most, everyday 
circumstances, hemineglect patients fail to report and/or act upon stimuli on the 
left side of space. To put it more vividly, they act as if the left side of space did not 
exist (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001, 40).49 Focusing our attention on visual 
perception, hemineglect patients may fail to read words on the left side of a page, 
ignore people on the left, etc. Consistently with the above, in experimental settings, 
when presented with two stimuli side by side, one on the right of fixation, and the 
other on the left, hemineglect patients only report seeing the stimulus on the right. 
But there is something very surprising: when the stimulus on the left is presented 
alone, patients often report seeing it. This is consistent with the fact that, unlike 
blindsight, in hemineglect patients, most of the neural systems and pathways 
underpinning visual perception (including the primary visual cortex) are left 
untouched. But if most of the visual perceptual machinery is there, and if, when 
the left stimulus is presented alone, patients report seeing it, why is it that they fail 
to do so, when right and left stimuli are presented simultaneously?  
The most credited hypothesis is that hemineglect is an attentional 
impairment. When subjects are presented with two stimuli, one on the right of 
fixation, and the other on the left, the stimuli compete for attention. This is thought 
to happen in hemineglect and normal subjects alike. In the former, however, 
                                                          
49 In the remainder of this paragraph, and in the next, I will draw on the work of Driver 
and Vuilleumier (2001). 
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attention is thought to be strongly biased towards the right side of space. For this 
reason, in simultaneous presentation conditions, stimuli on the right are always 
going to win the competition for attention, and are thus said to extinguish the 
stimuli on the left. 
Different lines of evidence support the attentional impairment hypothesis 
of hemineglect. For one thing, as mentioned, in hemineglect patients, most of the 
neural systems and pathways underpinning visual perception are left intact. 
Consistently with this, as we have seen, when subjects are presented with one lone 
stimulus in the left side, they report seeing it. Secondly, in experimental settings, 
hemineglect can be temporarily reversed (Watzl 2017). The reversal of the 
condition is normally achieved by presenting patients with very salient stimuli on 
the neglected side, thereby “forcing attention to it” (Ibid., 256). Last, but not least, 
the right parietal region of the brain has traditionally been thought to underpin the 
capacity to guide attention into one’s visual field (Watzl 2017). 
What is the upshot for the gatekeeping view? On the plausible assumption 
that hemineglect is indeed an attentional impairment, the condition is strong 
evidence for the claim that there can be no (a-)consciousness – and thus no global 
broadcasting – in the absence of attention (Dehaene and Naccache 2001). 
Accordingly, hemineglect is strong evidence for the gatekeeping view.  
Having established that attention is necessary for cognitive accessibility 
(and global broadcasting), how does it work? The idea is that attention triggers the 
global broadcasting of information about the attended stimulus/group of stimuli. 
We do not know the exact mechanisms behind the triggering yet. The general idea, 
however, is that when one attends to a certain stimulus, attention amplifies/boosts 
the activity of selected groups of processors beyond a certain threshold, while 
suppressing the activity of other groups (Dehaene and Changeux 2004, 1147).50 
                                                          
50 See also Dehaene and Naccache (2001, 19) 
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Once the activity of the selected groups of processors reaches that threshold, global 
broadcasting occurs. Following Carruthers (2015b, 4, 2015a, 84) we may thus called 
such a threshold the “threshold for global broadcasting”.  
By ‘activity’ here, I mean neural activity (or activation). For according to 
GWM, processors are highly specialized cortical or subcortical groups of neurons, 
each group being dedicated to the processing of a very specific kind of information. 
In the case of visual perception, this may be information about a certain kind of 
horizontal motion, or information about the edges of objects. When one attends 
to a stimulus/group of stimuli, attentional signals target the activity of selected 
groups of neurons, thereby boosting it beyond the threshold for global 
broadcasting, and suppressing the activity of other groups.51   
One last point. I have assumed that global broadcasting is both necessary 
and (all other things being equal) sufficient for a-consciousness. As a consequence, 
I have understood arguments for the conclusion that attention is necessary for a-
consciousness, also as arguments for the conclusion that attention is necessary for 
global broadcasting. As I will argue in the next chapter, however, I think that there 
is one further condition that must be met for a-consciousness to be present. This 
is what I will call the ‘functionality condition’. Roughly, the idea is that for a state 
to be a-conscious, it is necessary, alongside global broadcasting, that the 
consuming systems be functional. But this raises an issue: how can we be sure that 
attention is a necessary for global broadcasting, rather than for the consuming 
systems to be functional? What justifies the inference from the claim that attention 
is necessary for a-consciousness to the claim that attention is necessary for global 
broadcasting?  
                                                          
51 It is worth noting that, according to view of attention under discussion, the neural 
activity targeted by attention is activity in the so-called mid-level sensory areas of the brain 
(Carruthers 2014, 147). In the case of visual perception, these are those areas of the visual 
cortex that are responsible for processing “color, form, motion, spatial layout, and faces” 
(Ibid.).  
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The answer is that the evidence that I have discussed in this chapter is 
corroborated by evidence of a different nature. Thanks to different brain imaging 
techniques, it has been possible to establish that it is only when one attends to a 
certain stimulus/group of stimuli, that neural activation extends from the occipito-
temporal areas in the “back of the head”, to the more “frontal” areas that are 
thought to underpin/realize much of the global workspace. On the other hand, 
when the relevant stimulus is not attended, neural activation remains confined in 
the “back of the head” (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2006).52 From this, it is inferred that 
attention is necessary for the content of a perceptual representation to be broadcast 
in the workspace.53  
The reader will probably wonder why I have chosen to discuss inattentional 
blindness and hemineglect, rather the evidence that I just mentioned in the 
paragraph above. The reason has to do with the fact that, for the purposes of 
chapter 2, I needed a way to establish that attention is necessary for a-
consciousness, and that such a claim can be endorsed even by someone who’s not 
committed to GWM. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
I started this chapter by introducing Block’s distinction between p-consciousness 
and a-consciousness. As noted on several occasions, Block’s distinction is a 
fundamental assumption of this work. More specifically, as I pointed out in §2.2.3., 
the assumption is that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are different concepts, 
but also numerically different properties. The claim that the two are different 
properties, I should stress, is to be kept distinct from the stronger claim that they 
are not coextensive in the actual world. Something else that I should stress is that, 
in spite of my commitment to Block’s distinction, I wish to remain neutral as to 
                                                          
52 I will come back to this point in chapters 4 and 5. 
53 In chapter 4, I will also argue that, all other things being equal, attention is also 
sufficient for global broadcasting.  
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whether p-consciousness is neither functional nor identical to a mental state’s 
having a certain representational content. 
In the second part of the chapter I gave a first pass at defining GWM, the 
model of a-consciousness that Block and I assume. As explained, according to 
GWM, access consciousness is a matter of the content of a representation being 
broadcast in the global workspace. Globally broadcast contents are directly 
available – “without further processing” (Block 2007a, 491) – to systems of report, 
deliberation, memory, and so on. More will be said on GWM and its relationship 
with a-consciousness over the next chapters. 
In the third (and last) part of the chapter, I argued, together with the 
advocates of GWM, that attention is necessary for both a-consciousness and global 
broadcasting. As we will see, the former claim will be particularly important for the 
purposes of chapter 3, and the latter for the purposes of chapter 4 and 5. We are 
now ready to consider, and evaluate, Kriegel’s account of the functional role of p-
consciousness. 
   
80 
 
Chapter 3 
 
81 
 
3  
 
Kriegel on the Functional Role of Phenomenal 
Consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter challenges Uriah Kriegel’s account of the functional role of p-
consciousness. Against the backdrop of his self-representational theory of p-
consciousness (2009), Kriegel (2007, 2009, 2015) argues that the relationship 
between p-consciousness and a-consciousness is analogous to the one between the 
molecular structure of salt and salt’s solubility: p-consciousness is the categorical 
basis of a-consciousness. On this basis, Kriegel then construes a-consciousness as 
(part of) the functional role of p-consciousness. 
I offer two arguments against Kriegel’s account. First, I argue that the 
account is incompatible with the Global Workspace Model of a-consciousness 
(GWM). On the assumption that an account of the functional role of p-
consciousness must be compatible with GWM, I then conclude that Kriegel’s 
account is untenable. Second, I argue that the account gets the relationship 
between a-consciousness and attention wrong. As I argued in chapter 1, the 
empirical evidence strongly suggests that a-consciousness depends on attention. 
On Kriegel’s account of the functional role of p-consciousness, however, a 
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representation can be a-conscious even in the (almost complete) absence of 
attention.  
Here is the plan. In §2, I provide an outline of representationalism about p-
consciousness in general. In §3, I introduce Kriegel’s self-representational account 
of p-consciousness, and in §4 his account of the functional role of p-consciousness. 
My arguments against Kriegel’s account of the functional role of p-consciousness 
will be developed in §5, in the order outlined in the paragraph above.  
2. Representationalism about Phenomenal Consciousness: A Brief Outline 
Representationalism about p-consciousness holds that the phenomenal character 
of a mental state – its p-conscious aspect – is explainable in non-phenomenal terms, 
or, more specifically, in terms of intentionality.54 As explained in the previous 
chapter, the intentionality of a mental state is that feature whereby the state is 
directed at, or about, a certain object, property, or state of affairs. As is typically 
understood, the term ‘intentional’ is to be considered on a par with 
‘representational’. Intentional mental states are representational states. 
Representational mental states have content, and this content is normally taken to 
be a proposition. Thus, my belief that Mars is a planet has, as its content, the 
proposition that Mars is a planet. 
There are two main brands of representationalism: first-order and higher-
order. First-order representationalism (FOR) purports to explain the phenomenal 
character of an experience, its p-conscious aspect, in terms of its first-order content; 
i.e., in terms of its representing the world as being a certain way. Thus, for example, 
                                                          
54 Qualifications are already in order. The literature distinguishes between weak and 
strong representationalism about p-consciousness (e.g., Levine 2003, 57–76; Chalmers 
2010, 339–79). Weak representationalism holds that p-conscious states always exhibit 
intentionality. Strong representationalism, instead, holds that the p-conscious aspect of a 
mental state is explainable in terms of the state’s intentional properties. As should be 
apparent, the kind of representationalism that I am concerned with here is strong 
representationalism. 
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FOR will explain the phenomenal character of a visual experience as of a red tomato 
on the counter in terms of its representing that there is a red tomato on the counter, 
say. But virtually all advocates of FOR agree that mental representation alone does 
not suffice for p-consciousness. Thus, typically, it is also required that for an 
experience to have phenomenal character, the experience or its content satisfy 
further constraints.55  
For example, according to one influential version of FOR, due to Michael 
Tye (e.g., 1995; 2000), an experience has phenomenal character iff, among other 
things, it is poised to make an impact on the belief-desire system, and its content 
is non-conceptual. As concerns being poised, the thought is that p-conscious 
experiences are states that are disposed to inform our beliefs and desires. As for 
non-conceptuality, the idea is that p-conscious experiences are states one can be 
in, regardless of whether one possesses the relevant concepts. As an example, I can 
have a visual experience as of a specific shade of blue – majorelle blue, say – even if 
I lack the concept of majorelle blue. 
Higher-order representationalism (HOR) is a family of theories that purport 
to explain the phenomenal character of an experience in terms of its being suitably 
represented by a higher-order state. Suppose I am enjoying a visual experience as 
of a red patch of colour. According to HOR, the experience’s representing that there 
is a red patch of colour will not suffice for it to have phenomenal character. On the 
contrary, the experience itself must also be suitably represented by some higher-
                                                          
55 Thus, the literature distinguishes between pure and impure (strong) 
representationalism (Bourget and Mendelovici 2014; Chalmers 2010). Pure 
representationalism is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of a mental state – its p-
conscious properties – are identical with pure intentional properties. A pure intentional 
property is the property of having a certain content. Impure representationalism, instead, 
holds that phenomenal properties are identical to impure intentional properties. An 
impure intentional property is the property of representing something in a certain manner; 
e.g., visually, auditorily, doxastically, etc. Furthermore, as Chalmers notes, “manners of 
representation may also involve functional characterizations of the representing state” 
(2010, 342). More on this immediately below.   
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order state. The main reason for this constraint is that, according to the advocate 
of HOR, it does justice to the idea “that all (or at least most) mental state-types 
admit of both conscious and unconscious varieties” (Carruthers 2016, n/a). 
One of the main points of disagreement between different higher-order 
theories is this. Following a tradition which goes back to (at least) John Locke 
(1975), some philosophers, like Lycan (1996), take the relevant higher-order state 
to be perception-like. On this view, the relevant higher-order representations are 
non-conceptual. Others, like Rosenthal (2005), however, take the relevant higher-
order state to be thought-like. According to theories like Rosenthal’s, the relevant 
higher-order representations are conceptual. 
By requiring that experience be the object of some higher-order 
representation, HOR purports to do justice to the intuition that p-conscious 
experiences are experiences their subjects are aware of. According to the advocates 
of HOR, FOR holds the merit of having made progress with respect to the question 
of why a certain experience has this, rather than that phenomenal character 
(Kriegel 2009). Yet, they go on to suggest, FOR is unable to explain why our 
experiences are p-conscious at all. To do this, FOR would have to explain how we 
come to be aware of our experiences, which it does not.    
Traditionally, higher-order theories of p-consciousness have construed the 
higher-order representation and the experience as numerically distinct states. 
More recently, however, authors like Uriah Kriegel (2009) have argued for the 
alternative view that the higher-order representational state is actually constitutive 
of the experience itself.56 According to this view, known as Self-
Representationalism (SR), an experience has phenomenal character just in case it 
represents itself in a suitable manner.  
                                                          
56 More on this in §3. 
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While it is true that, unlike traditional HOR, SR does not distinguish a 
higher-order state from a lower-level one, the latter can generally still be seen as a 
higher-order theory (Carruthers 2016). Indeed, like standard higher-order theories, 
SR accounts for the phenomenal character of experience in terms of its having two 
different contents: a first-order content, whereby the experience represents the 
world, and a second-order content, whereby the experience represents itself.  
3. Kriegel’s Self-Representational Theory of P-Consciousness 
This section outlines Kriegel’s theory of p-consciousness. Following Kriegel’s (2012) 
explanatory strategy, I begin my exposition of his theory by outlining his account 
of the explanandum – p-consciousness. At a later stage, I will then introduce his 
account of the explanans – peripheral inner awareness and, ultimately, self-
representation.  
Levine (2001) distinguishes between two aspects of phenomenal character: 
what he calls subjectivity, on the one hand, and qualitative character, on the other. 
Consider my experience as of a red sunset. There is something it is like for me to 
have the experience, a reddish way it is like for me. This is the overall phenomenal 
character of the experience. According to Levine, “subjectivity is the phenomenon 
of there being something it is like for me to see” the red sunset (Ibid., 7). Qualitative 
character, instead, “concerns the ‘what’ it’s like for me: reddish or greenish, painful 
or pleasurable, and the like” (Ibid.). 
Echoing Levine, Kriegel (2009), too, distinguishes between qualitative 
character and subjectivity, although he prefers to call the latter subjective 
character. Again, with reference to my experience as of a red sunset, qualitative 
character is the reddish aspect of phenomenal character, while subjective character 
is its for-me aspect or for-me-ness. In Kriegel’s view, one way of understanding the 
relation between subjective and qualitative character is as a determinable 
/determinate relation. In his own words, “My view is that there are many 
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determinate phenomenal characters – bluish-for-me-ness, greenish-for-me-ness, 
bitterish-for-me-ness, trumpet-for-me-ness, etc. – and the determinable of all of 
them is for-me-ness as such” (2012, 443).57 One consequence of this, notes Kriegel, 
is that subjective character provides the existence conditions of phenomenality, 
while qualitative character provides its identity conditions (Ibid.). While subjective 
character is what makes a mental state “phenomenally conscious at all (rather than 
a non-phenomenal state)” (2009, 10), qualitative character is “what makes it the 
phenomenally conscious state it is (rather than another)” (Ibid.). 
Because subjective character is what makes a mental state p-conscious at 
all, Kriegel identifies it with p-consciousness as such; that is, with “that which is 
common (and peculiar) to all phenomenally conscious states” (2012, 444). For this 
reason, although a complete theory of p-consciousness will also provide an account 
of qualitative character,58 its main concern is to account for subjective character 
(2009, 12–13).   
                                                          
57 Kriegel (2009, 1, 11) suggests that phenomenal character can also be understood as the 
compresence of subjective and qualitative character. However, I believe this way of 
understanding phenomenal character is confusing. The reason is that the term 
‘compresence’ suggests that qualitative and subjective character are two different 
properties. But this is not Kriegel’s view. In fact, qualitative and subjective character are 
just two aspects of the same property (Ibid., 1, 8).  
58 Kriegel (2009, 8) suggests that the qualitative character of a conscious experience at 
a time T is the sum of the qualitative properties the experience instantiates at T. In his 
view, qualitative character is explainable, at least in part, in terms of an experience’s having 
a certain representational content. More specifically, an experience’s having qualitative 
character is partly a matter of its representing certain response-dependent properties (Ibid., 
87). Roughly, a response-dependent property is a dispositional property of objects. It is the 
disposition to cause certain intra-cranial effects, in specific kinds of subjects, under certain 
circumstances (Ibid., 84–93). One important thing to note is that, unlike most 
representational accounts of the qualitative properties of experience, Kriegel takes the 
content involved in qualitative character to be narrow (Ibid., 93). Roughly, what this means 
is that this content is determined, at least in part, by factors that are internal to the 
subject’s head. Another way of explaining the same idea is to say that, according to this 
view, qualitative character is locally supervenient (Kriegel Ibid., 93). That is, roughly, there 
cannot be a difference in qualitative character without an intra-cranial difference. 
Crucially, it should be noted that, according to Kriegel (Ibid., 110), an experience’s having 
a certain representational content is but a necessary condition for it to have qualitative 
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Kriegel’s ultimate aim is to provide a reductive account of subjective 
character; that is, an account of p-consciousness in non-phenomenal terms (Ibid., 
12). 59 To that end, Kriegel begins by explaining subjective character in terms of a 
certain kind of awareness. In his own words, “to say that my experience has 
subjective character is to point to a certain awareness I have of my experience” 
(Ibid., 8). Consider my current visual experience. I am visually aware of my laptop, 
the alarm clock to its left, and the red lamp to its right. Because the objects of my 
awareness are objects and features in my environment, Kriegel calls this awareness 
outer awareness (Ibid., 16). However, one’s awareness can also be directed at one’s 
inner goings on. More precisely, one can also be aware “of internal events and states 
in one’s own mental life” (Ibid.). The latter form of awareness, Kriegel calls inner 
awareness. Inner awareness is fundamental to p-consciousness. Indeed, in Kriegel’s 
view, the right kind of inner awareness is normally both necessary and sufficient for 
a mental state to have subjective character (Ibid., 16-17). But what is the right kind 
of inner awareness? Kriegel thinks it is peripheral inner awareness. Let me explain. 
Normally, notes Kriegel, inner awareness is peripheral. To see what this 
means, consider my current visual experience again. I am visually aware of my 
laptop and a host of other items. But the way I am aware of my laptop differs from 
the way I am aware of the red lamp to its right, and the alarm clock to its left. In 
particular, I am currently focally aware of the laptop, but only peripherally aware of 
the other items. In a more picturesque manner, we can say that the laptop occupies 
the centre stage of my consciousness, while the lamp and the clock occupy one of 
its outer sides.  
                                                          
character. Indeed, for an experience to have qualitative character, it is also necessary that 
the experience be for the subject. As we will see immediately below, an experience is for 
the subject just in case the latter is aware of the former in the right way. 
59 I should point out that the claim that subjective character is the main explanandum 
of a theory of p-consciousness was already emphasized by Levine (2001). According to both 
Levine and Kriegel, it is subjective character – or ‘subjectivity’ as Levine calls it – that is 
responsible for the explanatory gap, and that, as a consequence, is where the deepest 
problem of consciousness lies.  
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The focal/peripheral distinction extends to inner awareness (Ibid., 47). On 
occasion, we can be focally aware of our experience. This happens when we 
introspect. In that case, we bring our experience to the “forefront of consciousness”. 
In all other circumstances, however, we are only peripherally aware of our 
experience. That is to say that, typically, the awareness we have of our own 
experiences is analogous to the awareness I have of the alarm clock beside my 
laptop, the traffic noise in the background, and so on. While being introspectively 
(focally) aware of my experience is sufficient for it to have subjective character, it 
normally is not necessary. That is precisely because, aside from those rare cases in 
which we introspect, we are normally only peripherally aware of our experiences. 
In this sense, normally, peripheral inner awareness is both necessary and sufficient 
for subjective character. More strongly, in Kriegel’s own words, “subjective 
character just is normally peripheral inner awareness” (Ibid., 50, emphasis mine).  
(One note. Because focal inner awareness is of secondary importance – for 
both Kriegel’s theory and my critique below – we can now put it aside, and focus 
exclusively on peripheral inner awareness. Moreover, unless otherwise specified, in 
the remainder of this chapter, I use ‘inner awareness’ and ‘peripheral inner 
awareness’ interchangeably). 
But how is inner awareness to be explained? Kriegel argues that it should be 
explained in self-representational terms. As anticipated, like traditional HOR, 
Kriegel holds that being aware of one’s experience is a matter of being in a mental 
state that represents the experience. Unlike traditional HOR, however, he rejects 
the idea the state representing the experience – on the one hand – and the 
experience itself – on the other – are numerically distinct states. On the contrary, 
in his view, to be aware of one’s experience is a matter of having an experience that 
represents itself (in the right way).60  
                                                          
60 In Kriegel’s view, a mental state is p-conscious iff it represents itself non-derivatively, 
specifically, and essentially (2009, 157–164). As Kriegel (2012, 445) explains, “The first 
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One of the most important aspects (if not the most important aspect) of 
Kriegel’s theory is his account of the ontology of self-representation. That is, his 
account of just what kind of property self-representation (and hence p-
consciousness) is (Ibid., 200). What is it for a mental state to represent itself? 
Kriegel opts for an account that appeals to the notions of broadly causal relation 
and indirect representation. Let me explain.  
Roughly, Kriegel’s idea is that p-conscious states are complex, two-part 
states, where ‘complex’ means that the overall state is not a mere sum of the two 
parts, but a single entity of which the two parts are proper parts. P-conscious states 
comprise a lower-order part (P1) and a higher-order part (P2). Suppose you are 
having a p-conscious experience as of a shining star. P1 represents the star as 
shining – it is, so to speak, world-directed. P2, instead, represents the whole mental 
state – that is, P1 plus itself. The question now is just how P2 does what it does. 
Kriegel’s idea can be explained in two steps. The first step involves P2’s representing 
P1. Kriegel’s thought is that P2 represents P1 by standing in a broadly causal relation 
with it. The kind of broadly causal relation that Kriegel has in mind is that of 
covariation. Thus, for example, the number of rings on a tree’s trunk represents the 
tree’s age in virtue of a covariation between the former and the latter.  
The second step involves P2’s representing the whole mental state. This, 
Kriegel explains in terms of the notion of indirect representation. What is it to 
represent indirectly? Consider a painting of a house. The painting depicts a house, 
even though a small part of the house is occluded by a bush. Kriegel thinks it is 
natural to suggest that the painting represents the entire house (indirectly) in 
virtue of representing a big part of it (directly). In this sense, notes Kriegel, “it seems 
                                                          
qualification is designed to rule out merely derivative, or conventional, self-representation 
(as in, e.g., the sentence ‘this very sentence is written in black’); the second to rule out 
generic self-representation (as in, e.g., having the thought that all thoughts are neurally 
realized); the third to rule out purely accidental self-representation (as when I think that 
my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew is probably short before realizing that I am 
my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew)”. 
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that x may sometime represent y in virtue of representing z because z is a part of 
y” (Ibid., 225).61 In roughly the same fashion, P2 represents the entire mental state 
(and hence itself) indirectly, in virtue of representing P1, directly.  
 
Figure 1. An illustration of Kriegel’s account of self-representation. I should stress that P1 and P2 
form a complex of which they are proper parts. 
 
With Kriegel’s account of p-consciousness in hand, we can now turn to his 
account of the latter’s functional role. 
4. Kriegel’s Account of the Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness 
This section introduces Kriegel’s (2007, 2009, 2015) account of the functional role 
of p-consciousness. In a way to be duly explained, Kriegel thinks that the functional 
role of p-consciousness is a-consciousness. In his view, this claim is meant to follow 
directly from another claim, namely, that p-consciousness is the categorical basis 
                                                          
61 Importantly, as Kriegel points out, “one thing’s being part of another does not 
guarantee that by representing the former we represent the latter” (2009, 225). The house 
in the example above is part of our galaxy, but this does not mean that by representing the 
house we represent the galaxy. As a consequence, for something to represent something 
else by representing one of its parts, further conditions must be met (Ibid.).     
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of a-consciousness. At a first pass, to say that a property P is the categorical basis 
of another property, P1, is to say that P is related to P1 in the same way in which, 
for example, the molecular structure of salt is related to its solubility (or the 
physico-chemical structure of glass is related to glass’s fragility). 
4.1. Phenomenal Consciousness as the Categorical Basis of Access Consciousness 
Kriegel introduces the claim that p-consciousness is the categorical basis of a-
consciousness as part of his attempt to vindicate current scientific practice. As 
explained in the previous chapter, Block (1995) believes that scientists have 
systematically failed to target p-consciousness, and studied a-consciousness 
instead. In Kriegel’s view (2009, 34-35), Block’s argument for this claim can be 
roughly reconstructed as follows: (1) a-consciousness and p-consciousness are 
distinct properties; (2) scientists have only studied a-consciousness; (3) therefore, 
scientists have not studied p-consciousness. Is Block’s argument sound? Kriegel 
thinks it is not. The idea is that if we manage to establish that p-consciousness is 
the categorical basis of a-consciousness, then we will be able to claim that scientists 
might have been studying the former via studying the latter.62 As a result, from 
premises (1) and (2) above, Block’s conclusion, (3), does not follow. 
But why should we believe that p-consciousness is the categorical basis of 
a-consciousness? Here’s a reconstruction of Kriegel’s argument:  
1. A-consciousness is a dispositional property.  
2. Dispositional properties have categorical bases that ground them.  
3. P-consciousness grounds a-consciousness. Therefore, 
4. P-consciousness is the categorical basis of a-consciousness.  
                                                          
62 As Kriegel points out, his claim is not that “research into consciousness has targeted 
phenomenal consciousness, but, more modestly, that its doing so is not excluded by the 
facts that it has targeted access consciousness and that phenomenal and access 
consciousness are distinct” (2009, 35). 
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We begin with the premise that a-consciousness is a dispositional property. As you 
will remember from chapter 1, a dispositional property can be defined as the 
tendency of a thing T to behave in characteristic ways, under certain 
circumstances. As an example, Kriegel considers fragility (Ibid., 37). Fragility is a 
dispositional property of certain materials. It is the tendency of a wine glass (Ibid.), 
for example, to shatter when subject to a force of a certain degree.  
But on what grounds should one think of a-consciousness as a dispositional 
property? Earlier we saw that, in Block’s view, a state is a-conscious if its content is 
available to be used in processes such as report, reasoning, the rational control of 
action, etc. More generally, a state is a-conscious if its content is available to a 
number of higher-level cognitive processes/capacities. In this sense, a state’s being 
a-conscious seems to be a matter of the state’s being disposed (or having the 
potential) to be accessed by its subject. As Kriegel points out: 
 
Nothing has to actually happen with a mental state or event for it to qualify as 
access-conscious: the state or event need not actually be accessed; it needs only to 
be accessible. To become access-conscious, a mental state need not be actually used 
in the control of reasoning and action, and so on; it need only be poised for such 
use (Kriegel 2009, 37). 
 
In the same fashion, nothing has to actually happen for a wine glass to be fragile. 
The glass need not actually break; it only needs to have the tendency to break under 
suitable conditions.  
The second premise of the argument says that dispositional properties have 
categorical bases that ground them. As Kriegel explains, “dispositional properties 
are often taken to require categorical bases. A categorical basis is a non-
dispositional, occurrent property that accounts for and grounds certain 
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dispositions” (Ibid.).63 To appreciate the above passage, let us first briefly consider 
the question of what a non-dispositional, occurrent property is. As an example, Tim 
Maudlin compares two properties of a specific window: massiveness and fragility. 
“Massiveness”, he says, “is just a matter of how the window is” (2007, 72). Fragility, 
on the other hand, “is a matter of how [the window] would behave under certain 
circumstances” (2007, 72). The latter, as we have seen, is a dispositional property of 
the window. The former, instead, is a non-dispositional, occurrent property of it; 
that is, it is a property that concerns how the window is, as opposed to how it would 
behave were one to throw a stone at it.  
Occurrent, non-dispositional properties that account for or ground certain 
dispositions are known as categorical bases. Consider a wine glass again. One of 
the dispositional properties of wine glasses is fragility. Fragility is the tendency to 
break under certain circumstances. But in virtue of what does a wine glass have 
such a tendency? What are the non-dispositional, occurrent properties that ground 
such a tendency? The answer lies in the “physico-chemical properties the glass it is 
made of” (Kriegel 2009, 37). It is “because, or in virtue of its physico-chemical 
constitution” that the wine glass is fragile (Ibid.). The physico-chemical 
constitution of the wine glass is thus the categorical basis of its fragility (Ibid.). 
But if one accepts the idea that for every dispositional property there is a 
non-dispositional property that grounds it, this suggests that there should be a 
property of this kind for a-consciousness as well (Ibid.). This gets us to the next 
step of Kriegel’s argument: p-consciousness grounds a-consciousness. There are 
two main reasons for this claim. First, p-consciousness is an occurrent property. 
Second, the phenomenological structure of p-consciousness makes it the ideal 
candidate to ground a-consciousness. What makes it the case that p-consciousness 
is an occurrent property? The idea seems to be that, unlike a-consciousness, p-
                                                          
63 In taking dispositional properties to require categorical bases, Kriegel follows 
Armstrong (1968, 86).  
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consciousness is a property that concerns the way mental states are, rather than 
concerning some tendency that they may have. In this respect, to say that a mental 
state is p-conscious is analogous to saying that the window is massive.64  
As for the second reason, you will recall that, according to Kriegel, the 
phenomenal character of an experience – i.e., its p-conscious aspect – is analysable 
into subjective and qualitative character. The former is what makes a mental state 
p-conscious at all, whereas the latter is what makes a mental state the p-conscious 
state that it is. You will also recall that Kriegel identifies subjective character with 
a special kind of awareness: peripheral inner awareness. Now, Kriegel explains: 
 
[S]ubjective character seems to play the right explanatory role vis-à-vis access 
consciousness. The reason why a mental state is poised for the subject’s free use in 
personal-level reasoning and action control, it is reasonable to suppose, is that the 
subject is already [peripherally] aware of it. Once the subject is [peripherally] aware 
of the state, she can freely make use of it in her deliberate reasoning and action 
control. Thus the state’s free usage to those ends can be explained in terms of its 
subjective character or for-me-ness […]. It is because (or in virtue of the fact that) I 
am [peripherally] aware of my bluish experience of the sky that the experience is 
poised to be freely used in my reasoning about the consistently nice weather and 
in guiding my vacation plans (Kriegel 2009, 37–38).65  
                                                          
64 In fact, as Kriegel himself concedes, categorical bases need not always be occurrent 
properties (2009, 37). In other words, although, normally, categorical bases are non-
dispositional, occurrent properties, the categorical bases of some dispositions are 
dispositions themselves. In light of this, the claim that p-consciousness is an occurrent 
property is not the strongest of reasons to believe that it is the categorical basis of a-
consciousness.   
65 Importantly, although, in some rare cases, subjective character can take the form of 
inner focal awareness, when Kriegel speaks of subjective character above, he means 
peripheral inner awareness. This he makes explicit when he says that “the subject’s 
peripheral inner awareness of her conscious state is the categorical basis of the state’s direct 
availability to verbal report, introspective appraisal, intentional action, and rational 
deliberation” (Kriegel 2015 n/a, emphasis mine). Understanding Kriegel otherwise would 
commit him to a very strange position. As the passage above specifies, among the cognitive 
capacities that a state with subjective character is accessible to is introspective appraisal. 
But in 4.1 I explained that introspecting involves being focally aware of one’s experience. 
As a consequence, if Kriegel’s thesis were understood as suggesting that both focal and 
peripheral awareness ground a-consciousness, it would follow that focal awareness 
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A subject’s peripheral awareness of her mental states is thus what grounds the 
states’ accessibility. It is because a subject is peripherally aware of her experience 
that she can access it, and use its content in a number of higher-level cognitive 
processes/capacities. Together with (1) and (2), (3) entails (4), namely, that p-
consciousness is the categorical basis of a-consciousness.66 To use a more precise 
(and recent) formulation of Kriegel’s conclusion, (1), (2), and (3) entail that p-
consciousness “is the categorical basis of [an experience’s] informational content 
being able to be processed by such modules/capacities as verbal report, 
introspective appraisal, intentional action, and rational deliberation without first 
being processed by other modules/capacities” (Kriegel 2015 n/a).  
According to Kriegel, the proposed account has a number of advantages 
(2009, 40–42). One is that it preserves the metaphysical distinction between p-
consciousness and a-consciousness, while also preserving the existence of an 
intimate relation between the two. This is because the account “casts the two as 
metaphysically but not nomologically independent” (Ibid., 41). The point is that 
dispositions supervene on their categorical bases only with nomological necessity. 
In a world where gravity was much weaker, say, a wine glass would not be as 
disposed to break as it is in the actual world. In other words, the wine glass would 
                                                          
grounds, among other things, the possibility of focal awareness itself. But this would 
commit Kriegel to a very strange position. It would be like saying that the reason why a 
wine glass is fragile is that it is shattered – that the categorical basis of fragility is its 
manifestation. At any rate, this is not Kriegel’s view.  
66 But how is this supposed to justify the claim that scientists might have been studying 
p-consciousness via studying a-consciousness? Kriegel notes that, in the history of science, 
it is quite common “that scientists labor around a dispositional property by way of trying 
to learn about its categorical basis” (2009, 38). As an example, he cites the study of 
hereditary properties. For centuries, notes Kriegel, “geneticists have been studying 
hereditary properties, which are dispositional, by way of trying to reach an understanding 
of their categorical basis, which we have only recently identified as DNA” (Ibid.). 
Analogously, it is possible that researchers have been trying to study a-consciousness, 
which is dispositional, by way of studying its categorical basis, which is p-consciousness.  
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not be fragile. Such a world is metaphysically possible, but nomologically 
impossible. In the same fashion, in a world where the psychological laws are 
different from ours, p-conscious states may well not be available to be used in 
reasoning, in the rational control of action, etc. Such a world too is metaphysically 
possible, but is clearly not nomologically so (Ibid.). 
4.2. The Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness 
What about the functional role of p-consciousness? Kriegel thinks that another 
advantage of (4) is precisely that it accounts for p-consciousness’s having a 
functional role. More strongly, it accounts for p-consciousness’s having a 
functional role at all. He observes that, as drawn by Block (1995), the distinction 
between p-consciousness and a-consciousness has a rather unhappy consequence. 
This is that “any function we may wish to attribute to phenomenal consciousness 
would be more appropriately attributed to access consciousness, leaving 
phenomenal consciousness devoid of any functional significance it can properly 
call its own” (2009, 40).67  
Kriegel continues by pointing out that, “[t]he source of this unhappy 
consequence is the picture of phenomenal and access consciousness as two 
separate properties sitting side-by-side at the same theoretical level” (Ibid.). I am 
not entirely sure as to what Kriegel has in mind here. Presumably, by “sitting side-
by-side at the same theoretical level”, he means that, according the picture offered 
by Block, neither property is more fundamental than the other. By that I mean that 
neither property can be construed as grounding the other, in the sense explained 
in §4.1. But even if that is the right way of understanding Kriegel’s phrase above, I 
find it hard to see why a picture of p-consciousness and a-consciousness as the one 
he attributes to Block would leave the former without any functional significance. 
                                                          
67 See also Kriegel (2007, 203). 
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At any rate, our main concern here lies with Kriegel’s own proposal about 
the functional role of p-consciousness. Having established that (4) p-consciousness 
is the categorical basis of a-consciousness, Kriegel takes this very claim to entail 
that a-consciousness is part of the functional role of the former. To appreciate what 
he has in mind, recall what I said in chapter 1. There, I argued for the following 
definition of the functional role of p-consciousness:  
Functional Role of P-Consciousness Relative to a Mental State M: the fund of 
appropriate dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows M with. 
In light of the above definition, if p-consciousness is the categorical basis of a-
consciousness, it is only natural to think that the latter is part of the functional role 
of the former. More slowly: let D be a-consciousness. That is, let D be an 
appropriate disposition of a mental state M, 
i. D of M’s is part of the functional role of p-consciousness iff p-
consciousness endows M with D; 
ii. If p-consciousness is the categorical basis of D, p-consciousness endows 
M with D; 
iii. P-consciousness is the categorical basis of D (as established by Kriegel’s 
argument above); therefore, 
iv. P-consciousness endows M with D; therefore, 
v. D is part of the functional role of p-consciousness. 
What should we think of Kriegel’s account? In the remainder of this chapter, I 
argue that it is untenable.68 
                                                          
68 Note that Kriegel is not the first one to suggest that a-consciousness can be construed 
as the functional role of p-consciousness. In the commentary to Block’s paper (1995), 
Atkinson and Davies (1995) suggest that p-consciousness “may figure in the causal 
explanation of [access] consciousness” (1995, 248). Like Kriegel, they begin by noting that 
a-consciousness is a dispositional property. States that have dispositional properties, they 
continue, also have “more intrinsic” properties in virtue of which they have the dispositions 
that they do (Ibid.). Thus, in response to the question “In virtue of what property of my 
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5. Against Kriegel’s Account of the Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness 
In what follows, I offer two arguments against Kriegel’s account of the functional 
role of p-consciousness (henceforth, ‘AF’). Both arguments will challenge AF by 
challenging Kriegel’s account of the relation between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness (henceforth, ‘AR’). The first argument concludes that AR should be 
rejected on the ground that it is incompatible with GWM. The second argument 
argues for the same conclusion, but this time on the ground that AR is committed 
to a view of the relation between a-consciousness and attention that is empirically 
implausible. 
5.1. The Objection from the Incompatibility with the Global Workspace Model of Access 
Consciousness 
This section argues that AR should be rejected, on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with the global workspace model (GWM), a well-established model 
of a-consciousness. In order to show that AR and GWM are incompatible, I suggest 
we show that the two provide different sets of jointly sufficient conditions for 
accessibility. Let us start from GWM. What are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for cognitive accessibility, according the model? As noted in the 
previous chapter, GWM explains a mental state’s being accessible in terms of its 
content being globally broadcast in the workspace. But although necessary, global 
broadcasting does not, by itself, seem sufficient for cognitive accessibility. To see 
why, imagine a cognitive system whose consuming mechanisms responsible for 
                                                          
pain state am I in a position to report that I have pain?” (Ibid.), the answer, Atkinson and 
Davies suggest, is that my being disposed to report that I have pain “is grounded in my 
pain’s being a phenomenally conscious state” (Ibid.). It is because I am in pain that I can 
report that I am in pain. Importantly, as the authors suggest, seeing things this way does 
justice to the “asymmetric dependence relation” (Ibid., 249)  that, in Block’s view, exists 
between p-and a-consciousness. If p-consciousness is the categorical basis of a-
consciousness, then we will expect that, in those cases where the machinery linking the 
two is disrupted, there will be p-consciousness without a-consciousness. But because a-
consciousness is grounded in p-consciousness, we won’t expect cases of a-consciousness 
without p-consciousness. 
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reporting, evaluating, deciding, remembering, etc. were damaged or absent. Now 
suppose that the content of a mental state was globally broadcast in the system’s 
workspace. Would that state count as being accessible? No: the way I understand 
it, one of GWM’s implicit claims is that cognitive accessibility is to be understood 
as accessibility to the consuming systems connected to the workspace. It is those 
very systems that, once the content of a state is globally broadcast, are in a position 
to process it.  
The occurrence of global broadcasting will thus not guarantee accessibility. 
What is required, in addition, is that the relevant consuming systems be present.69  
More strongly, it is necessary that the consuming systems not be impaired, at least 
as regards their capacity to take the broadcast content of a representation as input. 
Call this the ‘functionality condition’. As an example, consider the system of 
reporting. This system can be said to meet the functionality condition if, were the 
subject asked to report an experience E, the system would be able to take the 
content of E as input. But why require that the consuming systems be functional, 
rather than just present? For a present, and yet non-functional, system is as good 
as an absent system. To say that accessibility is accessibility to the consuming 
systems is to say that, were the content of a mental state to be globally broadcast, 
the consuming systems would at least take its content as input.  
The occurrence of global broadcasting and the satisfaction of the 
functionality condition will thus guarantee the presence of cognitive accessibility. 
                                                          
69 That the consuming be present is a condition that seems to be required by Block 
(1995), too. Recall, for example, one of the conceptually possible cases adduced by Block 
in support of the claim that p-consciousness and a-consciousness are numerically different 
properties. I am talking about the case of an animal “for which brain damage has destroyed 
centers of reasoning and rational control of action” (Ibid., 233). In Block’s view, on the 
assumption that the neural underpinnings of p-consciousness are distinct from the neural 
underpinnings of a-consciousness, this would count as a case of the former without the 
latter. It seems clear then, that for Block (1995), too, accessibility is accessibility to the 
consuming systems. This, in turn, suggests that the presence of the consuming systems is 
a necessary condition for cognitive accessibility. 
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We can express this in biconditional form as follows: a mental state is access 
conscious iff (1) its content is globally broadcast in the workspace and (2) the 
consuming systems are functional.  
A natural question now is what AR takes the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for accessibility to be. Kriegel (2015, n/a) suggests that “if the 
phenomenality is present, and the relevant machinery is in place, the disposition 
[accessibility] is guaranteed to be present”. How are we to understand this claim? 
Phenomenality, as we have seen, Kriegel construes as the categorical basis of 
accessibility. As for the condition that the relevant machinery be in place, there are 
two things to note. First, by ‘relevant machinery’, Kriegel means what I have been 
calling consuming systems/mechanisms. In this sense, the condition that the 
relevant machinery be in place is akin to what I have called the ‘functionality 
condition’. Second, such a condition is what Kriegel calls an ‘enabling condition’. 
In general, enabling conditions are conditions that, together with a dispositional 
property’s categorical basis (or bases), guarantee/suffice for the presence of the 
disposition.70   
For present purposes, I make the (unharmful) assumption that Kriegel 
would agree with me in requiring not just that the consuming systems be present, 
but also that they be functional. In light of this and of what I said in the previous 
paragraph, Kriegel’s (2015, n/a) claim that “if the phenomenality is present, and the 
relevant machinery is in place, the disposition [accessibility] is guaranteed to be 
present” can thus be rephrased as follows: a mental state is a-conscious iff (1*) it is 
p-conscious and (2) the consuming systems are functional. We now have the 
following two biconditionals: 
                                                          
70 Thus, notes Kriegel (2009, 41), the fact that wine glasses are characterized by a specific 
physico-chemical constitution does not, by itself, guarantee their actual fragility. For 
fragility to be present, it is also necessary that the gravitational constant be what it is: “[i]f 
gravity was a thousand times weaker […] the glass would not be fragile – in that its 
disposition to break would be very limited” (Ibid., 41). 
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GWM: a mental state is a-conscious iff (1) its content is globally broadcast 
in the workspace and (2) the consuming systems are functional. 
AR: a mental state is a-conscious iff (1*) it is p-conscious and (2) the 
consuming systems are functional.   
While both GWM and AR identify (2) as one of the two necessary conditions for 
accessibility, they differ in respect to the other condition – (1) vs (1*). According to 
GWM, it is also necessary that the content of the relevant mental state be globally 
broadcast; according to AR, instead, it is necessary that the relevant mental state 
be p-conscious.  
Importantly, the difference between (1) and (1*) is substantive – they are not 
merely two different ways of picking out the same property. Let me explain. 
According to GWM, for the content of a mental state to be broadcast in the global 
workspace is, roughly, for it to be “distributed” across the cognitive system, in such 
a way this content is made available to systems of report, deliberation, etc. 
According to Kriegel’s account of p-consciousness, on the other hand, the latter is 
(roughly) a matter complex state’s two proper parts, P1 and P2, standing into 
certain suitable relations with each other and with the overall state (see §3 of this 
chapter). 
I should note that the neural details do not matter here. For one might think 
that in order to establish that the difference between (1) and (1*) is substantive, we 
should go “further down”, and look at what GWM and Kriegel have to say about 
the neuronal underpinnings of global broadcasting and p-consciousness 
respectively. As concerns GWM, I have already explained that although Dehaene 
and colleagues have developed the model in a neural direction, there is a sense in 
which the neural details are irrelevant to it (and, of course, global broadcasting). 
To put it with Block, “the substantive claims of the model abstract away from the 
neuronal details” (2009, 1111).  
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The way I understand it, something analogous can be said with respect to 
p-consciousness. Although I have said nothing about it, Kriegel, too, does tell a 
story about the neural underpinnings of p-consciousness (and hence self-
representation).71 As with GWM, however, it seems that the neural details are 
irrelevant to the essence of p-consciousness. What is of the latter’s essence, instead, 
is that it has an abstract self-representational structure, as specified in §3 above.72  
I conclude that AR is incompatible with GWM. Together with the 
assumption that any model of the relation between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness must be compatible with GWM, this entails that AR – and hence AF 
– ought to be rejected. 
5.1.1. Objections and Replies  
In this section, I present and respond to two objections. (In fact, I will also present 
a third objection, but will respond to it at the end of §5.2.). The first objection 
challenges the claim that we should reject AR on the basis of its incompatibility 
with GWM. The second objection challenges what I called the ‘functionality 
condition’. Let us proceed in order. One might object that the claim that we should 
reject AR, and thus AF, on the ground that it is incompatible with GWM, is a trivial 
claim.73 As I mentioned, in the hands of its theorists (e.g., Baars 1988; Dehaene et 
al. 1998; Dehaene and Naccache 2001), GWM is not just a model of a-consciousness. 
Instead, it is also a model of p-consciousness. Indeed, as I also noted, according to 
GWM, there is no real difference between the two. Although, conceptually, the 
                                                          
71 See Kriegel (2009, chap. 7), for his account of the neural underpinnings of p-
consciousness. For a concise overview of the same account, see Kriegel (2011, 59). 
72 The reader should note, however, that this is not to say that Kriegel endorses a 
functionalist view of p-consciousness, at least insofar as a functionalist picture of p-
consciousness is understood as entailing that the latter is a dispositional property of 
mental states (2009, 209). In this respect, Kriegel’s metaphysical commitments about p-
consciousness are quite complex, and they need not concern us here. 
73 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for Philosophical Psychology for 
suggesting this objection.  
Chapter 3 
 
103 
 
distinction between p-consciousness and a-consciousness might even make sense, 
in practice, there is only one empirically tractable phenomenon, and this is what 
we typically refer to by the term ‘a-consciousness’.  
If one assumes the truth of GWM, the objection goes, then one will have to 
endorse the model both as a model of a-consciousness and as a model of p-
consciousness. As a consequence, my claim that we should reject AR (and thus AF) 
on the basis that it is incompatible with GWM will follow quite trivially. For if I 
assume that GWM is true, then I will also have to be committed to the claim that 
there is no real distinction between a-consciousness and p-consciousness. And if I 
am committed to that claim, then it is obvious that I should reject AR, for this 
assumes that there is a distinction between the two. 
But the objection is easily rebutted. Dehaene and Naccache have provided 
a model that explains our capacity to access our mental states. According to this 
model, such a capacity hinges on global broadcasting. To claim that such a model 
is also a model of p-consciousness is a further step. That is, to claim that p-
consciousness, too, hinges on global broadcasting is a further step, one that is not 
entailed by the claim that a-consciousness hinges on global broadcasting. One can 
thus accept GWM as a model of a-consciousness without having to accept it as a 
model of p-consciousness. Indeed, as I noted in the previous chapter, this is exactly 
what some have done (e.g., Block 2007; Carruthers 2015). 
A second, minor objection has to do with what I called the ‘functionality 
condition’.74 As you will recall, in §6 I noted that, according to GWM, the 
occurrence of global broadcasting is not a sufficient condition for cognitive 
accessibility. On the contrary, in addition to global broadcasting, it is also 
necessary that the consuming systems – systems of report, deliberation, etc. – be 
functional. What do I mean by ‘functional’? As explained, to say that the consuming 
                                                          
74 I would like to Stephen Stich for this objection. 
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systems are functional is to say that they a1re not impaired, at least as regards their 
capacity to take the content of a globally broadcast representation as input. 
But suppose you are under the effect of some drug that impairs some of the 
consuming systems connected to the workspace – systems for the rational control 
of action, say. Would a globally broadcast representation still count as accessible? 
Or would it count as accessible, but only “in part”? And what would happen if you 
took a drug that impaired all the consuming systems except one? These are all good 
questions – questions that surely deserve careful consideration. For present 
purposes, however, these questions are relevant insofar as they reveal how the 
functionality condition and the motivations behind it – namely, that accessibility 
is accessibility to the consuming systems – are not at all uncontroversial.75  
Fortunately, however, the unsolid ground upon which the functionality 
condition rests is not a real threat to the claim that AR and GWM are incompatible. 
For even though I have argued for that claim by showing that the two provide 
different sets of jointly sufficient conditions for accessibility, this is not the only 
argumentative strategy available. To be sure, such a strategy has the advantage of 
providing a clearer picture of how AR and GWM relate with one another. Strictly 
speaking, however, one could make do by noting that AR and GWM identify 
divergent necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for accessibility. That is, one 
could make do by noting that, while AR explains cognitive accessibility (partly) in 
terms of p-consciousness (and hence self-representation), GWM explains the same 
property (partly) in terms of global broadcasting. Accordingly, even if the 
                                                          
75 In fact, one might even push further and question the very idea that the functionality 
of the consuming systems – or even their very presence – is a necessary condition for 
cognitive accessibility in the first place. Chalmers (1997) seems to do just that. In passing, 
he points out that even when the consuming systems “are mostly shut down”, cognitive 
accessibility is still present (Ibid., 148). He does not, however, offer any justification for 
such a claim.  
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functionality condition turned out to be ungrounded, the claim that AR is 
incompatible with GWM would still be defendable. 
As anticipated, there is also a third objection that I should consider. I have 
argued that GWM and AR are incompatible on the basis that they provide different 
sets of jointly sufficient conditions for a-consciousness. But one might object that 
that won’t suffice to establish their incompatibility. To do that, the objection goes, 
I also need to consider a possible scenario in which Kriegel’s conditions for a-
consciousness are satisfied, but global broadcasting does not occur. For reasons of 
exposition, I will set this objection aside for now, and address it at the very end of 
the next section. 
5.2. The Objection from Attention 
This section argues against AF, on the ground that AR gets the relationship 
between a-consciousness and attention wrong. In the previous chapter, we saw that 
there is convincing evidence for the thesis that a-consciousness depends on 
attention. As I will argue, however, AR entails that a representation can be a-
conscious even in the (almost complete) absence of attention. I should note that 
even though espousing GWM entails endorsing the claim that a-consciousness 
depends on attention – the latter being one of GWM’s core claims – endorsing the 
latter claim does not entail espousing GWM. One can buy into the claim that 
attention is necessary for a-consciousness without having to endorse the claim that 
a-consciousness hinges on global broadcasting. For this reason, the objection I raise 
in this section will hold regardless of one’s commitment to GWM.  
Let us begin by considering the following scenario from Block, which we 
already encountered in the previous chapter: 
 
Suppose you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon 
you realize that right outside your window there is–and there has been for 
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some time–a deafening pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were 
aware of the noise all along, but only at noon you are consciously aware of 
it. That is, you were P-conscious of the noise all along, but at noon you are 
both P-conscious and A-conscious of it (Block 1995, 234). 
 
An implicit assumption in the above passage is that a-consciousness – but not p-
consciousness – depends on attention (Block 2001, 203). While Block is engaged in 
intense conversation, all or almost all his attentional resources are focused on the 
conversation. This suggests that very few attentional resources, if any, are 
committed to the sound of the pneumatic drill. But if a-consciousness depends on 
attention, then no auditory representation of the pneumatic drill can be (and is) a-
conscious. Still, as Block points out, the same auditory representation was p-
conscious all along. 
According to Kriegel, too, Block’s experience of the pneumatic drill was p-
conscious the whole time. As he notes, “while engrossed in conversation, Block has 
a very peripheral awareness of his auditory experience” (2009, 191). But now note 
that because of AR, Kriegel will also have to say that Block’s auditory experience of 
the pneumatic drill was a-conscious all along as well. That is, the contents of Block’s 
auditory experience were available to systems of report, the rational control of 
action, etc., even before noon.76 
A first – if, admittedly, weak – point to be made about Kriegel’s view is that, 
phenomenologically, it seems very implausible. Scenarios like the one described in 
Block’s passage above are very familiar. I am engaged in doing something, when, 
all of a sudden, I realize that the rain is – and has been for some time – hitting a 
nearby window, or that the wind turbine just outside is – and has been for some 
time – making a lot of noise. But I find it hard to make sense of the idea that the 
contents of my auditory experience were directly available for me to report all 
                                                          
76 The latter claim is also endorsed by (Chalmers 1997). 
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along, even in the absence of attention. They would become available, instead, were 
I to turn my attention to them (or, against the backdrop of Kriegel’s account of a-
consciousness, were I to turn my attention to my experience of them). Observations 
made on the basis of purely phenomenological intuitions should be trusted only to 
an extent, however. It is quite fortunate, then, that my point also fits nicely with 
the empirical data.  
Consider the experiment by Simons and Chabris (1999) that we encountered 
in the previous chapter. Participants were instructed to watch a video where two 
teams, one in black, and one in white, are passing basketballs. They were also 
instructed to pay attention to either one team or the other, and to keep count of 
the basketball passes made by the attended team. At some point, a subject wearing 
a gorilla costume walked towards the middle of the scene, stopped, thumped its 
chest, and then continued walking across the scene. Surprisingly, when asked 
whether they had noticed the gorilla, a significant percentage of participants gave 
a negative response.  
What would Kriegel’s take on the experiment be? My best guess is that, 
given his interpretation of Block’s passage above, he would say that the 
participants’ experience of the gorilla was p-conscious. More precisely, as in the 
case of the pneumatic drill, he would claim that participants had a very peripheral 
awareness of their experience. According to AR, this entails that their experience 
of the gorilla was also a-conscious. But if, as I argued earlier, experiments like 
Simons and Chabris’s experiments, along with conditions like hemineglect, lend 
support to the thesis that a-consciousness is strongly dependent on attention, then 
Kriegel is wrong. I conclude that AR gets the relation between attention and a-
consciousness wrong. For this reason, AR, as well as AF, should be rejected.  
But maybe my move was too quick. For I have been tacitly assuming that for 
a subject to be peripherally aware of her experience, she need not attend to it at all. 
According to Kriegel, however, even peripheral awareness requires attention. In his 
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own words, “it is impossible to be aware of something when 0% of one’s attentional 
resources are dedicated to it. Awareness requires some minimal attention, though 
not focal attention” (2009, 257). In the present context, what this means is that, on 
Kriegel’s account, it is not entirely true that Block was not attending to his 
experience of the pneumatic drill before noon. If he was peripherally aware of it, as 
Kriegel contends, then he was also attending to it, albeit only peripherally. 
Does this mean that Kriegel is right to claim that Block’s experience of the 
pneumatic drill was a-conscious all along? I do not think so. For consider Simons 
and Chabris’s experiments again. On the assumption that participants were 
peripherally aware of, and hence peripherally attending to, their experience of the 
gorilla – as Kriegel would probably contend – their inability to report seeing it 
strongly suggests that peripherally attending to one’s experience is not sufficient 
for a-consciousness. In this respect, then, it seems that peripheral attention is no 
better than the complete absence of attention.77 
The considerations above bring to light an issue which I mention only to set 
aside: how do cognitive scientists think of attention? Do they think of it as an all 
or nothing phenomenon, or do they think it admits of degrees? I suspect it will be 
hard to find a single answer to these questions. At any rate, in connection to the 
Simons and Chabris’s experiments, it is apparent that if, like Kriegel, we think of 
attention as admitting of degrees – or as admitting of a focus and a periphery – then 
a-consciousness requires focal attention. 
One last point. In §5.1.1., I presented an objection to the argument from the 
incompatibility with GWM that, for reasons of exposition, I said I would only 
                                                          
77 It should be noted that inferences from hemineglect can no longer help us counter 
Kriegel’s claim that Block’s experience of the pneumatic drill was a-conscious all along. For 
while Kriegel’s take on Block’s scenario strongly suggests that he would take participants 
in the Simons and Chabris experiments to be peripherally aware of their experience of the 
gorilla, it is hard to tell what Kriegel would say about hemineglect patients; i.e., would they 
be peripherally aware of their experience of what goes on in the neglected side of space? 
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address at the very end of this section. As you will recall, the objection said that, in 
order to establish that AR and GWM are really incompatible, I would also have to 
consider a possible scenario in which Kriegel’s conditions for a-consciousness are 
satisfied, but global broadcasting does not occur. Since I find that to be a valid 
point, here is one such scenario. 
 You will recall that, according to KA, Block’s experience of the pneumatic 
drill is p-conscious both before and after noon. According to GWM, however, the 
contents of the same experience are globally broadcast only at noon – that is, only 
once Block turns his attention to the noise. Even though, for the purposes of the 
present section, I have only been concerned with the claim that attention is 
necessary for a-consciousness, the reader will remember that GWM takes global 
broadcasting to depend on attention. We thus have a scenario in which p-
consciousness is present but global broadcasting is not.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
According to Kriegel, if p-consciousness is the categorical basis of a-consciousness, 
then the former can be construed as the functional role of the latter. This chapter 
has rejected Kriegel’s account of the functional role of p-consciousness by arguing 
against the former claim. In particular, I have put forward two related and yet 
independent arguments. First, I have brought to light KA’s incompatibility with 
GWM. On the assumption that any account of the relation between p-
consciousness and a-consciousness must be compatible with GWM, this entails 
that KA must be jettisoned. Second, I have argued that KA gets the relationship 
between a-consciousness and attention wrong. According to KA, a mental state can 
be a-conscious even in the (almost complete) absence of attention. But this flies 
directly in the face of the point made in the previous chapter, namely, that a-
consciousness is strongly dependent on attention. This gives us an additional 
reason to reject KA, one that can be shared independently of one’s commitment to 
GWM. 
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4  
 
Closing in on the Relation Between Phenomenal 
Consciousness and Access Consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and argued against Kriegel’s account of the 
functional role of p-consciousness. I suggested that the account is untenable for 
two reasons. First, it is incompatible with a well-established model of a-
consciousness: the Global Workspace Model (GWM). Second, it gets the relation 
between a-consciousness and attention wrong. In search of a more promising 
account, in chapter 5, I will attempt to make sense of, and evaluate, Block’s own 
view on the functional role of p-consciousness. To that end, however, I first need 
to say more on Block’s positive characterization of p-consciousness, and introduce 
his most recent account of the relationship between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness (e.g., 2007a; 2008). Doing so will also allow me to defend Block’s 
account of the relationship between the two from a recent criticism advanced by 
Carruthers (2015b). Carruthers’s criticism threatens to show that Block’s view 
suffers from serious problems that would evidently make it unacceptable regardless 
of its potential as an account of the functional role of p-consciousness. My response 
to Carruthers will, by removing these potentially devastating obstacles to Block’s 
view, allow me to focus precisely upon its relevance for this thesis’s main concern; 
i.e., the question of what the functional role of p-consciousness is.  
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As explained in chapter 2, in his (1995), Block argues that p-consciousness 
and a-consciousness are numerically different properties on the basis that it is 
metaphysically possible for either to occur without the other. That, I also explained, 
is compatible with the two properties’ being coextensive in the actual world. Block 
(2007a, 2007c; 2008; 2011) goes one step further, and offers his Overflow-Mesh 
Argument to make a much stronger claim: the neural basis of a-consciousness is 
not included in the neural basis of p-consciousness. One consequence of this is that, 
in this world, a mental state can be p-conscious without being a-conscious.78 
Carruthers (2015b) is happy to accept Block’s distinction as drawn in the latter’s 
(1995). At the same time, he argues that the conclusion of the Overflow-Mesh 
Argument is untenable: the neural basis of p-consciousness is identical to that of a-
consciousness. Having reconstructed Block’s and Carruthers’s arguments, in this 
chapter I show that the conclusion of the Overflow-Mesh Argument can still be 
savaged. The reason, as we will see, is that Carruthers’s argument against the latter 
rests on a view of attention that, in light of certain empirical results, is highly 
implausible.  
Here is the plan. To begin with (in §2) I provide the reader with a general 
idea of Block’s approach to p-consciousness, which, as we will see, can labelled as 
a biological approach. Second (in §3) I say something about why, according to 
GWM, attention is not only necessary, but, in conjunction with other conditions, 
also sufficient for global broadcasting. Third (in §4) I provide a detailed picture of 
the notion of working memory. As we will see, the latter plays a central role in 
Block’s Overflow-Mesh Argument. Having introduced the notion of working 
memory, I then reconstruct (in §5) the first step of Block’s argument, which we 
may just call the Overflow Argument. After that, (in §6) I turn to the second step of 
                                                          
78 As opposed to the pneumatic drill scenario discussed earlier, which was meant to be 
an intuitive case of p-consciousness’s actually occurring without a-consciousness, the 
Overflow-Mesh argument is Block’s first, systematic attempt to establish that, in this 
world, the former can (and does) occur without the latter. 
 
Chapter 4 
113 
 
the Overflow-Mesh Argument, namely, the Mesh Argument. The reconstruction of 
the argument itself will be preceded by a discussion of the notion of neural basis, 
and of the neural and functional events surrounding global broadcasting. In the 
last part of the chapter, I present Carruthers’s criticism against the Overflow-Mesh 
argument (in §7), and defend the latter’s conclusion (in §8). 
2. A First Look at the Biological Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness 
Just what kind of property does Block take p-consciousness to be? We have seen 
what Block thinks p-consciousness is not: it is neither a functional nor a 
representational property. It is not a functional property in that what makes a 
mental state p-conscious is not the state’s functional role. And it is not a 
representational property in that it is not identical to a mental state’s representing 
the world as being a certain way. But what kind of property is it, then? 
In many of his writings (e.g., 2001, 2007a, 2009)79 Block has been leaning 
toward a biological approach to p-consciousness: p-consciousness is a biological 
property of the brain. In order to obtain a first, general idea of what that means, it 
will be useful considering a couple of theories that do not characterize p-
consciousness in the same way. Theories like GWM, along with theories like 
Rosenthal’s higher-order representationalism (HOT), for example, are sometimes 
called by Block cognitive theories of p-consciousness (2009, 2015). What these 
theories have in common is precisely that they take p-consciousness to be a 
cognitive phenomenon. (Importantly, for the purposes of this section only, I 
understand GWM as a model of both a-consciousness and p-consciousness. As you 
will recall from chapter 2, this is how its original advocates construe the model.)  
Let’s begin by considering GWM. According to the model, p-consciousness 
just is cognitive accessibility. A mental state’s being p-conscious is just a matter of 
its content’s being made available to a number of cognitive systems – systems of 
                                                          
79 But see also Block (2007c, 2015). 
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thought, memory, reasoning, etc. As such, GWM counts as a cognitive account of 
p-consciousness. Consider HOT, now. As hinted at in the previous chapter, 
according to HOT, a mental state’s being p-conscious is to be explained in terms of 
a subject’s harbouring two suitably-related representations: a lower-order and a 
higher-order representation. The lower-order representation – the experience – 
represents the world as being a certain way. The higher-order, thought-like 
representation, instead, represents the lower-order one. According to HOT, it is 
only when an experience figures in the representational content of (is represented 
by) a higher-order thought, that it is p-conscious. 
Qua cognitive theories, GWM and HOT account for p-consciousness at a 
level of explanation that abstracts away from the biology of the brain. The idea is 
that even though, in beings like us, p-consciousness is implemented in a certain 
biological system – the brain – in theory, it could also be implemented in a 
functionally isomorphic non-biological system – a super-computer, say. P-
consciousness, accordingly, is not to be explained by appealing to biological 
properties of the brain – properties that are exclusive to neurons, or to the ways in 
which neurons interact with one another, for example. 
Mental representations are often thought to be implementable in different 
systems with different properties – e.g., computers with electrical properties, and 
robots with electrical and hydraulic properties. Accordingly, understanding why, 
on the HOT account, p-consciousness does not depend on the biological makeup 
of the brain should be quite straightforward. Things, however, might not appear as 
straightforward in connection to GWM. As noted, this account, especially in the 
hands of Dehaene and his colleagues, makes explicit reference to the brain and its 
structure. The global workspace itself, for example, is thought to “consist” of a 
network of workspace neurons whose long axonal projections make it possible to 
transmit information from, say, the visual cortex, to those areas of the brain 
underpinning higher-level cognitive processes/capacities (report, deliberation, 
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etc.). How could the biology of the brain be irrelevant to p-consciousness, then? As 
hinted at earlier on, the answer is that, in spite of being couched in neuronal terms, 
a global workspace architecture could be implemented in many ways. According 
to GWM, what is essential to p-consciousness is just that a representation enters 
into certain suitable causal relations with the relevant components of the cognitive 
systems. Whether the representation, the causal relations it enters into, etc. are 
realized in a brain, rather than in a hydraulic machine, is completely irrelevant to 
p-consciousness. As long as the relevant functional relations are in place, p-
consciousness is guaranteed to be present. Accordingly, GWM is as functional an 
account of p-consciousness as any other. 
If cognitive theories abstract away from the biology of the brain, the same 
does not hold for the biological approach to p-consciousness. To put it with Block, 
cognitive theories 
 
leave out too many details of the actual working of the brain to be adequate 
theories of [phenomenal] consciousness. Information in the brain is coded 
electrically, then transformed to a chemical code, then back to an electrical code, 
and it would be foolish to assume that this transformation from one form to 
another is irrelevant to the physical basis of [phenomenal] consciousness (Block 
2009, 1113). 
 
According to cognitive theories, the relationship between p-consciousness and the 
biology of the brain is contingent. Although p-consciousness happens to sit in 
brains with a specific biological makeup, nothing about it requires that biological 
makeup, or a biological makeup at all. The biological approach, instead, holds that 
the biology of the brain is essential to p-consciousness. By purporting to account 
for p-consciousness in biological terms, the biological approach rejects the 
characterization of consciousness as a cognitive phenomenon. Cognitive theories 
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may be successful at explaining cognitive accessibility and surrounding 
phenomena, but not p-consciousness. 
 I will return to Block’s biological approach to p-consciousness below, when 
discussing the Mesh Argument. In the next section, I come back to the relation 
between attention and global broadcasting. 
3. Attention and Global Broadcasting Again 
In chapter 2, I explained that, according to GWM, attention is necessary for global 
broadcasting. For the purposes of this and the next chapter, however, I now need 
to address the question of whether it is also thought to be sufficient. The advocates 
of GWM, as well as many philosophers/cognitive scientists (Prinz 2013; Carruthers 
2015a) agree that, strictly speaking, it is not. As Carruthers (2015a, 57–58) notes, the 
studies typically cited in support of this claim (e.g., McCormick 1997; Bressan and 
Pizzighello 2008) purport to show that, under experimental conditions, attention 
can be directed to a stimulus without resulting in the subject’s ability to use the 
relevant information for report, the rational control of action, etc.  
In the studies at issue, however, attention’s failure to trigger global 
broadcasting seems to result from one or a combination of the following factors: a) 
the presented stimulus is too weak; b) the stimulus is presented for an extremely 
short period of time; c) insufficient attentional resources are deployed. On the 
contrary, when none of the above factors are in play, attention regularly results in 
global broadcasting (Carruthers 2015a, 57–58). For this reason, Carruthers (Ibid.), 
as well as Dehaene and Naccache (2001), for example, conclude that, to put it with 
the former’s own words, “attention is sufficient for global broadcasting in cases 
where enough attention is devoted to a stimulus that is sufficiently intense and long-
lasting” (Ibid., 58).  
I now turn to the notion of working memory. 
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4. Working Memory 
4.1. A Temporary Storage Capacity 
As anticipated, a notion that plays a key role in Block’s Overflow-Mesh Argument 
is the one of working memory. What is working memory? This is not an easy 
question, as theorists use the term in slightly different ways (Cowan 2005b). Two 
minimal definitions that should be accepted by virtually all researchers, including 
Block, are Baddeley’s and Cowan’s, two of the most prominent scholars working on 
working memory. The former characterizes working memory as “a temporary 
storage system […] that underpins our capacity for complex thought” (Baddeley 
2007, 1). The latter, instead, defines it as “the retention of information in a 
temporarily accessible form” (Cowan 2005b, 155). The gist of both definitions is 
roughly the same: working memory is a temporary storage capacity – hence, 
‘memory’ – whose contents can be easily accessed by the subject and used in 
complex cognitive tasks – hence, ‘working’.  
Below are some examples of the many activities that are thought to require 
working memory. Consider adding 44 to 37 in your head. Among other things, this 
requires that one hold 11 (7+4) in mind, while adding 4 to 3, and so on. Given the 
general characterization of working memory provided above, mental arithmetic 
requires working memory in that it requires holding in mind partial results, 
retrieving those results at a later stage, combining them with other partial results, 
etc. Another example would be keeping a long alphanumerical password in your 
head while writing it down on a piece of paper. Still, other examples would include 
figuring out the best route to go from the philosophy department to the best 
restaurant in town, or imagining the different ways in which a set of boxes might 
be organized into the trunk of a car (Carruthers 2015a, 12). All the activities above 
are believed to require working memory in that they involve keeping in mind 
certain pieces of information while working with them.  
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What are the cognitive mechanisms involved in working memory? Block 
does not say much about this. In more than one paper (2007c; 2008; 2007a), 
however, he notes that there is an intimate relation between working memory and 
the global workspace. The idea seems to be that the global broadcasting of a 
representation is somehow necessary for that representation being in working 
memory. In this section, I explain how working memory is thought to work, and 
how it is thought to be related to the workspace. In doing so, I will mostly – 
although not exclusively – follow the work of Peter Carruthers (2011, 2013, 2015a), 
who, unlike Ned Block, provides a very detailed account of how working memory 
works. 
4.2. Working Memory and Long-Term Memory 
Let me begin by pointing out that everyone agrees that working memory should be 
distinguished from long-term memory (Cowan 2008; Carruthers 2015a). First, the 
latter should be thought of as consisting of “stored representations that are no 
longer in a [heightened state of accessibility]” (Carruthers 2015, 12; but see also 
Shelton et al. 2008). In this respect, long-term memory differs from working 
memory in that the contents of the latter are in a heightened state of accessibility 
(what this means, exactly, will become clearer below).  
Second, working memory and long-term memory differ in terms of capacity. 
While the former has a vast storage capacity, the storage capacity of the latter is 
thought to be very limited (Cowan 2008). In relation to working memory, the 
phrase ‘storage capacity’ is to be understood as “the amount that an individual can 
hold in mind at one time” (Cowan 2005a, 4). In general, psychologists believe that 
working memory capacity is limited to three or four “items” (Cowan 2008). The 
notion of item is slightly ambiguous, however. For it seems that an item may be 
either a separate entity, such as a letter, or a “chunk” (Ibid.). Intuitively, chunks 
can be said to correspond to larger, meaningful units. These might be “syllables, 
words, etc.” (Cowan 1988, 166). Consider the string of letters IRSCIAFBI (Cowan 
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2008, 326). This can be chunked into three meaningful units: IRS, CIA, and FBI. 
Indeed, these are three acronyms for federal agencies in the United States (IRS 
stands for Internal Revenue Service, CIA for Central Intelligence Agency, and FBI 
for Federal Bureau of Investigation) (Ibid.). To say that working memory can hold 
up to three or four chunks of information is thus to say that it can hold up to three 
or four meaningful units like the ones above.80 
A third aspect in relation to which working memory and long-term memory 
are thought to differ is what Carruthers (2013, 10372) calls sensitivity to attentional 
interference. Unlike long-term memory, the contents of working memory are quite 
feeble. That is to say that whatever the subject is holding in mind at any one time 
will be lost the moment she turns her attention fully to something else (Ibid.). This 
can be easily seen in those cases where one is trying to hold a phone number in 
mind, for example. Any distraction, even the smallest, has the potential to make 
the number (or part of it) slip out of one’s mind. This connects to a fourth, 
fundamental difference between the two forms of memory at issue. Unlike long-
term memory, the contents of working memory need to be actively sustained by 
the subject. In this sense, working memory is an active memory capacity. A good 
example, again, is holding a phone number in mind. This requires that one 
repeatedly rehearses the number in one’s head, or else it will be lost. 
4.3.  Working Memory and the Global Workspace 
There are several models of working memory. The most influential are Baddeley 
and Hitch’s (1974)  and Cowan’s (1988, 2005a). Although the details are different, 
both models agree on a number of essential points. A picture of working memory 
that focuses on the shared tenets of these two models, while abstracting away from 
                                                          
80 Chunking – the process of grouping together more items into larger, meaningful units 
– is a strategy that every one of us employs in order to “increase the efficiency of use” of 
the limited working memory capacity (Cowan 2008, 329) It should be borne in mind, 
however, that chunking takes time. For this reason, when subjects are required to hold in 
mind briefly presented perceptual items, this strategy is not available.   
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their particular differences, has recently been offered by Carruthers (2013, 2015a, 
2011). In fact, Carruthers goes even further than Baddeley and Cowan: as noted, in 
line with Block, he contends that working memory is intimately related to the global 
workspace. Carruthers’s picture of working memory is the one that I assume in this 
chapter. 81  
Working memory can be construed as a multi-component system that 
comprises the following three ingredients: a central executive, the sensory areas of 
the brain, and the global workspace.82 The central executive is thought to be a 
system under voluntary control (Cowan 1988), tasked with the control of selective 
attention (Carruthers 2013). Selective attention, in turn, is thought to work by 
targeting representations in the sensory areas of the brain. The latter are the areas 
where sensory representations are processed (Postle 2006; Carruthers 2015a), but 
also where long-term memories are stored (Mayes and Roberts 2001; Carruthers 
2015a). By targeting representations in the sensory areas, attention allows the 
former entry to, and sustains them in, the global workspace. There, those 
representations can be manipulated for purposes of reasoning, report, action-
planning, etc.  
Here is an instance of a perceptual representation’s being sustained in 
working memory: you are presented with a row of letters, and are instructed to 
hold the letters in mind after stimulus offset. According to the picture offered by 
Carruthers, what happens is this. Upon presentation of the row of letters, 
attentional signals will target the areas of the brain where the letters are 
represented. In turn, this will result in the global broadcasting of the relevant 
information. In order for that information to gain entry into working memory, 
                                                          
81 The reader should note that Carruthers draws extensively on Dehaene and colleagues’ 
work (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene et al. 2006). More specifically, 
Carruthers’s understanding of the relation between working memory and the global 
workspace is almost identical to Dehaene and colleagues’.  
82 Carruthers does not put things exactly in these terms, but I believe he would agree 
with me on this.  
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however, it will have to be kept in the global workspace. To do this, it is necessary 
that attentional signals keep targeting the sensory areas even after stimulus offset. 
Having gained entry in working memory, information will be kept there on 
condition that attentional signals keep targeting the same areas. 
But why would one want to think of the global workspace as a component 
of the working memory system? As should be apparent, the main reason has to do 
with the very notion of working memory (2011, 2015a). As we have seen, it is widely 
accepted that working memory is to be understood as the retention of information 
in an accessible state. But if accessibility is construed – in line with GWM – as a 
property of representations whose contents are broadcast in the workspace, then 
the contents of working memory representations will be globally broadcast 
contents themselves. This suggests that the global workspace is an integral part of 
the working memory system. 
It is noteworthy that while all working memory representations are always 
cognitively accessible, typically, not all cognitively accessible representations are 
working memory representations. In other words, normally (although by no means 
always), the contents of working memory representations are only a proper subset 
of the contents of the global workspace (Carruthers 2015a, 83–84). Notice that the 
asymmetry in question is diachronic; that is, the amount of information that is 
cognitively accessible over a certain period of time may far exceed the amount of 
information that is in working memory over the same amount of time (Ibid., 84). 
The reason for this asymmetry lies in the fact that, as mentioned earlier, working 
memory representations are only those representations that are actively sustained 
by the subject. And, we may assume, only some of the broadcast representations 
are so sustained. “Put differently, since working memory is a form of actively 
sustained memory, much of what is [cognitively accessible] may never enter 
working memory because no steps are taken to keep it actively in mind” (Ibid., 83). 
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Information that is globally broadcast information can be held in working memory, 
“but much may not be” (Ibid.). 
With the concept of working memory in hand, we can now turn to the first 
step of Block’s Overflow-Mesh Argument, namely, the Overflow Argument. 
5. Block’s Overflow Argument 
The Overflow Argument (Block 2007a, 2007c, 2011) purports to establish that more 
information can be (and is) p-conscious than is in working memory and, on that 
basis, that “the machinery of phenomenology is at least somewhat different from 
the machinery of cognitive accessibility” (Block 2007a, 489). The argument is 
strongly dependent upon Sperling’s partial report paradigm (Sperling 1960).83 For 
this reason, I begin with a few words on the latter. 
5.1. Sperling’s Partial Report Paradigm 
Sperling ran a number of experiments to test how much information can be 
processed by the human visual system in a single brief exposure; that is, basically, 
how much one can see at a glance. In one experiment – call it the whole report 
paradigm –  subjects were presented with arrays of letters for a very brief period – 
50 msec. (Sperling 1960, 6). The arrays comprised a varying number of letters. Some 
consisted of 2 rows of 3 letters, while others consisted of 3 rows of 4 letters, for 
example. After stimulus offset, subjects were required to give a complete report of 
the letters. Although subjects believed that they had seen all the letters with great 
clarity, they were only able to report 4.3 letters on average. Sperling took this result 
as evidence for the claim that the “immediate memory span” – what we now call 
working memory – is limited to 4.3 letters (Ibid., 5).  
 
                                                          
83 To make his case, Block also appeals to a couple of more recent experiments from 
Landman et al. (2003) and Sligte et al. (2008). Both experiments, however, are quite similar 
to Sperling’s. In what follows, I will focus my discussion exclusively on the latter.  
Chapter 4 
123 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of array of letters used in Sperling's experiments. 
 
Given the subjects’ belief that they had seen much more than they could 
report, Sperling hypothesized that “the immediate memory-span sets a limit on a 
process that is otherwise rich in available information” (Ibid., 26). In other words, 
he suggested that although, due to working memory limitations, subjects could 
only report 4.3 letters, they had probably chosen those letters from an otherwise 
larger store of letters which had been briefly available to them.  
To test his hypothesis, Sperling had to find a way to circumvent the limit 
imposed by working memory. That is, he had to find a way to test whether subjects 
had actually seen much more than they could report – a way that would be 
unaffected by the limited capacity of working memory. He thus devised an 
ingenious experiment where subjects were required to give only a partial report of 
the contents of the stimulus: the partial report paradigm. In the experiment, 
subjects were presented with arrays of letters like the ones used in the previous 
experiment. 150 msec. after stimulus offset, a randomly chosen row was cued by 
sounding a tone lasting about 0.5 sec.: a high tone for the upper row, a medium 
tone for the middle row, and a low tone for the lower row. Depending on which 
tone was sounded, subjects had to report the letters from the relevant row.  
Sperling found that, on each trial, subjects were able to accurately report 
almost all of the letters from the cued row (typically 3 out of 4 letters). He took this 
to confirm his initial hypothesis: subjects had actually seen much more than they 
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were able to report. The thought was roughly the following. If subjects were able 
to accurately report the letters of any of the rows, after this had been cued, then 
the amount of information available to them during the cueing was much larger 
than they could report. Differently put, if subjects were able to report the letters of 
any of the rows, after cueing, then the cueing acted as a lead for the subjects to 
select some letters (the letters of the cued row) from a larger store of letters which 
was shortly available to them. Sperling calculated that this larger store could 
contain an average of 9.1 letters – many more letters than subjects could actually 
report.  
That subjects can see much more than they can report is one of the two 
major findings of Sperling’s experiment. Another finding has to do with the 
persistence of the visual image after stimulus offset. As noted above, in the partial 
report paradigm, a tone was sounded 150 msec. after stimulus offset. The fact that 
subjects were able to accurately report almost all of the letters from the cued row 
suggests that what they had seen during the 50-msec. exposure, they continued 
seeing for a very short time right after stimulus offset – just enough time for the 
cue to attract their attention on the relevant row. In Sperling’s own words, this 
suggests that “the stimulus information is thus “stored” for a fraction of a second 
as a persisting image of the objective stimulus” (Ibid., 20).84 This “persisting image” 
is what Ulric Neisser later called iconic memory (1967, 20). As Neisser suggests, 
from a phenomenological perspective this persisting image is perceptual. That is, 
from the subjects’ point of view, it appears no different than the visual image they 
had while the stimulus was being shown. Iconic memory, as Sperling (1960, 11) 
calculated, lasts about a second. This was clear from the fact that, if the instruction 
                                                          
84 As Sperling suggested, there was also further evidence for this claim. There was, for 
example, phenomenological evidence. Apparently, the subjects of the experiment reported 
that an image of the display was still available the moment a tone was heard, namely, 150 
msec. after stimulus offset. In addition, as he noted, it is very implausible to suppose that 
the subjects should stop seeing the stimulus the moment the display goes blank. As he 
writes, “the rise and fall of sensation may be rapid, but they are not instantaneous” (1960, 
20). 
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to report a certain row was delayed until one second after stimulus offset, the 
accuracy of the reports drops down dramatically. 
5.2. The Argument 
We are now ready to introduce Block’s Overflow Argument. This can be 
reconstructed as follows:  
(1) Subjects have a p-conscious experience of/see all or almost all the characters 
in the array (below, I follow Block in using ‘see’ in the sense of p-conscious 
seeing); 
(2) Subjects report much fewer characters than they are p-conscious of/see;  
(3) Report of the characters in the array is underpinned by working memory; 
therefore, 
(4) More information is p-conscious than is in working memory; therefore, 
(5) More information is p-conscious than is cognitively accessible; therefore, 
(6) “the machinery of phenomenology is somewhat different from the 
machinery of cognitive accessibility” (Block 2007a, 489).  
Start with premise (1). In both the whole and partial report paradigm, subjects 
claim to see all or almost all the characters in the array very clearly. Differently put, 
they report a rich and detailed p-conscious experience of the array. As noted, the 
partial report paradigm appears to confirm this. When, right after stimulus offset, 
a tone corresponding to one of the rows is sounded, subjects accurately report the 
letters of the relevant row. From this, it is inferred that subjects really did, as they 
claim, have a rich and detailed p-conscious experience of the entire array.85 
                                                          
85 One might wonder whether the view that one can have a p-conscious experience of 
the array (as opposed to an intransitive p-conscious experience) does not entail a view on 
which the p-conscious properties of a state are identical to the state’s representational 
properties (e.g., Jacob 2007). Block (2007c) thinks that it does not. Indeed, as I explained 
in chapter 2, while he rejects the equation of p-conscious properties with representational 
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Granted the truth of premise (1), premise (2) seems quite uncontroversial. When, 
in the whole report paradigm, subjects are required to report the letters that they 
saw, they typically only report an average of 4.3 letters. But considering that, 
according to Sperling’s calculations, subjects could actually see an average of 9.1 
letters, it follows that the number of letters that subjects are able to report is much 
smaller than the number of letters they could (and did) actually see.86  
As for premise (3), there is not much to say about this that has not been said 
before. The thought is just that, in order to report the letters that they saw, subjects 
need to actively sustain a representation of the letters in working memory. Report 
takes a considerable amount of time, so it is necessary that a representation of the 
letters be actively sustained in working memory, for at least as long as it takes to 
make a report. But, the thought goes, if working memory underpins report of the 
letters in the array, then the number of letters that subjects report will be identical 
to the number of letters represented in working memory. This number, as we have 
seen, Sperling calculated to be about 4.3. But, given that, upon stimulus 
presentation, subjects enjoy a p-conscious experience of about 9.1 letters, it follows 
that (4), more information is p-conscious than is in working memory. Now, on the 
assumption that all working memory information is cognitively accessible – as 
noted in §4.3 – Block can conclude that (5), more information is p-conscious than 
is cognitively accessible; that is, p-consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility.87 
                                                          
properties, he also thinks that p-conscious properties represent/have content. In virtue of 
being able to represent, p-consciousness can then also be p-consciousness of.   
86 One might wonder why Block’s argument refers to the number of letters that subjects 
report in the whole report paradigm, rather than in the partial report paradigm. The answer 
is that, in the partial report paradigm, subjects are only required to report the letters of the 
cued row. In this sense, if we want to know how many letters subjects can report in relation 
to the entire array, then we need to refer to the whole report paradigm.  
87 In his (2011), Block points out that the Overflow Argument does not show that any 
items are cognitively inaccessible, but only that most items are unaccessed. Prima facie, 
this suggests that he has changed his mind. In fact, I believe he has not. For everyone 
accepts that most items are unaccessed in the sense that they are not reported – this is an 
undisputable empirical claim. What some of Block’s opponents (e.g., Carruthers, 2015) 
challenge, instead, is the claim that any items are inaccessible. But why would Block (2011) 
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But (5) is just one of two claims that the Overflow Argument seeks to 
establish. The other claim, which Block takes to follow from (5), is that, (6), “the 
machinery of phenomenology is somewhat different from the machinery of 
cognitive accessibility” (2007a, 489). In the present context, we can take the term 
‘machinery’ to broadly refer to whatever brain mechanisms/processes suffice for 
the instantiation of p-consciousness, on the one hand, and cognitive accessibility, 
on the other. With that in mind, the idea is the following. If more information can 
be (and is) p-conscious than is cognitively accessible, then whatever 
mechanisms/processes suffice for the instantiation of p-consciousness must be “at 
least somewhat different” from the ones that suffice for the instantiation of 
cognitive accessibility. But why the ‘somewhat’?  
For even though participants are only able to report very few letters, they 
also claim to have seen them all in detail. In this sense, subjects are p-conscious of 
                                                          
make the above claim, then? The answer, I believe, is that what he means by ‘inaccessible’ 
and ‘unaccessed’ in his (2011) is simply different from what he means by the same terms in 
his (2007). In order to appreciate what Block (2011) means by ‘inaccessible’ and 
‘unaccessed’, I need to say something about Block’s (2007a, 492) distinction between broad 
and narrow cognitive accessibility. A representation is said by Block to be cognitively 
accessible in the narrow sense if it is actually globally broadcast in the workspace, and thus 
directly available to report, the rational control of action, etc. ‘Directly’ here means that, 
once globally broadcast, the representation is available to the consuming systems “without 
further processing” (Ibid.). As for broad cognitive accessibility, a representation is said by 
Block to cognitively accessible in the broad sense if it is not actually, but only potentially, 
broadcast in the workspace. In other words, a representation’s being accessible in the 
broad sense is a matter of its being poised to be globally broadcast. Now, in all likelihood, 
what Block (2011) means by ‘inaccessible’ is broad inaccessibility. For any one item would 
be globally broadcast if properly cued (Block 2007a, 489). Thus, the Overflow Argument 
does not show that any items are inaccessible in the broad sense. Still, most items are not 
globally broadcast. Thus, what the Overflow Argument does show is that most items are 
unaccessed in the broad sense. At this point, one thing that I should note is that, as should 
be clear, accessibility in the narrow sense is the notion of accessibility that I have been 
assuming so far. Moreover, unless otherwise specified, this is also the notion that I will 
assume in the remainder of this work. There are two different reasons for focusing on 
narrow accessibility. First, this is what Block (and Kriegel) have in mind when using the 
term ‘cognitive accessibility’: cognitively accessible representations are (actually) globally 
broadcast representations. Second, as we have seen, according to Dehaene and colleagues, 
it is globally broadcast representations that are conscious – both in the access and 
phenomenal sense, if you will. 
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all the letters in detail and a-conscious of their own p-conscious experience. More 
precisely, what is a-conscious is a conceptual representation of their own p-
conscious experience, a representation with the “generic content” that they “[have] 
had specific phenomenology”  (Block 2007c, 539). But, for all we know, this might 
mean that cognitive access to a representation of our own p-conscious states is a 
necessary condition of p-consciousness.88 It may be that a representation R cannot 
be p-conscious unless a representation of R, R1, is cognitively accessible. Still, the 
thought goes, the machinery of p-consciousness has to be at least partly different 
from the machinery of cognitive access. For while subjects are p-conscious of all 
the letters in the array – and know that they are – they can only report very few of 
them.   
6. Overflow Meets Neuroscience: The Mesh Argument 
This section introduces the second step of the Overflow-Mesh Argument, namely, 
the Mesh Argument. The latter proceeds from the claim that (4) p-conscious 
information overflows what is in working memory, to the conclusion that the 
neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in the neural basis of p-
consciousness. In a nutshell, Block’s reasoning is that if we assume that the neural 
basis of a-consciousness is not included in the neural basis of p-consciousness, then 
we will have a mechanism that explains why p-conscious information overflows 
working memory (Block 2007, 498). This, in Block’s view, is a strong enough reason 
to make the above assumption. 
Clarifications are already in order. In particular, I first need to explain what 
Block means by ‘neural basis’. This is what I will do immediately below. 
                                                          
88 Block is not explicit about this. That is, although he notes that the ‘somewhat’ in (6) 
is due, in part, to the fact that subjects report that they have seen all the characters, he is 
silent as for why that is the case. The idea that, because subjects know that they have seen 
all the letters, access to a representation of the phenomenal character of the experience 
may be a necessary condition of p-consciousness, however, is made explicit by Katalin 
Balog (2007).  
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6.1. The Neural Basis of Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness 
According to a standard definition, the neural basis of consciousness (tout court) 
is “the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a 
specific conscious percept” (Koch 2004, 16).89 We can tweak Koch’s definition so as 
to make it more general by replacing ‘percept’ with ‘(mental) state’. Importantly, in 
the present context, we also need to distinguish between the neural basis of p- 
consciousness and the neural basis of a-consciousness. The former can be defined 
as the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a 
specific p-conscious state. The latter, instead, can be defined as the minimal set of 
neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific a-conscious state.  
Koch’s definition of neural basis concerns specific types of p-conscious/a-
conscious states; e.g., the neural basis of a p-conscious experience with a reddish 
phenomenal character, and the neural basis of the a-conscious experience of a 
horizontal line. But this does not mean that one might not also be interested in the 
neural basis of broader types of p-conscious/a-conscious states; e.g., the neural 
basis of a p-conscious visual experience, the neural basis of an a-conscious auditory 
experience. Crucially, it also does not mean that the core of Koch’s definition 
cannot work as a definition of ‘neural basis’ in relation to these broader types of 
states. Thus, for example, we can easily define the neural basis of a p-conscious 
visual experience as the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly 
sufficient for that experience, and the neural basis of an a-conscious auditory 
experience as the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient 
for that experience. 
Let us now have a closer look at the neural basis of p-consciousness and a-
consciousness, respectively. Echoing Chalmers (2000), Block (2005, 2007a) 
                                                          
89 Strictly speaking, this is the definition that Koch (2004) provides of ‘neural correlate 
of consciousness’. As I understand it, however, this definition captures Block’s notion of 
neural basis just as well.    
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distinguishes between the total and core neural basis of p-consciousness.90 The 
former, he defines as follows: “[t]he total neural basis of a state with phenomenal 
character C is itself sufficient for the instantiation of C” (Block 2007a, 482). Block’s 
definition can be construed as concerning both specific and broader types of p-
conscious states. Thus, for example, the total neural basis of a mental state with a 
reddish phenomenal character is sufficient for the instantiation of that reddish 
phenomenal character. The total neural basis of a mental state with visual 
phenomenal character, instead, is sufficient for the instantiation of visual 
phenomenal character. As for the core neural basis, Block suggests that “The core 
neural basis of a state with phenomenal character C is the part of the total neural 
basis that distinguishes states with C from states with other phenomenal characters 
or phenomenal contents” (Ibid.). Again, this definition can be understood as 
concerning specific and broader types of p-conscious states. The core neural basis 
of a state with a reddish phenomenal character, for example, is the part of the total 
neural basis that distinguishes states with reddish phenomenal character from 
states with bluish phenomenal character. The core neural basis of an experience 
with visual phenomenal character, instead, is the part of the total neural basis that 
distinguishes experiences with visual phenomenal character from experiences with 
auditory phenomenal character. (Note that, in light of the distinction between total 
and core neural basis, Koch’s definition above counts as a definition of total – rather 
than core – neural basis).   
But what is the “total minus core neural basis” (Block 2007a, 482) of p-
consciousness? That is, what is it that needs to be added to the core neural basis of 
a p-conscious state to get its total neural basis? Block defines the total minus core 
neural basis of a p-conscious state as the set of “enabling conditions” (2005, 47) for 
                                                          
90 Koch (2004), too, draws a similar distinction between enabling and specific factors. 
As he notes, “enabling factors are tonic conditions and systems that are needed for any 
form of consciousness to occur at all, while specific factors are required for any one 
particular conscious percept, such as seeing the glorious, star-studded alpine night sky” 
(Koch 2004, 88).  
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a p-conscious state. More precisely, it is what makes a (potentially p-conscious) 
state p-conscious (2009, 1112). (More on this below).91 Thus, while the core and total 
neural basis change from one type of p-conscious experience to another, the total 
minus core neural basis is the same for all types of p-conscious experiences. 
For later purposes, it will be worth saying something about the neural 
mechanisms and events that Block identifies as potential candidates for the core 
neural basis of p-consciousness, on the one hand, and its total minus core neural 
basis, on the other. (Perhaps it is best to say visual perceptual p-consciousness, 
rather than p-consciousness simpliciter, as the former is what Block is primarily 
concerned with. Unless otherwise specified, below I assume that p-consciousness 
is always visual perceptual p-consciousness). The most plausible candidate for the 
core neural basis of visual p-consciousness, Block thinks is recurrent activation in 
the occipito-temporal areas of the brain. It is recurrent activation in those areas that 
Block thinks determines how the phenomenal character of p-conscious visual 
experiences differs from the phenomenal character of p-conscious auditory 
experiences, gustatory experiences, and so on.92 His chief example concerns the 
experience as of motion. Block cites different lines of evidence which all point to 
the idea that the core neural basis of the phenomenal experience as of motion is 
recurrent activation between V1, the primary visual cortex, and V5, in the 
extrastriate visual cortex (Block 2007a, 496).  
Now for the total minus core neural basis. Citing, for example, Alkire and 
Miller (2005), Block suggests that the “single neural background of all experience” 
involves the activation of connections between the cortex and the thalamus (Block 
2007a, 482). Alkire and Miller (2005) review several studies on the relationship 
between general anaesthesia and consciousness which all converge on one point: 
disabling certain connections between the cortex and the thalamus what general 
                                                          
91 I will also come back to this in chapter 5. 
92 I discuss the notion of recurrent activation at length in the next chapter. 
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anaesthetics do. On the assumption that consciousness (in any sense of the term 
‘consciousness’) is absent when a subject is under general anaesthesia, the authors 
infer that the activation of the aforementioned connections may be necessary for 
consciousness (in any sense of the term of the term ‘consciousness’).93 On the basis 
of Alkire and Miller’s study, Block hypothesises that activation of those connections 
may be the total minus core neural basis of p-consciousness.  
But what, exactly, is the relationship between p-consciousness (in general; 
i.e., visual, auditory, and maybe even non-perceptual) and its total neural basis, 
according to Block? Block suggests that “[p-]consciousness is identical to its total 
neural basis” (2007a, 482 emphasis mine).94 Let us see if we can shed some light on 
this statement. We have seen that the total neural basis of a kind of conscious state 
is defined as “the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient 
for [it]” (Koch 2004, 16). This definition, however, is compatible with a wide range 
of views about the relationship between p-consciousness and the neuronal events 
and mechanisms that constitute its total neural basis. For example, it is compatible 
with the view according to which p-consciousness is determined by said neuronal 
events and mechanisms. A view of this sort is endorsed by Searle (1992). According 
to Searle, p-consciousness supervenes on its total neural basis. Roughly, this means 
that any difference in p-conscious properties guarantees a difference in the 
neuronal events and mechanisms that constitute its total neural basis, but not the 
other way around. Looking at the notion of supervenience from a different angle, 
                                                          
93 I should note that Block’s reasons to claim that the activation of certain connections 
between the cortex and the thalamus is the total minus core neural basis of p-
consciousness can be easily called into question. Alkire and Miller (2005) write that, in the 
reviewed studies, “the ‘unconscious’ endpoint referred to in many anaesthetic studies is 
that point at which an anaesthetic dose is given in sufficient quantity that it causes a 
subject to be unable to respond to a verbal command or to a rousing shake” (2005, 232). 
But, if anything, this is evidence for the claim that the activation of certain connections 
between the cortex and the thalamus is necessary for a-consciousness. While one’s inability 
“to respond to a verbal command or to a rousing shake” suggests that one’s experience of 
the command/shake is not a-conscious, it is compatible with that experience’s being p-
conscious. 
94 But see also Block (2009). 
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“sameness of neurophysiology guarantees sameness of mentality; but sameness of 
mentality does not guarantee sameness of neurophysiology” (Searle 1992, 125).  
But the above definition of neural basis is also compatible with the claim 
that p-consciousness is identical with the neuronal events and mechanisms that 
constitute its total neural basis. This is Block’s own view. To say that p-
consciousness is identical with its total neural basis is the same thing as saying that 
p-consciousness just is a certain brain state, or that the property of being p-
conscious just is a certain biological property. Consider visual p-consciousness 
again. To say that visual p-consciousness just is a certain brain state is to say that 
visual p-consciousness just is the brain’s having recurrent activation in the 
occipito-temporal areas of the brain, plus activation of certain neural connections 
between the cortex and the upper brain stem. To say that visual p-consciousness 
just is a biological property, instead, is to say that the property of being visually p-
conscious just is the property of being recurrent activation in the occipito-temporal 
areas, plus activation of certain neural connections between the cortex and the 
upper brain stem.  
What about the neural basis of a-consciousness? For our purposes, 
identifying the core and total neural basis of a-consciousness is of no relevance. 
What needs pointing out, however, is that a crucial component of the neural basis 
of a-consciousness is activation in the frontal, prefrontal, and cingulate areas of the 
brain. As you will remember from chapter 2, workspace neurons are particularly 
dense in those areas, which is where the consuming systems are located. Indeed, 
one might even see those areas as the “seat” of the global workspace. It is those very 
areas that, in his argument, Block refers to as ‘the neural basis of a-consciousness’, 
and this is how I will use the same phrase below. 
One last brief point. What is the nature of the relation between a-
consciousness and its total neural basis? Above we saw that Block construes the 
relation between p-consciousness and its total neural basis as an identity relation. 
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But the same cannot be said with respect to the relation between a-consciousness 
and its total neural basis. As you will remember, a-consciousness is a functional 
property. This entails that, unlike p-consciousness, the relation between a-
consciousness and its total neural basis is one of realization. As it happens, in 
humans as well as other animals, a-consciousness is realized by its total neural 
basis. 
Before introducing Block’s argument, I need to take care of one last thing. 
In particular, I need to say something about the brain mechanisms and processes 
surrounding global broadcasting. 
6.3. The Neuronal and Functional Events Surrounding Global Broadcasting 
Consider visual perception. Here is a rough picture of what, according to GWM, 
happens upon presentation of a stimulus. Within a few msec. from the presentation 
of the stimulus, bottom-up (i.e., sensory) stimulation results in the activation of 
the occipito-temporal areas in the “back of the head” (e.g., Dehaene and Changeux 
2004; Dehaene et al. 2006). In general, if the stimulus is sufficiently strong and 
long-lasting, activation in the above areas will be strong, too. According to GWM, 
if the stimulus is targeted by attention, the already strong neuronal activation in 
the relevant areas will be amplified to the point that it will spread to the parietal, 
prefrontal, and cingulate regions. These areas of the brain are normally referred to 
as higher association cortices (Dehaene et al., 2006) and, as already noted, are 
thought to be the areas where systems of report, deliberation, etc. are located.  
Importantly, according to GWM, the activation of the higher association 
cortices by the occipito-temporal areas hinges on the presence of the long-distance 
axons of workspace neurons. These connect the occipito-temporal areas to parietal, 
prefrontal, and cingulate areas, and the latter areas among themselves – indeed, as 
noted on several occasions, workspace neurons are particularly dense precisely in 
the areas in question. Dehaene et al. (2006) refer to the information processing 
Chapter 4 
135 
 
state corresponding to this state of widespread activation – the state in which 
activation has extended from the occipito-temporal areas to the parietal, 
prefrontal, and cingulate areas – as conscious. According to Block’s distinction 
between p-consciousness and a-consciousness, however, this information 
processing state would only qualify as a-conscious. In the language of GWM, the 
spreading of activation from the occipito-temporal areas to the higher association 
cortices corresponds to the global broadcasting of information about the relevant 
stimulus, and thus to such information becoming accessible to the relevant 
consuming systems.95  
But what happens when the presented stimulus is sufficiently strong and 
long-lasting, and yet it is not targeted by attention? In that case, brain activation, 
although intense – indeed, almost as intense as it would have been had the stimulus 
been targeted by attention – will remain confined to the occipito-temporal areas. 
Dehaene et al. (2006) and Dehaene and Changeux (2011) refer to the information 
processing state corresponding to this state of confined activation as preconscious. 
Information carried by the strong activation of the occipito-temporal areas is only 
potentially accessible information: it would become (actually) accessible if the 
relevant stimulus were targeted by attention, which would in turn trigger the global 
broadcasting of the relevant representation.96  
It might also happen that a visual stimulus is too weak, short-lasting, or 
both. In cases such as this, although presentation of the stimulus will still cause 
activation in the occipito-temporal areas of the brain, this activation will be very 
weak, and will be barred from spreading to more frontal areas. Dehaene et al. 
                                                          
95 Here and in the remainder of this chapter I (unharmfully) assume that if the 
functionality condition that I argued for in chapter 3 has to indeed be satisfied for a-
consciousness to be present, then it is normally satisfied. This means that the occurrence 
of global broadcasting normally guarantees the presence of a-consciousness. 
96 Consider the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, encountered in chapter 2. The 
visual stimulus is quite strong and yet, because the subjects’ attention is directed elsewhere 
the relevant representation is inaccessible. It would become accessible, however, were the 
subjects to attend to the stimulus. This is a clear case of preconscious processing. 
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(2006) and Dehaene and Changeux (2011) refer to the information processing state 
corresponding to this state of weak and confined activation as ‘subliminal’. As in 
the case of preconscious processing, information involved in subliminal processing 
is inaccessible. Unlike the case of preconscious processing, however, subliminal 
information is not even potentially accessible. That is, it could not be made 
available to the brain’s consuming systems even if the subject’s attention were 
directed to the relevant stimuli.97   
But a visual scene will normally contain many objects. Accordingly, the 
number of stimuli concurrently causing bottom-up activation in the occipito-
temporal areas of the brain will normally be quite large. So while neuronal 
activation caused by one or more strong and long-lasting stimuli will, in virtue of 
being amplified by attention, extend to parietal, prefrontal, and cingulate areas, 
neuronal activation caused by the remainder of the stimuli in the visual field, 
regardless of their initial strength, will not. Crick and Koch (2003), Koch (2004), 
and Block (2007a, 2009) speak of neural coalitions. The notion of neural coalition 
is somewhat flexible. In the present context, a neural coalition may be thought of 
as a temporary assembly of neurons whose overall activation represents a specific 
stimulus/group of stimuli (Fahrenfort and Lamme 2012). At any one time, different 
coalitions feature different levels of activation, depending, among other things, on 
the initial strength of the stimuli they carry information about, but also on the 
attentional boost they (do or do not) receive.98  
                                                          
97 Subliminal processing can also be induced through masking in laboratory settings. 
Masking consists in the reduction or elimination of the visibility of a stimulus S through 
the presentation of other stimuli Sn, in close temporal or spatial contiguity with S. As an 
example, consider the visual presentation of a word for about 33ms. That word is fully 
visible (and reportable) when presented in isolation, but stops being so when it is 
immediately preceded or followed by the presentation of a geometrical shape (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011, p. 201).  
98 What is the relationship between neural coalitions and the processors discussed in 
earlier? In chapter 1, I defined processors as highly specialized group of neurons dedicated 
to the processing of very specific kinds of information. In light of this, neural coalitions 
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Following Block’s terminology (Block 2007a, 2009), we can thus distinguish 
between “winning” or “dominant” and “losing” neural coalitions. Winning 
coalitions are assemblies of neurons whose (already strong) activation has been 
amplified by attention and has thus resulted in global broadcasting. Normally, 
these coalitions are selected because of their relevance to the organism’s current 
goals (Dehaene & Changeux, 2004). As for losing coalitions, these come in two 
kinds. On the one hand, there are losing and weak coalitions. These are assemblies 
of neurons whose activation level is too low to ever cause global broadcasting – in 
the language of Dehaene et al. (2006), the information carried by activation of these 
coalitions would count as subliminal. On the other hand, there are losing but strong 
coalitions. These are assemblies of neurons whose activation is strong, albeit not 
sufficiently strong to have resulted in global broadcasting – in the language of 
Dehaene et al. (2006), the information carried by the activation of these coalitions 
would count as preconscious. Losing but strong coalitions, however, are also 
potentially winning coalitions. What that means is that, were the relevant 
stimulus/stimuli be targeted by attention, the activation of these coalitions would 
become strong enough to trigger global broadcasting. 
We are now ready to introduce the Mesh Argument. 
6.4. The Argument 
As noted, the Mesh Argument proceeds from the claim that (4) p-conscious 
information overflows what is in working memory, to the conclusion that the 
neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in the neural basis of p-
consciousness. More precisely, in light of the distinction between core and total 
neural basis, the argument concludes that the neural basis of a-consciousness is 
not included in either the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness. The 
                                                          
might also be seen as groups of processors whose activity codes for the properties of the 
relevant stimulus/groups of stimuli. 
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argument, which takes the form of an inference to the best explanation, can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
(4) More information is p-conscious than is in working memory;  
(51) If we assume that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in 
either the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness, then we have a 
neural mechanism that explains (4); 
(61) The assumption in (51) is the best explanation for (4) in that it leads to 
a mesh between psychological and neuroscientific results; 
(7) Therefore, the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either 
the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness.  
Let us have a closer look at the argument. As noted, Sperling’s partial report 
paradigm, as well as other experiments in the same vein, can be understood as 
warranting the claim that (4) more information is p-conscious than is in working 
memory. How can we explain this overflow of working memory by p-
consciousness? Suppose we assume that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not 
included in either the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness. In other words, 
suppose we assume that all strong – both winning and losing – neural coalitions of 
activation in the occipito-temporal areas of the brain can be p-conscious in the 
absence of activation of the more frontal areas that underpin global workspace 
activation. Then we have a neural mechanism that explains why more information 
is p-conscious than is later stored in working memory. Even though, at any one 
time, only one (or some) neural coalitions trigger global broadcasting – which 
results in the information they carry becoming a-conscious – many other losing, 
albeit strong, coalitions will still be p-conscious.99  
                                                          
99 One tacit assumption here is that, as we have seen, there is a strong relationship 
between a-consciousness and working memory. As noted, Block is not entirely clear about 
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The assumption that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in 
either the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness leads to a mesh between 
psychology and neuroscience. That is, it leads to a mesh between the psychological 
result that more information can be (and is) p-conscious than is in working 
memory and the result from neuroscience that some coalitions of activation in the 
occipito-temporal areas of the brain can be almost as strong as the coalitions that 
trigger activation in more frontal areas. In virtue of leading to the mesh, that 
assumption is the best explanation for (4). 
7. Carruthers’s Criticism of the Overflow-Mesh Argument 
This section introduces Carruthers’s (2015b) criticism of the Overflow-Mesh 
Argument. To this end, I begin by providing a more concise reconstruction of the 
Overflow Argument, and leave out (5) and (6) above: 
(I) Subjects are p-conscious of all or almost all the letters in detail;  
(II) Subjects only report about 4 letters in the whole report paradigm;  
(III) More information is p-conscious than is in working memory. 
As we already know, the second step of the Overflow-Mesh Argument – the 
Mesh Argument – argues for the conclusion that the neural basis of a-
consciousness is not included in either the core or the total neural basis of p-
consciousness, on the grounds that this is a powerful explanation for (III). 
The Overflow-Mesh argument has been challenged in multiple ways. Many 
critics have attempted to deny the claim that (III) more information is p-conscious 
than is in working memory, by rejecting the claim that, upon presentation of the 
                                                          
what this relationship is. There is little doubt, however, that he thinks that a 
representation’s being a-conscious – and thus being globally broadcast – is a necessary 
condition for its being a working memory representation. Now, if we assume that neural 
coalitions in the “back of the head” can be p-conscious in the absence of global 
broadcasting – in the absence of a-consciousness – it follows that information can be p-
conscious without being in working memory.  
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array, (I) subjects are p-conscious of all or almost all the letters in detail. 
Consistently with the outcome of Sperling’s partial report paradigm, Cohen and 
Dennett (2011), for example, claim that upon presentation of the array subjects “are 
conscious only of the few letters they attend to and the impression that there are 
other items on the display whose identities they do not know” (2011, 359). Similarly, 
Naccache and Dehaene (2007) suggest that, upon presentation of the array, 
subjects distribute their attention evenly over it. Because attentional resources are 
limited, this results in only a gist representation of the array being globally 
broadcast, and thus conscious. But on this and the previous account, how is the 
participants’ ability to report all (or almost all) the letters of any cued row to be 
explained, then? The thought seems to be that the effect of cueing is to attract the 
subjects’ attention to part of an unconscious representation of the array. This 
results in the relevant representation’s being globally broadcast in the workspace, 
and thus in its being available for report. The reason why subjects claim to have 
seen every letter in the array in great detail is just that they have fallen victim to 
some kind of illusion.  
To appreciate what this means, consider Dehaene and Naccache’s proposal 
(2001). According to the authors, in the Sperling experiments, subjects have “the 
intuition of a rich phenomenological world” (Ibid., 30) because, were they to focus 
their attention on any of the letters, they would actually be able to see them in 
great detail. In this sense, to use Block’s terminology, subjects confuse potential 
with actual phenomenology (2007a, 491). Block (2001, 2007a) dubs the alleged 
phenomenon the ‘refrigerator light illusion’: “[t]he allusion being to the possibility 
that a technologically naïve person might have the illusion that the refrigerator 
light is always on because it is always on when he looks” (2001, 209).100  
Unlike the above critics, Carruthers (2015b) wishes to grant the truth of (III). 
He believes that it may indeed be possible for subjects to have a rich p-conscious 
                                                          
100 Cohen and Dennett (2011) espouse a view that is similar to Dehaene and Naccache’s. 
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experience of the array and that, given that (II) they only report 4 letters, this 
suggests that (III) more information is p-conscious than in working memory. On 
the other hand, Carruthers aims to challenge Block’s idea that (III) is best explained 
by the claim that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either the 
core or total neural basis of p-consciousness. In his view, there is a better 
explanation for this fact – one that supports Dehaene et al.’s claim that p-
consciousness and a-consciousness are identical with the property of being globally 
broadcast, and thus with each other. To make his point, Carruthers (2015b, 4) puts 
forward five related theses, which he suggests are all widely accepted among 
cognitive scientists: 
i. “Attentional signals directed at representations in sensory regions of the 
brain are a necessary (and, with other factors, sufficient) condition for those 
representations to be globally broadcast”;  
ii. “attention is a limited resource: only so much information can be attended 
to at any one time”; 
iii. “the effect of attentional signals is to boost the neural activity underlying 
the targeted representations (while also suppressing competing activity, and 
perhaps also sharpening the representations in question)”; 
iv. “working memory uses the same attentional network to sustain previously-
presented sensory representations in the global workspace”; 
v. “global broadcasting takes place when some sort of threshold of neural 
activity is reached”. 
With the above theses in place, Carruthers notes that the reason why Block’s 
argument fails is fairly straightforward. The thought is that the amount of attention 
needed to actively sustain a representation in working memory is much larger than 
the amount required to globally broadcast the same representation. In the latter 
case, “the incoming signal will involve exogenously caused neural activity that is 
already above baseline, needing less of an attentional boost in order to reach the 
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threshold for global broadcasting” (2015b, 4). 101 The same cannot be said with 
respect to sustaining a representation in working memory, however. For in that 
case attention will have to do its work in the absence of exogenously caused neural 
activity. Attention will thus have to boost the relevant neural activity all by itself. 
In virtue of that, it is reasonable to suppose, more attention will be needed to 
sustain a representation in working memory than to broadcast the same 
representation in the global workspace. It follows that a richer and more detailed 
representation of a stimulus will be globally broadcast (and hence a-conscious) 
than will later be held in working memory.  
In this way, Carruthers can grant that (I) subjects in the Sperling 
experiments are conscious “of most of [the letters] in identity-defining detail” 
(2015b, 4); explain why (II) subjects can only name about 4 letters; and vindicate 
the claim that (III) more information is p-conscious than is in working memory. At 
the same time, however, he can reject the conclusion of Block’s argument, namely, 
that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either the core or total 
neural basis of p-consciousness. When, in the whole report paradigm, subjects are 
presented with the array of letters, they distribute their attention “evenly over the 
entire display” (2015b, 5). Because exogenously caused neural activity is already 
high, attention may be sufficient to cause the global broadcasting of a detailed 
representation of the entire array. At this stage – call it T1 – information about the 
array will thus be broadcast in the workspace, but not yet retained in working 
memory.  
After stimulus offset – call this stage T2 – exogenously caused neural activity 
will gradually drop. In order to report the letters that they have seen, subjects will 
now have to hold the relevant information in working memory. That is, they will 
now have to actively sustain the relevant neural activity, “holding [it] far enough 
                                                          
101 What does ‘baseline’ mean, in this context? The idea is that, even in the absence of 
exogenously caused activity – activity caused by the presence of a stimulus – there is still 
some spontaneous activity in the relevant brain areas. 
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above baseline for global broadcasting to continue to take place” (Ibid.). Crucially, 
however, in the absence of bottom-up stimulation, attentional resources alone 
won’t suffice to sustain as much neural activity as is needed to keep a detailed 
representation of the array in a broadcast state. Instead, all attentional resources 
will now have to be focused on a much smaller number of characters – three or four 
– and withdrawn from the others. As a result, three or four is the number of letters 
that subjects can normally report. 
But if global broadcasting is all that is needed to explain (III), namely, that 
more information is p-conscious than is in working memory, then Carruthers can 
conclude that there is only one neural basis of consciousness (tout court), and that 
p-consciousness and a-consciousness are thus one and the same thing. 
8. In Defence of the Overflow-Mesh Argument 
What should we think of Carruthers’s reply? In what follows, I argue that it does 
not undermine the Overflow-Mesh Argument. Let me begin by laying out three 
assumptions. First, let us assume the truth of all five theses introduced in §7. As 
Carruthers notes, although not uncontroversial, all five theses are widely accepted 
among cognitive scientists. Second, let us grant Carruthers that, at T1, subjects 
distribute their attention evenly over the entire display. This seems a reasonable 
assumption, for in the absence of reasons for doing otherwise – e.g., the 
experimenter’s instruction to attend to one specific row – the even distribution of 
attention over the entire display is what one would probably expect. Finally, let us 
also grant Carruthers that, at T1, a representation of the array is broadcast in the 
global workspace.   
My argument will proceed in two steps. First, I will challenge the claim that, 
because of “the exogenously caused neural activity that is already above baseline” 
(Carruthers 2015b, 4), the even distribution of attention over the entire display 
results in the global broadcasting of a detailed representation of the array. Having 
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established that no detailed representation of the array is broadcast in the 
workspace, I will then argue that if, in line with Block and Carruthers, we wish to 
grant that (III) more information is p-conscious than is in working memory, then 
we will have to assume with Block that all strong coalitions – both winning and 
losing – in the occipito-temporal areas of the brain can be (and are) p-conscious in 
the absence of global broadcasting. In other words, we will have to assume that the 
neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either the core or total neural 
basis of p-consciousness. 
In their commentary to Block (2007), Naccache and Dehaene write: 
 
When subjects report seeing “all the letters,” we suggest that they distribute their 
attention globally over the array, and thus are only able to determine its 
approximate numerosity and “letterhood”; […] only this approximate content, not 
the detailed letter identities, accesses a fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace. 
When subjects report individual letters, they change to a focused attention mode 
that allows them to enhance one location at a time, to let its specific content access 
the global workspace, and, therefore, to name it (Naccache and Dehaene 2007, 519). 
 
Upon presentation of the array, subjects in the Sperling experiments distribute 
their attention evenly over the entire display. But evenly distributed attention over 
the entire display results in the global broadcasting of only an approximate 
representation of the array. If Naccache and Dehaene are right, attention is 
therefore too much of a limited resource to trigger the global broadcasting of a 
detailed representation of the array.102 But are they right? 
Naccache and Dehaene justify their claim that only an approximate 
representation of the array will be broadcast in the global workspace by appealing 
                                                          
102 Note that, as one would expect, Naccache and Dehaene’s goal is antithetic to mine – 
they offer those considerations in the context of arguing against Block. Still, this does not 
mean that we can’t use the same considerations to argue in favour of Block.   
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to the work of Sabine Kastner et al. (1998) on attention.103 Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Kastner et al. have provided evidence 
suggesting that when attention is distributed evenly over a scene consisting of four 
or more objects, representations of the objects in the occipito-temporal areas of 
the brain “interact in a competitive, mutually suppressive fashion” (Ibid., 108). One 
plausible consequence of the representations’ mutually suppressive interaction is 
that only some information about each of the objects in the subject’s visual field 
will be able to reach further stages of processing. In the language of GWM, this 
means that only some information about each individual object will be broadcast 
in the workspace. On the other hand, the focusing of attention upon a specific 
location/object in the same scene has the effect of cancelling out “the suppressive 
influence of nearby stimuli, thereby enhancing information processing at the 
attended location” (Ibid.). Again, in the language of GWM, the focusing of 
attention will result in detailed information about the attended stimulus being 
broadcast in the workspace, just as would have happened had the stimulus been 
presented alone.  
Below is a concise account of the evidence that Kastner and colleagues have 
provided for the claim that evenly distributed attention over a scene consisting of 
four or more objects results in the mutually suppressive interaction of the relevant 
extrastriate representations. Eight subjects were presented with complex visual 
images in the absence of spatially directed attention. The images were shown in 
random order within a quadrant under sequential and simultaneous presentation 
conditions. “In the sequential condition (SEQ), each of the stimuli was shown alone 
in one of the four locations. In the simultaneous condition (SIM), the stimuli 
appeared together in all four locations” (Ibid.). On the basis of results from 
previous experiments in the same vein conducted on monkeys (e.g., Treue and 
Maunsell 1996; Miller et al. 1993), Kastner and colleagues hypothesised that, if 
                                                          
103 But see also Kastner et al. (1999), Kastner et al. (2001), and Beck & Kastner (2005). 
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representations of the stimuli in the occipito-temporal areas did really interact in 
a mutual suppressive fashion in the simultaneous condition, fMRI signals 
concerning those very areas would be smaller than in the sequential condition. This 
is exactly what they found. As they suggest, fMRI signals during the presentation 
of single stimuli were “significantly greater” than the signals during the 
presentation of the same stimulus plus three other stimuli (Ibid., 109). 
On the assumption that Kastner and colleagues are right, Carruthers’s claim 
that evenly distributed attention over the entire display will result in the global 
broadcasting of a detailed representation of the array is rejected. For given the 
mutually suppressive effect of the simultaneous presence of multiple objects, 
evenly distributed attention over the Sperling array is unlikely to suffice for the 
broadcasting of a detailed representation of the same. As Naccache and Dehaene 
point out (2007, 519), subjects will only be “able to determine [the array’s] 
approximate numerosity and ‘letterhood’ […] only this approximate content, not 
the detailed letter identities, accesses a fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace”.  
But if we still wish to grant, in line with Block and Carruthers, that (III) more 
information is p-conscious than is in working memory, then we will also have to 
grant – again, in line with both authors – that (I) subjects are p-conscious of all or 
almost all the letters in detail. But having established that only an approximate 
representation of the array is broadcast in the workspace, it seems clear that ‘p-
conscious’ cannot be understood in terms of global broadcasting, but a la Block. In 
other words, in order to account for the richness of the experience, we will have to 
assume with Block that all strong neural coalitions – both winning and losing – in 
the occipito-temporal regions can be (and are) p-conscious in the absence of global 
broadcasting.  
I would now like to anticipate a possible response. The second step of my 
argument has focused on Carruthers’s inability to account for (I) – namely, that 
subjects are p-conscious of all or almost all the letters in detail – by appealing to 
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global broadcasting. But in light of the evidence on attention discussed above, 
Carruthers might now give up his attempt to vindicate (I), while noting that a 
weaker claim will suffice to establish (III) just as well. For all that is needed to 
establish (III) is that more information is globally broadcast than is later encoded 
in working memory. And although the empirical evidence is incompatible with the 
global broadcasting of a detailed representation of the array, it might still be 
compatible with the broadcasting of an amount of information that is just a bit 
larger than the amount later held in working memory.  
Were Carruthers to pursue this line of response, the burden of proof would 
be on him to show that the evidence is indeed compatible with the above. And even 
if he were able to do that, part of my point would still stand. Even though, clearly, 
I would no longer be able to salvage Block’s conclusion, I will have at least shown 
two things. For one thing, the claim that a rich representation of the array can be 
globally broadcast is almost certainly false. For another, the claim that (I) subjects 
are p-conscious of all or almost all the letters in detail can only be vindicated by 
assuming that all neural coalitions – both winning and losing – in the occipito 
temporal areas of the brain can be (and are) p-conscious in the absence of global 
broadcasting. In other words, (I) can only be vindicated by assuming that the 
neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either the core or total neural 
basis of p-consciousness. 
Carruthers has offered a story of the cognitive processes at play in the whole 
report paradigm. Is it possible to offer an alternative story, this time against the 
background of my defence of the distinctness of p-consciousness and a-
consciousness? And is it possible to offer such a story while preserving the five 
assumptions put in place by Carruthers? I believe so. Start with the presentation of 
the array – T1. Suppose that subjects enjoy a p-conscious experience of the entire 
array in detail. At the same time, the even distribution of attention on the array 
results in the global broadcasting of an approximate representation of it. In other 
  Chapter 4 
148 
 
words, the even distribution of attention on the array results in an a-conscious, 
approximate representation of it. Right after stimulus offset – T2 – subjects 
continue enjoying a p-conscious representation of the array for a brief period of 
time. The existence of a persisting image after stimulus offset – iconic memory 
(Neisser, 1967) – is, as we have seen, taken to be shown by Sperling’s partial report 
paradigm. How could subjects report almost all the letters from the cued row? 
Sperling’s answer was that what subjects had seen during the 50msec. exposure, 
they continued seeing for a very short time right after stimulus offset – just enough 
time for the cue to attract their attention on the relevant row. Given the 
assumption that a detailed representation of the entire array is p-conscious at T1, 
we can also assume that the same representation will be p-conscious for as long the 
neural activity underlying it stays the same – about 1 sec., to be exact (Sperling 1960, 
11). We will now expect that, in order to make a report, all attentional resources will 
be focused on three or four characters. This will result in the global broadcasting 
of a representation of those characters. But given that report takes a considerable 
amount of time, those characters will have to be sustained in working memory. 
That is, a representation of those characters will have to be kept in a broadcast state 
for as long as it takes the subject to make a report.  
9. Concluding Remarks 
In order to understand and evaluate Block’s position on the functional role of p-
consciousness, we first need to appreciate his positive account of the latter, as well 
as close in on his understanding of the relation between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness. In §2, I provided a general picture of the biological approach to p-
consciousness, which Block favours. Having explained that, unlike the defenders of 
cognitive theories of consciousness, Block thinks that an account of p-
consciousness cannot abstract away from the biological/neurological details, I then 
moved onto analysing the Overflow-Mesh Argument. In its ultimate attempt to 
disentangle the neural machinery of p-consciousness from the machinery of a-
Chapter 4 
149 
 
consciousness, the Overflow-Mesh Argument has worked as a powerful tool to 
further our understanding of Block’s take on p-consciousness, and the latter’s 
relation with a-consciousness. 
In short, the picture that we have obtained is the following. First, p-
consciousness is identical with its total neural basis. In the specific, this is to say 
that p-consciousness is identical with activation of a certain kind in the occipito-
temporal areas, plus activation of certain connections between the cortex and the 
brain stem. Second, the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in either 
the core or total neural basis of p-consciousness. This means that, in effect, p-
consciousness can (and does) occur in the absence of a-consciousness. 
Importantly, discussing the Overflow-Mesh has also allowed me to defend 
the last two claims from a recent criticism advanced by Carruthers (2015b). By 
appealing to the empirical work of Kastner et al.'s (1998), I have argued that first, 
Carruthers’s argument rests on a view of distributed attention that is empirically 
implausible and second, that Kastner et al.’s empirical results can be used in direct 
support of Block’s conclusion.  
In the next chapter, I put many of the notions introduced in this chapter to 
work, and attempt to make sense of, and assess, Block’s account of the functional 
role of p-consciousness.  
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5 
  
Block on the Functional Role of Phenomenal 
Consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I consider, and assess, Block’s take on the functional role of p-
consciousness. Block has touched on the question of what the functional role of p-
consciousness is on several occasions (e.g., 2009, 2015). To a first approximation, 
his view is that p-consciousness figures in the causal explanation of a-
consciousness. To a second approximation, his view is that (the core neural basis 
of) p-consciousness contributes to the triggering of global broadcasting (personal 
communication, April 21, 2017).104 Unfortunately, this is as detailed as Block’s view 
on the matter gets.  
Against the background of, first, Block’s view on p-consciousness, and, 
second, the definition of functional role of p-consciousness provided in chapter 1, 
can we do the philosophical work for Block, and explain just in what sense 
contributing to the triggering of global broadcasting may be said to be (part of) the 
                                                          
104 As explained earlier, Block distinguishes between the total and core neural basis of 
p-consciousness: “[t]he total neural basis of a state with phenomenal character C is itself 
sufficient for the instantiation of C. The core neural basis of a state with phenomenal 
character C is the part of the total neural basis that distinguishes states with C from states 
with other phenomenal characters or phenomenal contents” (2007a, 482). I will come back 
to this below.  
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functional role of (the core neural basis of) p-consciousness?105 Below I attempt to 
do just that, and argue for the following construal of Block’s view: potential a-
consciousness is the functional role of (the core neural basis of) p-consciousness. 
With a clearly-defined account of the functional role of (the core neural 
basis of) p-consciousness in hand, I then also argue, contra Block, that the account 
is untenable. In a nutshell, the reason is that potential a-consciousness is best 
understood as the functional role of a property other than (the core neural basis of) 
p-consciousness.  
Here is the plan. In §2, I provide a careful explanation of the notion of local 
recurrent activation. Doing so is a necessary step towards making sense of Block’s 
view. For as I anticipated in chapter 4, Block thinks that the core neural basis of p-
consciousness is exactly local recurrent activation. In the remainder of the chapter, 
I put to work many of the notions introduced in §2 as well as in chapter 4. In §3, I 
argue that Block’s view should be understood as the view that potential a-
consciousness is the functional role of a mental state’s property of being a local 
recurrent activation. Finally, in §4, I argue that, if my construal of Block’s view is 
right, that view is unacceptable. Note that, as in the previous chapter, I will focus 
exclusively on visual perceptual p-consciousness.  
2. Lamme and Block on Local Recurrent Activation and Phenomenal 
Consciousness 
In this section, I explain what local recurrent activation is, and how, exactly, Block 
thinks it is relevant to p-consciousness. What we know about local recurrent 
activation we know mostly thanks to Victor Lamme, a cognitive neuroscientist. As 
a consequence, in what follows, I will mainly – although not exclusively – draw on 
                                                          
105 I assume here that Block’s proposal does not concern the entire functional role of p-
consciousness, but only part of it. For the purposes of exposition, below I am going to omit 
the ‘part of’ qualification, however. 
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his work. As it happens, as I will briefly explain, Lamme, too, thinks that this kind 
of activation is crucial to p-consciousness.  
This section is divided into several chunks, so it will be useful outlining its 
structure. I begin with a few words on the structure of the visual system, with a 
specific focus on its hierarchical structure. After that, I introduce the feedforward 
sweep, a form of neural activation that is thought to temporally precede the onset 
of local recurrent activation itself. Having introduced the feedforward sweep, I then 
move onto recurrent activation tout court, and distinguish between local and 
widespread recurrent activation. Last, I close in on Block’s take on the relationship 
between local recurrent activation and p-consciousness.  
2.1. The Parallel and Hierarchical Structure of the Human Visual System 
Neuroscientists often speak of the visual system (or parts thereof) as having a 
parallel as well as hierarchical structure (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000, 572; 
Gazzaniga et al., 2014, 189–90; Postle 2015, 139–40). I take the term ‘visual system’ 
to refer to all the areas, connections, and structures of the nervous system that 
underpin the processing of visual information. These would certainly include the 
retina, the optic nerve, the visual cortex, and a variety of areas in the parietal and 
temporal lobes. As already mentioned in chapter 2 in the context of explaining the 
phenomenon of blindsight, in humans and other primates the optic nerve leaving 
the eye projects directly into an area of the thalamus known as lateral geniculate 
nucleus (Weiskrantz 1990, 3-6). From there, new fibres originate which terminate 
into an area of the occipital lobe known as primary visual cortex, striate cortex, or 
V1.  
Two main parallel pathways emerge from within the primary visual cortex: 
a dorsal pathway and a ventral pathway. The former, which flows to the parietal 
lobe, is involved in the processing of information for online, real-time action. The 
latter, which flows into the temporal lobe, is involved in the processing of 
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information for perception (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000, 572). (I will come back to 
this distinction in §2.2.1. below). “Within this parallel flow”, neuroscientists 
distinguish a number of functionally (as well as anatomically) individuated areas, 
among which are V2, V3, V3a, V4, V5 (also known as MT), TEO, and TE (Ibid.). 
Along with a number of other areas, the areas just mentioned constitute the so-
called extrastriate cortex. The primary visual cortex plus the extrastriate cortex, 
instead, are typically referred to as the visual cortex simpliciter.   
While the parallel aspect of the visual system has to do, partly, with the 
ventral/dorsal distinction, its hierarchical aspect – which is where our main interest 
lies – has to do mainly with how, starting from the striate cortex, or V1, 
“progressively higher levels of stimulus representation are constructed at 
progressively higher levels of the [visual] system” (Postle 2015, 139). In order to 
make things clearer, the idea that the visual system has a hierarchical structure can 
be analysed as the conjunction of the following two claims: first, the system is 
thought to be organized in a multi-level fashion, one level differing from another 
on the basis of the stimulus features it is tasked with processing. Second, level Ln is 
said to be higher up in the hierarchy than Ln-1 iff, “[elaborating] on the 
representation derived by processing” in Ln-1, Ln is dedicated to the processing of 
more complex stimulus features than the latter (Gazzaniga et al. 2014, 189).  
Neurons in V1 – which is thought to be at the very bottom of the hierarchy 
– for example, are dedicated to the detection of fairly simple visual features: edges 
(Ibid.). Neurons in V2, instead, use the information processed by V1 “to represent 
corners and edge terminations” (Ibid.). And so on, all the way up to the highest 
levels of the hierarchy. As concerns the ventral stream, the highest levels of the 
hierarchy can be found in the temporal lobe. As concerns the dorsal stream, instead, 
the top is harder to accurately identify (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000, 571). 
Relatedly, a second reason why the visual system is also said to be organized in a 
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parallel fashion is that there are multiple parallel connections from one level to the 
next even within the same stream (dorsal or ventral). 
2.1. The Feedforward Sweep 
With the above picture of the organization of the visual system in hand, let us now 
consider what happens upon presentation of a visual scene. By means of multiple 
parallel neural connections “activation [will spread] from low-level to high-level 
areas of the visual cortical hierarchy (Ibid.). This spreading of activation, is typically 
known as the fast feedforward sweep (Ibid.). The feedforward sweep is said to be 
fast because it only takes about 100 msec. for activation to spread from the lowest 
to the highest areas of the hierarchy in the ventral stream, for example (Ibid.). 
Importantly, the earlier the latencies, the larger the number of stimuli that are 
represented at each stage of the sweep (Lamme 2004, 868). At a latency of 40ms, 
for example – which is when activation has spread to the whole of V1 – all the 
stimuli in the visual scene are represented.106 At a latency of about 60-80ms, instead 
– which is when activation has spread to some of the extrastriate areas – a smaller 
number of stimuli is processed in full. In general, however, most stimuli will be 
processed to a good extent even at the highest areas of the hierarchy. Construing, 
as in the previous chapter, neural coalitions as temporary assemblies of neurons 
whose overall activation carries information about/represents a specific 
stimulus/group of stimuli (e.g., Crick and Koch 2003; Cohen and Dennett 2011), we 
may say that, during the feedforward sweep, there is relatively little competition 
among different neural coalitions. 
 Before continuing, let me pause for a moment to point out that although 
the story that I am currently telling is, in part, different from the one I told in §6.3. 
of chapter 4, the two are not to be seen as alternative. In that section, I looked at 
some of the neural events occurring in the “back of the head” following the 
                                                          
106 More precisely, once feedforward activation has spread to the whole of V1, the edges 
of all stimuli are represented. 
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presentation of a visual scene. Given my purposes in that section and chapter more 
generally, however, I mainly focused on distinguishing weak vs strong, and winning 
vs losing, neural coalitions, and on identifying the different relations that, 
according to the Global Workspace Model (GWM), exist between those coalitions 
and global broadcasting. Here my focus is different – I want to understand what 
local recurrent activation is. For this reason, I need to make some fine-grained 
distinctions that were absent in §6.3. But one might still wonder whether those 
distinctions are compatible with what I said in the previous chapter, and GWM 
more generally. The answer is that they are. Indeed, except for Lamme’s take on 
the relationship between local recurrent processing and p-consciousness, which we 
will briefly look at in §2.2.1., the advocates of GWM do explicitly endorse Lamme’s 
characterization of the feedforward sweep, recurrent processing, etc. I will come 
back to this in a couple of pages. 
In going back to the feedforward sweep, there are still a couple of things to 
note about it. First, in spite of being so fast, the sweep is thought to involve quite a 
great deal of processing. It enables, for example, the detection of features such as 
edges, colour, orientation, and motion (Lamme n.d., 5). Second, the sweep is 
thought to be responsible for enabling “reflex-like” behavioural responses, such as 
the “grasping of moving objects” (Lamme et al. 1998, 531). Third, feedforward 
activation is wholly unconscious, in both the phenomenal and access sense (Lamme 
2004, 869). This is inferred from the fact that feedforward activation can also be 
detected in anesthetised animals, and in cases where a stimulus has been made 
invisible by backward masking,107 for example (Lamme 2004, 867–868; Lamme n.d., 
7).  
                                                          
107 Backward masking involves the presentation of a stimulus shortly after the 
presentation another stimulus. In this way, the second stimulus renders the former 
invisible (see, for example, Lamme, 2004, 867). 
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Figure 3. The feedforward sweep in the ventral stream. Upon presentation of a stimulus, 
activation spreads rapidly from the bottom to the top of the visual cortical hierarchy.108  
 
2.2. Recurrent Activation 
If a number of conditions are met – e.g., a stimulus has not been made invisible by 
backward masking or it is not too weak and short-lasting – the fast feedforward 
sweep is followed, at each stage of processing, by recurrent (or re-entrant) 
activation. Better, as Lamme explains, “as soon as the feedforward sweep has 
reached an area [of the visual system hierarchy], recurrent interactions between 
neurons within that area and neurons that have been activated earlier at lower 
levels may start” (2004, 867). Thanks to feedback and feedforward connections, 
information from higher areas of the hierarchy is thus fed back to lower areas, then 
fed forward again to higher areas, and so on (Ibid.).  
A distinction of central importance here is that between two kinds of 
recurrent activation: local and widespread (e.g., Lamme 2004; 2006). Before 
expanding on such a distinction, it will be worth, especially for later purposes, 
clarifying the notion of recurrent activation itself. On the basis of what I have said 
so far, we may characterize recurrent activation as follows: recurrent activation is 
                                                          
108 This illustration is similar to Lamme’s (2009, 556). 
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a kind of neural activation involving bi-directional (feedforward and feedback) 
interactions among neurons from different levels of the visual system hierarchy.  
2.2.1. Local Recurrent Activation 
A few words on local recurrent activation. Local recurrent activation is a kind of 
activation involving feedforward and feedback interactions between neurons in V1 
and neurons in the extrastriate areas of the visual cortex only (Lamme 2004, 867). 
(A terminological note. V1 + the extrastriate areas are typically referred to by the 
name of ‘sensory areas’. In what follows, I will sometimes use that term, too). 
Local recurrent interactions are thought to be responsible for a level of 
perceptual processing that is more advanced than the one occurring during the 
feedforward sweep. As explained, the sweep enables, for example, the detection of 
features such as edges, colour, orientation, and motion. But thanks to local 
recurrent interactions, many of those features start to get bound together, to 
produce a unitary, coherent representation of an object (Lamme 2003, 17; 2004, 
870). More precisely, local recurrent processing is thought to be responsible for the 
generation of what are sometimes known as intermediate level representations 
(Lamme 2003, 17). To put it with Jesse Prinz (2013, 50), an intermediate level 
representation provides “a coherent representation of an object’s boundaries. It 
represents surface textures, separates figure from ground, and [captures] 
information about depth”.  
I mentioned that Lamme, too, thinks that local recurrent activation has 
something to do with p-consciousness. Indeed, according to Lamme, local 
recurrent activation is both necessary and sufficient for (visual) p-consciousness. 
More strongly, in his view, (visual) p-consciousness just is local recurrent 
activation.109 At a more fine-grained level, recurrent activation involving neurons 
in V1 and neurons in one (or more) specific extrastriate area(s) can be equated with 
                                                          
109 I shall say something about Lamme’s argument(s) below.  
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specific kinds of phenomenally conscious visual experiences. Consider the 
experience as of a kind of motion, for example. As already noted in the previous 
chapter, Block (2005, 2007a) cites several studies that seem to suggest that the 
(core) neural basis of the experience as of (a certain kind of) motion is recurrent 
activation from MT to V1, the former being an area in the so-called 
‘temporoparietal-occipital junction’ (Heywood and Kentridge 2009). On Lamme’s 
account, what these studies would probably suggest is that the experience as of (a 
certain kind of) motion just is recurrent activation from MT to V1.  
 
Figure 4. Local recurrent activation in the ventral stream. Once feedforward activation has spread 
from V1 to the whole of V4, for example, bi-directional interactions from V4 to V1 begin.110 
 
Before explaining how local recurrent activation differs from widespread 
recurrent activation, I would like to say something more about the ventral stream. 
As we have seen, Lamme thinks that p-consciousness is identical to local recurrent 
activation. In fact, however, Lamme does not think p-consciousness is identical to 
local recurrent activation tout court, but to local recurrent activation in the ventral 
stream.111 Briefly expanding on the ventral stream will also help the reader 
understand why, as noted on several occasions, the areas of the brain where p-
                                                          
110 This illustration, too, is similar to Lamme’s (2009, 556). 
111 An exception here seems to be recurrent activation involving MT. For this area – 
which, as we have seen, Block (and plausibly also Lamme) think is part of the neural basis 
of the visual experience as of (a certain kind of) motion – is actually located between the 
ventral and the dorsal streams.   
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conscious and/or a-conscious visual perceptual representations are processed are 
sometimes called occipito-temporal areas.  
At the very beginning of §2, I mentioned that two major parallel pathways 
originate from within V1: the ventral and the dorsal streams. The ventral stream 
flows from V1 – which is in the occipital lobe – into the temporal lobe; hence, the 
relevant areas are called occipito-temporal. The dorsal stream, on the other hand, 
flows from V1 into the parietal lobe. Milner and Goodale (e.g., 1995, 2003) have 
argued for a thesis that is now accepted by several researchers in vision science and 
beyond: the ventral stream is involved in processing information “for perception” 
(2003, 45), whereas the dorsal stream is involved in processing information “for 
action” (Ibid., 46). Berit Brogaard (2011) summarizes the distinction nicely. Start 
with the ventral stream. 
Activation in the ventral stream, as Brogaard puts it, “is responsible for 
object recognition and classification” (2011, 452). Information processed by 
activation in the ventral stream can be temporarily stored in different forms of 
memory (e.g., working memory and episodic memory) and used in the planning of 
“offline” action (non-real-time action). Activation in the dorsal stream, on the other 
hand, is involved in the processing of information that “guides programming and 
unfolding of on-the-fly actions needed when delayed action is counterproductive” 
(Ibid.). Examples would be grasping a pen without giving it much thought, catching 
a ball mid-air, or dodging a punch. When movement is delayed, however, “dorsal 
stream representations decay” and action becomes guided by information in the 
ventral stream (Ibid.).  
For many, the moral of the story just outlined is that it is only activation in 
the ventral stream (and hence the occipito-temporal areas) that is involved in the 
processing of information that is relevant to perceptual visual consciousness 
(simpliciter). This claim is endorsed by authors with completely different views 
about consciousness (simpliciter). On the one hand, it is endorsed by those who, 
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like Lamme (and, as we will see in more detail below, Block), think that local 
recurrent activation plays a key role in accounting for p-consciousness. On the 
other hand, it is also endorsed by those who, like the advocates of GWM, identify 
p-consciousness with a-consciousness, and think that there is no consciousness 
(simpliciter) without global broadcasting – and hence without the extension of 
neural activation to more frontal areas.112  
2.2.2. Widespread Recurrent Activation 
Now for widespread recurrent activation. If targeted by attention, some local 
recurrent coalitions in the ventral system – cross-level local coalitions whose 
neurons are engaged in recurrent interactions – grow stronger and spread from the 
sensory areas (V1 + extrastriate areas) to the higher association cortices (parietal, 
prefrontal, and cingulate areas).113 It is precisely when it reaches the interface 
between sensory and higher association areas that recurrent activation is amplified 
(or suppressed) by the intervention of attentional signals (Lamme 2004, 869). 
While selective attention plays little to no role during the feedforward sweep, it 
plays a key role in connection to the extension of recurrent activation to the higher 
association areas. Thus, whereas at a local level, the number of recurrent coalitions 
– and hence of stimuli being represented – is relatively high (2004, 869), that 
number drops dramatically the moment one goes from the sensory areas to the 
higher association cortices.114  
                                                          
112 Relatedly, as one would expect from what I said in the two paragraphs above, it is 
only activation in the ventral stream that can be targeted by attention. Together with the 
fact that, as noted, information processed by the ventral stream can be temporarily stored 
in different forms of memory (e.g., working memory and episodic memory), that should 
make it apparent that it is only information in the ventral stream that can be broadcast in 
the global workspace (Dehaene et al., 1998, 14530; Carruthers 2006, 84).   
113 We already encountered the higher association cortices in earlier chapters. As 
explained, these are thought to be those areas where systems of report, deliberation, and 
so on, are located.  
114 Let me say something about Lamme’s general approach to the study of consciousness 
(tout court), as well as his reasoning for the claim that local recurrent activation is 
necessary and sufficient for p-consciousness. Lamme’s point of departure is the observation 
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According to Lamme, recurrent activation that has spread to more frontal 
areas is (at least part of) the neural underpinning of a-consciousness. At this stage 
of processing, information is thus made available “for conscious access and can be 
reported about” (Ibid.). It is noteworthy that, unlike GWM, Lamme does not 
                                                          
that current scientific research on consciousness almost exclusively relies on gauging the 
presence of the latter from behavioural and introspective data (Lamme 2006, 494). But this 
approach, he claims, is problematic for at least two different reasons. First of all, one has 
to choose what, exactly, would count as evidence for the presence of consciousness. For 
example, does verbal report count as evidence of a subject’s having a conscious experience? 
And what about the pushing of a button? Secondly – and most importantly – by gauging 
the presence of consciousness from behavioural and introspective data, current scientific 
research automatically excludes the possibility of unreportable – or, more generally, 
cognitively inaccessible – consciousness. Is there a viable alternative? Lamme argues for 
“letting arguments from neuroscience override our intuitive and introspective notion of 
consciousness” (2006, 499). On the basis of purely neuroscientific considerations, he then 
proceeds to argue that local recurrent activation is necessary for consciousness. This claim 
is not deeply controversial, as it is also accepted by the major opponents of Lamme’s view: 
the advocates of GWM. What is controversial, instead, is the claim that local recurrent 
activation is also sufficient for consciousness. Lamme has a number of arguments for the 
latter claim. Here I will sketch only one (Lamme 2007). Recall Dehaene et al.’s (2006) 
tripartite classification of processing states: subliminal (I1), preconscious (I2), and conscious 
(I3). Information processed by neural activation at I1 is neither actually nor potentially 
accessible. Information processed by neural activation at I2 is potentially, but not actually 
accessible. Information processed by neural activation at I3 is actually accessible. Lamme 
notes that there is no question as to whether information processed by activation at I1 is 
really unconscious. Everyone agrees that information processed at I1 is information 
processed during the feedforward sweep. And there is also no question as to whether 
information at I3 is really conscious. If subjects report that they are conscious of a stimulus 
x, as is typically required in Dehaene et al.’s experiments, then they are probably really 
conscious of x. What is far from settled, however, is whether information at I2 – which both 
Lamme and Dehaene agree is processed by recurrent activation – is really unconscious, as 
Dehaene et al. contend. According to Lamme, this issue can be addressed by asking 
ourselves “whether I2 is more like I1 (i.e., unconscious) or like I3 (conscious)” (Lamme 2007, 
512). If it turns out that I2 is more like I3, then it is likely that local recurrent activation is 
also sufficient for consciousness – and that, as a consequence, there is a distinction to be 
made between p-consciousness as a kind of consciousness that does not require 
accessibility, and a-consciousness. One strategy that could be adopted to establish whether 
I2 is more like I1, or more like I3 is to asking whether the properties we normally associate 
with conscious perception have already been processed at (I2). Lamme, as well as many 
others (e.g., Prinz 2013; Carruthers 2015a), would agree that they have. Another strategy is 
to ask “what the critical neural differences are between I1, I2, and I3 states” (Ibid.). While 
information at both I2 and I3 is processed by recurrent activation, information at I1 is not. 
Hence, “the critical neural dichotomy [lies] between I1 and I2/I3” (Ibid.). For these reasons, 
Lamme concludes that I2 is not just necessary, but also sufficient for p-consciousness. 
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provide a detailed account of a-consciousness. However, what little he says about 
a-consciousness is entirely compatible with the former. Thus, for example, both 
Lamme and the advocates of GWM agree that, first, local recurrent activation is 
necessary, but not sufficient for a-consciousness, and, second, that attention is 
necessary (and, together with other factors, sufficient) for the spreading of 
activation from the “back” to the “front of the head” (Dehaene et al. 2006; Dehaene 
and Changeux 2011). 
I now close in on Block’s take on the relationship between local recurrent 
activation and (visual) p-consciousness. 
 
Figure 5. Widespread recurrent processing. Recurrent activation has spread beyond the 
extrastriate cortex to more frontal areas.115 
 
2.3. Block on Local Recurrent Activation 
In personal communication (April 21, 2017), Block has suggested that, on his view, 
local recurrent activation in the occipito-temporal areas of the brain (in the ventral 
stream) is sufficient for p-consciousness. This claim needs refining. 
For one thing, as explained, Block leans towards a biological account of p-
consciousness. On such an account, p-consciousness is identical to a brain 
state/property. Accordingly, what Block has to say is that local recurrent activation 
                                                          
115 This illustration is similar to Lamme’s (2004, 497). 
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just is p-consciousness. Mere sufficiency is too weak. For the claim that local 
recurrent activation in the occipito-temporal areas is sufficient for p-consciousness 
is compatible, for example, with the claim that the latter empirically correlates 
with, but is not identical to, the former.116 (A terminological note. From now on, I 
will always speak of local recurrent activation tout court, rather than local recurrent 
activation in the occipito-temporal areas/ventral stream).  
But not only is Block not allowed to say that local recurrent activation is 
sufficient for p-consciousness. He is also not allowed to say that local recurrent 
activation is, all by itself, sufficient for p-consciousness. For as I anticipated in 
chapter 4, Block contends that recurrent activation in the occipito-temporal areas 
of the brain is only the core neural basis of p-consciousness; that is, it is the part of 
the total neural basis that distinguishes states with this phenomenal character from 
states with that phenomenal character (Block 2007a, 482). But what reasons does 
Block provide for the claim that local recurrent activation is only the core neural 
basis of p-consciousness?  
Block does not have a proper argument for this claim. Instead, partly by 
appealing to the reader’s own intuition, and partly by citing Nancy Kanwisher 
(2001), he simply limits himself to note that, for example, “no one would take 
recurrent activation of MT/V5 + V1 all by itself in a bottle as sufficient for 
experience of motion” (2005, 47). Something else must be added to local recurrent 
activation in order to get the total neural basis of p-consciousness. The total minus 
core neural basis of p-consciousness, as we have seen, Block hypothesises is the 
activation of certain connections between the thalamus and the cortex.  
                                                          
116 To a first approximation, we may say that a property A empirically correlates with a 
property B when, and only when, relative to our experience of A and B, any instance of B is 
accompanied by an instance of A. (Correlation may be synchronic or diachronic. In the 
present context, however, it is only the former that seems relevant.) But although empirical 
correlation suggests sufficiency – any instance of B may be said to suffice for any instance 
of A – it says nothing about identity: as far as empirical correlation is concerned, A and B 
may be different properties. 
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In light of the above, a more accurate description of Block’s is that local 
recurrent activation, together with the activation of certain connections between the 
thalamus and the cortex – the total minus core neural basis – is identical to p-
consciousness.117 We are now ready to look at Block’s proposal about the functional 
role of p-consciousness.  
3. Block’s Take on the Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness 
Block has touched on the question of what the functional role of p-consciousness 
is on multiple occasions. In two papers written twenty years apart, for example, he 
claims that p-consciousness “greases the wheels of [a-consciousness]” (1995, 242; 
2015, 157). In his (2009), he notes that “according to the biological account, global 
broadcasting [is] what [p-]consciousness does rather than what consciousness is. 
That is, one function of [p-]consciousness on the biological view is to promote 
global broadcasting” (2009, 1113). More recently, in personal communication (April 
21, 2017), Block suggests that “local recurrent processing is one factor that 
contributes to the triggering [of global broadcasting]”, the other factor being 
attention.  
Block’s position on the functional role of p-consciousness appears to have 
remained consistent over the years, the very last of the abovementioned passages 
providing a seemingly more precise expression of it than the first two.118 That 
                                                          
117 Thus, as anticipated, Block’s view differs from Lamme’s in one main respect. While 
Lamme takes local recurrent activation to be identical to be p-consciousness, Block takes 
it to be identical to p-consciousness’s core neural basis only. 
118 In the context of discussing the difference between GWM (as a theory of both a-
consciousness and a-consciousness) and the biological approach to p-consciousness, Block 
(2001) writes: “[t]he theory that consciousness is ventral stream activation plus, for 
example, neural synchrony, and the theory that consciousness is broadcasting in the global 
neuronal workspace are instances of the two major rival approaches to consciousness in 
the philosophical literature, physicalism and functionalism. The key to the difference is 
that functionalism identifies consciousness with a role, whereas physicalism identifies 
consciousness with a physical or biological property that fills or implements or realizes 
that role in humans” (Ibid., 203). (Note that Block uses the term “functionalism” to refer 
to GWM, and “physicalism” to refer to the biological approach/identity theory). The claim 
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passage is the one that I will focus in what follows. One thing that stands out 
immediately is that, strictly speaking, what Block has in mind is the functional role 
of a proper part of p-consciousness (of its core neural basis) rather than that of p-
consciousness “as a whole”, so to speak (of its total neural basis). For as I noted in 
several places, Block thinks that local recurrent activation is only “the part of the 
total neural basis that distinguishes states with [phenomenal character] C from 
states with other phenomenal characters or phenomenal contents” (2007a, 482). 
With that in mind, Block’s idea is that local recurrent activation figures in the 
causal explanation of global broadcasting. More accurately, local recurrent 
activation, which is part of p-consciousness, contributes to the triggering of global 
broadcasting.  
Alas, as a picture of the functional role of part of p-consciousness this is still 
quite vague. For what does it mean to say that local recurrent activation contributes 
to the triggering of global broadcasting, exactly? As far as my knowledge of Block’s 
work goes, the answer is nowhere to be found. Below, I am thus going to do some 
of the philosophical work for him, and attempt to develop his proposal further. 
Having argued for what I believe is a plausible, more informative way of 
understanding such a proposal, I then also argue that, in effect, Block’s attempt to 
identify the functional role of part of p-consciousness fails.  
                                                          
I wish to draw the reader’s attention here is Block’s claim that, according to the biological 
approach, p-consciousness realizes a-consciousness or, in other words, that a-
consciousness is (part of) the functional role of p-consciousness (call this claim C1). Should 
our discussion of Block’s view on the functional role of p-consciousness take C1 into 
account? I suggest not. For a moment’s reflection reveals that C1 is incompatible with the 
(2007a) claim that the neural basis of a-consciousness is not included in the neural basis 
of p-consciousness (call this claim C2). For if a-consciousness were the functional role of 
p-consciousness – if p-consciousness realized a-consciousness – the neural basis of p-
consciousness and a-consciousness would coincide. Given the plain inconsistency between 
C1 and C2, and given how dear C2 is to Block, I will assume that C1 is the result of some sort 
of confusion on Block’s side and, accordingly, disregard it.  
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3.1. Potential Access Consciousness as the Functional Role of Phenomenal Consciousness  
We can start making some progress by clarifying the relationship that I believe 
Block (e.g., 2007a, 2007b) assumes between local recurrent activation and (visual) 
perceptual mental states. Consider the notion of neural coalition again. As noted 
on several occasions, in the present context, we can think of a neural coalition as a 
temporary assembly of neurons whose overall activation carries information 
about/represents a specific stimulus/group of stimuli. In effect, then, the overall 
activation of a neural assembly is a representation. That is, roughly, it is an item 
that carries information about something. In the present context, it carries 
information about a visual stimulus/group of visual stimuli. 
Let us refer to the overall activation of a neural assembly by the name of 
‘neural activation’. Some neural activations in the occipito-temporal areas of the 
brain are recurrent activations. As I explained towards the end of §2.2., this is to 
say that some neural activations in the occipito-temporal areas involve feedforward 
and feedback interactions among neurons from different levels of the visual cortical 
hierarchy. Qua neural activations in the sense just specified, local recurrent 
activations carry information. The information they carry depends on the recurrent 
interactions that they involve. For example, local recurrent activations involving 
interactions among neurons from V1 to V5 (or MT) can be thought of as carrying 
information about a (kind of) motion. In short, then, local recurrent activations 
can be construed as representations. More strongly, we should be able to construe 
all local recurrent activations as (visual) perceptual mental states. 
I am not quite sure what a thorough argument for the claim that all local 
recurrent activations are perceptual mental states would look like. Nonetheless, I 
think we may be able to at least establish its prima facie plausibility. For notice that 
given Lamme’s and Block’s commitments, local recurrent activations have at least 
some of the features that we would happily attribute to perceptual mental states. 
Here are two examples that come to mind. For one thing, you will recall that local 
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recurrent activation is thought to enable the binding of different features into a 
unitary, coherent representation of an object (Lamme 2004, 870). For another, local 
recurrent activations carry information about the world that is potentially a-
conscious. I will come back to this below, but you will recall from §2.2.2. that local 
recurrent activations can, if targeted by attention, spread to more frontal areas. In 
this sense, they can (potentially) become a-conscious, and hence available for 
deliberation, report, etc.  
Having clarified the relationship that Block thinks there is between local 
recurrent activations and perceptual mental states, we should now consider the 
question of what, exactly, it is that we wish to know by asking what the functional 
role of local recurrent activation is. The reasoning behind this claim goes as follows. 
Block addresses the question of what the functional role of p-consciousness is by 
telling us that local recurrent activation (which, remember, is part of p-
consciousness) contributes to the triggering of global broadcasting. As already 
noted, as an answer to the above question, however, this is quite vague. So, what 
might we do to obtain a more informative answer? One natural suggestion is that 
we formulate a more specific question. As should be apparent, though, such a 
question must be constrained by Block’s commitments. That is, it must be true to 
Block’s own view. 
On the basis of a number of claims that, to my knowledge, are espoused by 
many philosophers – Block included – in chapter 1 I argued that the phrase ‘the 
functional role of p-consciousness’ is to be understood as follows: 
Functional Role of P-Consciousness Relative to a Mental State M: the fund of 
appropriate dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows M with. 
If p-consciousness has a functional role at all, then it endows the perceptual mental 
states (mental states, for short) that have it with a fund of appropriate dispositional 
properties, where a dispositional property counts as appropriate relative to a 
psychological theory (see chapter 1, §3). To ask about the functional role of p-
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consciousness, then, is to ask with which appropriate dispositions p-consciousness 
endows the mental states that have it.  
Against the background of what I have said thus far – and stressing that, on 
Block’s view, local recurrent activation is part of p-consciousness – I believe that 
the question we are looking for might be formulated as follows: which appropriate 
dispositions does the property of being a local recurrent activation endow the (p-
conscious) mental states that have that property with? Or, equally, which 
appropriate dispositions does a (p-conscious) mental state have in virtue of being 
a local recurrent activation? Assuming that we are on the right track, the next major 
task is to address these very questions.119  
At any one time, some mental states are actually a-conscious, others are only 
potentially a-conscious, and still other mental states are neither actually nor 
potentially a-conscious. Let’s focus on the potentially a-conscious ones. What is it 
to say that a mental state is potentially a-conscious? Well, if a mental state is 
actually a-conscious if its content is available to systems of report, deliberation, 
and so on, then a mental state is potentially a-conscious if its content is potentially 
available to the same systems. Consider a visual perceptual experience as of a 
tomato on the counter. That experience is potentially a-conscious if the content 
that there is a tomato on the counter is potentially available to the consuming 
systems. Assuming GWM, we may say that a mental state is potentially a-conscious 
if its content can be broadcast in the workspace. Crucially, like a-consciousness, 
potential a-consciousness is a dispositional property. That is to say that a mental 
state’s being potentially a-consciousness is just a matter of its being poised to 
become a-conscious. 
                                                          
119 It might be objected that the right question to ask is this: which appropriate 
dispositions does a p-conscious mental state have in virtue of having a local recurrent 
activation? Given the relationship between (visual perceptual) mental states and local 
recurrent activation, however, such a question does not really make much sense. 
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Block’s general answer to the general question of what the functional role of 
p-consciousness is, is that local recurrent activation (which is part of p-
consciousness) contributes to the triggering of global broadcasting. Armed with i) 
the more specific question of which dispositional properties p-consciousness 
endows the mental states that have it with, and ii) the considerations offered in the 
paragraph immediately above, a natural suggestion now be the following: on 
Block’s view, a mental state’s property of being a local recurrent activation is the 
categorical basis of its being potentially broadcastable in the workspace – and, thus, 
the categorical basis of the state’s being potentially a-conscious.120 Potential a-
consciousness, in other words, seems a good candidate for being the functional role 
of being a local recurrent activation (and hence of part of p-consciousness). But is 
it, really? Below I argue for a negative answer.  
4. Potential A-Consciousness Is Not the Functional Role of Phenomenal 
Consciousness 
As with any dispositional notion, one can offer what is sometimes called a simple 
conditional analysis of potential a-consciousness (Lewis 1997, 143). By that, I mean 
an analysis along the following lines: “[s]omething x is disposed at time t to give 
response r to stimulus s iff, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give 
response r” (Ibid.).121 Consider, as in chapter 3, the fragility of wine glass. In general, 
to say that wine glass is fragile is to say that it is disposed to break under certain 
circumstances. On the simple conditional analysis of wine glass’s fragility, wine 
glass is disposed to break iff, if it were struck, it would break (Ibid.). Having 
                                                          
120 Here, again, I am making the (unharmful) assumption that the functionality 
condition that I argued for in chapter 3 is satisfied. For if it weren’t, being potentially 
broadcastable would not be sufficient for being potentially a-conscious. 
121 For my purposes, I assume the truth of the simple conditional analysis. Note, 
however, that such an assumption is not uncontroversial. Lewis (1997) himself, for 
example, argues that such an analysis is inadequate.  
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outlined the simple conditional analysis, we can now ask what a simple conditional 
analysis of potential a-consciousness would look like.  
As I have noted on several occasions, global broadcasting is thought to occur 
“when some sort of threshold of neural [activation] is reached” (Carruthers 2015b, 
4). In this context, attention plays a crucial role: it amplifies (some) activations in 
the occipito-temporal areas of the brain until their content becomes globally 
broadcast (e.g., Dehaene and Changeux 2004, 1147; Carruthers 2015b, 4). As with 
the striking of a glass, or the pouring of some salt in a glass of water, the targeting 
of an activation by attention “triggers”, to use Kriegel’s (2015, n/a) terminology, the 
“manifestation” of the disposition. That is, attentional amplification makes it so 
that we go from potential a-consciousness to actual a-consciousness. With that in 
mind, a conditional analysis of potential a-consciousness will plausibly look 
something like the following: to say that an activation/representational mental 
state is potentially a-conscious is to say that the state would become (actually) 
access conscious – or, equally, that its content would be broadcast in the workspace 
– were it targeted by attention.  
According to GWM, when a local activation – an activation that is confined 
to the occipito-temporal areas in the “back of the head” – is weak, the global 
broadcasting of its content cannot occur (such an activation, as we know, Dehaene 
et al. (2006) would call subliminal). When a local activation is sufficiently strong, 
however, it can spread to more frontal areas (such an activation, Dehaene et al. 
(2006) would call preconscious). 122 It is thus because a mental state is a sufficiently 
strong local activation that its content is poised to be broadcast in the workspace. 
The relation between being a sufficiently strong local activation and potential a-
consciousness can be made clearer with the aid of the conditional analysis offered 
in the previous paragraph: it is in virtue of the fact that a mental state is a 
                                                          
122 The notion of sufficiency here is obviously vague. How strong counts as sufficiently 
strong for global broadcasting is an empirical matter. 
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sufficiently strong local activation that, were the state targeted by attention, it 
would become a-conscious – or, equally, that its content would be broadcast in the 
workspace. A mental state’s property of being a sufficiently strong local activation 
is thus the categorical basis of its being potentially a-conscious.  
But if a mental state’s property of being a sufficiently strong local activation 
is the categorical basis of potential a-consciousness, then we can readily construe 
potential a-consciousness as the functional role of being a sufficiently strong local 
activation. That is, we can construe potential a-consciousness as the appropriate 
disposition that a mental state’s property of being a sufficiently strong local 
activation endows the state with. In the present context, an important consequence 
of this is that there seems to be no role left for the property of being a local 
recurrent activation to play vis-à-vis potential a-consciousness. Differently put, it 
seems that what makes a mental state potentially a-conscious is not its being a local 
recurrent activation, but its being a sufficiently strong local activation. From this, 
we may then conclude that potential a-consciousness is not the functional role of 
local recurrent activation (and hence of part of p-consciousness). 
To sum up, I started by speculating that, according to Block, asking what 
the functional role of local recurrent activation is, is to ask how the property of 
being a local recurrent activation disposes a representational mental state. I then 
suggested that Block’s claim that local recurrent activation contributes to the 
triggering of global broadcasting should be understood as the claim that a mental 
state’s being a local recurrent activation is the categorical basis of its being 
potentially a-conscious. The latter claim turned out to be wrong, however. For 
potential a-consciousness is not the functional role of a mental state’s being a local 
recurrent activation, but of its being a sufficiently strong local activation. In the 
next section, I introduce and respond to three objections. 
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4.1. Objections and Replies 
Block might concede that potential a-consciousness is not the functional role of 
being a local recurrent activation. Yet, he might also insist that the latter can still 
be said to play a role vis-à-vis the former. If he is right, he might then still be able 
to salvage the more general claim that local recurrent activation contributes to the 
triggering of global broadcasting. But in what sense could being local recurrent 
activation be said to play a role vis-à-vis potential a-consciousness? By accounting 
for part of the categorical basis of potential a-consciousness. That is, more 
precisely, by accounting for a local activation’s property of being sufficiently strong.  
Before explaining what exactly it is that I have in mind, let me immediately 
note that even if such a response were successful, my argument would be defeated 
only in part. For as I hinted at above, that response is only an attempt at salvaging 
the idea that being a local recurrent activation figures in the causal explanation of 
potential a-consciousness, not that the latter is the functional role of the former. 
That being said, let me develop the response in question. 
Recall the characterization of recurrent activation that I offered in §2.2.: 
recurrent activation – be it local or widespread – is a kind of neural activation 
involving bi-directional (feedforward and feedback) interactions between neurons 
from different levels of the visual system hierarchy. Lamme (2004, 870, 2009, 559) 
as well as Block (2007a, 486) note that, because it involves cross-level feedforward 
and feedback interactions, recurrent activation is typically a strong form of 
activation. Neurons from level Ln of the visual system hierarchy interact with 
neurons of level Ln+1 Ln-1, for example, and, in so doing, they mutually excite each 
other, leading to an overall high level of activation (Lamme 2009, 559). In light of 
the above, Block might plausibly suggest that an activation’s property – be the 
activation local or widespread – of being recurrent (recurrency, for short) accounts 
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for its being strong, and from then proceed to argue that recurrency accounts for a 
local activation’s being sufficiently strong.123  
But I doubt such a move would work. For notice that we are now being told 
that what accounts for a local activation’s property of being sufficiently strong is 
not its being a local recurrent activation, but recurrency. In other words, we are 
being told that the reason why a local activation is sufficiently strong is just that it 
is recurrent. But the objection had it that a local activation’s being sufficiently 
strong was to be explained by its being a local recurrent activation. As a 
consequence, it is unsuccessful. 
The second objection that I would like to consider is that my development 
of Block’s view rests on a fundamental misunderstanding. I have been taking 
Block’s claim that “local recurrent processing is one factor that contributes to the 
triggering [of global broadcasting]” (the other factor being attention) as 
representative of his view. I have also relied on the claim that, on Block’s view on 
p-consciousness, local recurrent activation is part of what p-consciousness is, the 
other part being its total minus core neural basis. But the objection has it that the 
claim that local recurrent activation is part of p-consciousness is mistaken. On a 
correct understanding of Block’s take on p-consciousness, local recurrent 
activations are just states that are made p-conscious by something else. In this 
sense, although local recurrent activation plays a key role in his account of p-
consciousness, it is just wrong to say that it is a part of p-consciousness. 
                                                          
123 I deliberately leave the nature of the relation between recurrency and being 
sufficiently strong vague. The reason is simply that I am not sure what that is. Intuitively, 
being sufficiently strong is an occurrent, rather than dispositional property. As a 
consequence, it seems that the relationship between the properties in question cannot be 
an instance of the categorical basis-disposition relation. That, however, does not rule out 
that one property – recurrency – may be said to ground the other property – sufficient 
strength. Still, I am not certain that the relation between the two may be seen as one of 
grounding. 
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In effect, the view just sketched seems to be the view endorsed by Block in 
a passage of a recent paper (2009, 1112). There, Block suggests that local recurrent 
activations are only potentially p-conscious representations. And to the question of 
what makes those representations p-conscious, he answers by making reference to 
what, as explained, he takes to be the total minus core neural basis of p-
consciousness; i.e., the activation of certain connections between the cortex and 
the thalamus. According to this picture, it thus seems wrong to say that local 
recurrent activation is part of p-consciousness. In fact, local recurrent activations 
are just made p-conscious by the activation of the cortex-thalamus connections.  
In my defence, I think that the passage just mentioned does not accurately 
reflect Block’s take on p-consciousness. This is for three reasons. First, there is 
evidence suggesting that, under general anaesthesia, recurrent activation in 
general is either partly or fully suppressed (Lamme 2004, 868). Now, as I explained 
in the previous chapter, general anaesthetics are thought to work by disabling – 
suppressing the activation of – the very cortex-thalamus connections mentioned in 
the paragraph above. This suggests that there can be no recurrent activation 
without the activation of those connections. The latter claim, in turn, suggests that 
there can be no such things as potentially p-conscious local recurrent activations, 
as Block claims in the passage above.  
But maybe Block is unaware of that.124 Or maybe the claim that there can be 
no such things as potentially p-conscious local recurrent activations is still 
compatible with the claim that the activation of the cortex-thalamus connections 
is what makes local recurrent activations p-conscious. Luckily, as mentioned, there 
are two further points in my support. First of all, if local recurrent activation were 
                                                          
124 Interestingly, if Block is aware that there is evidence suggesting that when the cortex-
thalamus connections are disabled, recurrent activation is suppressed, that might explain 
why he takes the studies reviewed by Alkire and Miller (2005) to show that there can be 
no p-consciousness without the activation of the cortex-thalamus connections (see 
footnote n.93).  
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not part and parcel of p-consciousness, then Block’s claim that p-consciousness 
often has representational content would be unintelligible. In chapter 2, I explained 
that Block thinks that p-consciousness is often like the paint that represents Marat 
in the painting La Mort de Marat. In other words, p-consciousness is often what 
does (at least part of) the representing in a mental state. But the only way I can 
make sense of that claim is if local recurrent activation is part of p-consciousness. 
For unless Block wishes to say that it is the activation of the cortex-thalamus 
connections that do (part of) the representing, then the only candidate left for the 
job is local recurrent activations.  
Secondly, as the reader may have noticed, the claim that local recurrent 
activation is not part of p-consciousness flies right in the face of Block’s claims that 
(i) local recurrent activation is the core neural basis of p-consciousness, and (ii), 
that p-consciousness is identical to its total neural basis (i.e., the core, plus total 
minus core neural basis). The conjunction of (i) and (ii), as noted in several 
occasions, I take to be the core of Block’s take on p-consciousness. But why would 
the claim that local recurrent activation is not part of p-consciousness fly in the 
face of the conjunction of those two claims? For the latter make it apparent that 
local recurrent activation is part and parcel of p-consciousness. Taken together, the 
points that I have just made should suffice to show that, on a correct understanding 
of Block’s account of p-consciousness, local recurrent activation is part of p-
consciousness, the other part being its total minus core neural basis. 
I conclude that my argument is safe, and that potential a-consciousness is 
not the functional role of being a local recurrent activation. 
4.2. Is Block’s Question the Right Question to Begin With? 
If my development of Block’s view on the functional role of p-consciousness is 
correct, I suspect that there may be a further – and maybe even bigger – issue for 
that view. Here is what I have in mind. I have argued that we should understand 
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Block’s proposal as follows: potential a-consciousness is the functional role of a 
perceptual mental state’s being a local recurrent activation. But if this is really how 
Block’s view should be understood, such a view tells us nothing about how a mental 
state’s being p-conscious appropriately disposes the state. What it tells us, instead, 
is how a mental state’s being (part of) p-consciousness disposes the state.  
 Whether this is an issue for Block’s view boils down to what we think an 
account of the functional role of p-consciousness should tell us. Differently put, it 
boils down to how we understand the phrase ‘the functional role of p-
consciousness’. According to the definition that I put forward in chapter 1, here is 
how that phrase is to be understood: 
Functional Role of P-Consciousness Relative to a Mental State M: the fund of 
appropriate dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows M with. 
For the purposes of my development of Block’s proposal, in §3.1., I implicitly 
assumed that the above definition was compatible with construing the functional 
role of p-consciousness as the fund of appropriate dispositional properties that a 
mental state has in virtue of being part of p-consciousness. The reason I did so was 
that I saw no other way of making sense of Block’s proposal. In the specific, I saw 
no way of understanding how Block might attribute a functional role to local 
recurrent activation, other than by suggesting that being a local recurrent activation 
(and, hence, being part of p-consciousness) is that property that endows a (p-
conscious) mental state with certain appropriate dispositions.   
 But the reader may have noticed that construing the functional role of p-
consciousness in this way is, in fact, incompatible with the definition in question. 
For as I explained in chapter 1, to say that the functional role of p-consciousness is 
the fund of appropriate dispositional properties that p-consciousness endows M 
with, is to say that the functional role of p-consciousness is the fund of appropriate 
dispositional properties that M’s being p-conscious endows M with.  
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That definition, as I argued in the same chapter, should capture what most 
philosophers wish to know when they ask about what the functional role of p-
consciousness is. On top of that, it should be in line with what we have in mind 
when we ask about the functional role of some non-mental property in some non-
mental system.  
But if both my definition and my development of Block’s view are correct, 
then it follows that the latter rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
notion of functional role of p-consciousness. In this sense, the question that I have 
attributed to Block – the question of which appropriate dispositions the property 
of being a local recurrent activation endows a mental state with – is not the right 
question to ask if what one is seeking to understand is what the functional role of 
p-consciousness is. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have considered, and assessed, Block’s view on the functional role 
of p-consciousness. As we have seen, although Block has touched on the question 
of what that functional role is on several occasions, he has never provided a detailed 
account. Armed with the notions introduced in chapter 4, along with the notion of 
local recurrent activation introduced in §2, I have thus made an attempt at 
developing Block’s proposal further. First, I have argued that, on Block’s view, the 
question of what part of the functional role of p-consciousness is, boils down to the 
following question: which appropriate dispositions does the property of being a 
local recurrent activation endow the p-conscious mental states that have that 
property with? After that, I have argued that Block’s answer to that question 
involves potential a-consciousness. In the specific, according to Block, the property 
of being a local recurrent activation endows the relevant states with the disposition 
to become a-conscious. That view, however, turns out to be untenable. Why? For 
what disposes a mental state to become a-conscious is not the state’s being a local 
recurrent activation, but its being a sufficiently strong activation. Last, I have 
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argued that there may be an even bigger issue for Block. If my development of his 
view is correct, the issue is that that view rests on a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the notion of functional role of p-consciousness.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
My main aim in this thesis has been to explore what in the introduction I called the 
functional question: assuming that p-consciousness has a functional role at all, 
what is it? Against the background of Block’s distinction between p-consciousness 
and a-consciousness, I have considered two main views: Kriegel’s and Block’s very 
own. Both authors contend that p-consciousness figures, somehow, in the causal 
explanation of a-consciousness. According to Kriegel, a mental state’s being p-
conscious is that property in virtue of which that state is also (actually) a-conscious. 
According to Block, a mental state’s being part of p-consciousness is that property 
in virtue of which that state is potentially a-conscious.  
As I have argued, both accounts are untenable. As concerns Kriegel’s, I have 
made two main points. First, the account is incompatible with GWM (the Global 
Workspace Model). Given that the GWM is a well-established model of a-
consciousness, this gives us reason to reject the account. Second, the account 
entails a view of the relation between a-consciousness and attention that, in light 
of certain empirical discussed in chapter 2, is highly implausible.  
Things are a bit more complicated as concerns Block’s proposal. As we have 
seen, although Block has touched on the functional question on several occasions, 
he has never really offered what one would usually think of as a “proper” account. 
I have thus further refined and developed his view, and I have argued that it should 
be further articulated as the view that being a local recurrent activation is the 
categorical basis of potential a-consciousness. In other words, the idea is that a 
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(visual perceptual) mental state’s being a local recurrent activation is that property 
in virtue of which the state is also potentially a-conscious. Alas, this view, too, has 
turned out to be unsatisfactory. This is for two main reasons. First, the categorical 
basis of potential a-consciousness is not a state’s property of being a local recurrent 
activation, but a state’s property of being a sufficiently strong local activation. 
Second, given the definition of the notion of functional role of p-consciousness that 
I provided in chapter 1, the claim that potential a-consciousness is the functional 
role of being a local recurrent activation is not an answer to the functional question 
at all.  
Where does that leave us? Well, although Kriegel’s and Block’s accounts 
may not be the accounts to look at for a promising answer to the functional 
question, future exploration might profit greatly by continuing to look for the 
functional role of p-consciousness at the interface between the latter and a-
conciousness. This is for two reasons. First, the noted continuity between Kriegel’s 
and Block’s accounts seems to be more than just an accident. That is, the fact that 
both accounts take (or claim to take) p-consciousness to figure, somehow, in the 
causal explanation of a-consciousness seems to reveal an underlying, shared 
intuition. The intuition is that what p-consciousness contributes to the functioning 
of the mind, it must contribute vis-à-vis our capacity to access our mental states, 
and use their content in reasoning, deliberation, etc. Of course, intuitions are just 
that: intuitions. But it would be silly to abandon them at the current stage of 
research – which, as far as the functional role of p-consciousness is concerned, is 
still a very early stage.  
 Second, to look for the functional role of p-consciousness at the interface 
between the latter and a-consciousness is, ideally, to look for that functional role 
at the interface between p-consciousness and a-consciousness as accounted for by 
GWM. For if there is one positive thing that this thesis has hopefully been able to 
show is that although we still know very little about p-consciousness, we do know 
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a great deal about a-consciousness. In this sense, GWM provides us with a 
theoretically and empirically solid background against which we may keep testing 
our hypotheses about the functional role of p-consciousness. What I mean can be 
easily understood from my treatment of Kriegel’s account: if our hypotheses about 
the functional role of p-consciousness turn out to be incompatible with GWM, that 
should probably sound a note of warning.
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